By Eddie Benes, Joseph Clark, Tessa Hager, Marguerite Nairac, Dr. Naila Al Sowayel and Dr. William Lawrence
Since its 1945 inception, the modern global order has been instrumental in global security and cooperation while facing many obstacles and much criticism. The pillars of international law—institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and others—have kept the peace and increased prosperity most of the time in most parts of the world. More often than not, they have promoted human development and raised living standards. These institutions have accomplished much while facing ongoing challenges related to governance structures, unequal decision-making power, and the need to balance infrastructure investment with the economic and security needs of conflict-affected regions.
Nevertheless, international organizations have been under constant scrutiny and contestation. Other conduits of multilateral cooperation, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), have faced similar scrutiny and challenges, including limits on the extent of their influence on international diplomacy. Today, critics of multilateralism and the international order have never been louder. However, despite the many shortcomings of the organizations that define modern diplomacy, they remain vital to the advancement of international law, the legitimization of human rights, and the enhancement of global cooperation. Nations across the globe must endeavor to expand the mandates of these institutions, rather than reduce them, in order to achieve collectively a more peaceful, prosperous world.
Challenges
The efficacy of international organizations (IOs) is fundamentally constrained by structural and institutional limitations. Among these is a profound lack of enforcement mechanisms. Because IOs possess neither independent military power nor substantial autonomous enforcement resources, they rely almost entirely on voluntary compliance rooted in perceived legitimacy and utility. The 2026 Iran War exposes this systemic vulnerability. This is in part because the U.S., Israel, and Iran are not parties to the Rome Statute, an agreement that places a nation under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for all crimes within the court’s scope (Human Rights Watch, 1998), In addition, the International Criminal Court lacks the direct jurisdiction required to prosecute individuals for the initiation of war (Al Jazeera, 2026). Consequently, rhetorical appeals to international law by the UN Secretariat or regional bodies are continually blunted by the absence of an independent authority capable of enforcing compliance.
In an emergency session, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated, “I condemn today’s military escalation in the Middle East. The use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the subsequent retaliation by Iran across the region, undermine international peace and security” (UN Press Release, 2026). Yet such appeals had limited impact amid United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Permanent Member (P5) veto dynamics.
This enforcement crisis is compounded by fragmented regional alliances and a growing crisis of institutional legitimacy. Middle powers increasingly pursue strategic autonomy, as nations such as Brazil, Türkiye, Indonesia, the Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are hedging between traditional international alliances and often forming their own ad hoc coalitions to advance specific interests (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025) as well as engaging with Western coalitions to maximize their economic and resource security (Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2025). U.S. withdrawals from the World Health Organization and UNESCO, alongside persistent funding cuts, have severely diminished the global authority and operational reach of international organizations, rendering the modern multilateral system increasingly fractured.
Within the UNSC, the absolute veto power of the P5 (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China) and their resulting lopsided influence further paralyze action. The P5 hold disproportionate control over global peace and security (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). The Security Council is structurally incapable of imposing sanctions on its own permanent members or their key strategic allies. This stands in sharp contrast with the systemic disempowerment and exclusion of the Global South. UN Resolution 2817 exemplifies this. The main resolution passed in response to the 2026 Iran war does not mention the U.S. or Israel but condemns Iran for breaking international law, attacking Arab states, using proxies, and closing the Strait of Hormuz (UN Security Council, 2026). Middle Eastern actors have pointed to the UN’s selective enforcement of international law, such as the stagnation of UNSCR 2334 on the future of Palestine, which underscores a Western-centric power dynamic. In response, most nations of the world have long advocated for reforms, including expanding the number of rotating seats and rendering decision-making more equitable.
Beyond the UN, there is conflict between supranational mandates and national priorities. Efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to build a centralized collective defense architecture have been continually hampered by a sovereignty paradox. Member states fiercely guard their national autonomy and remain unwilling to cede decision-making authority to a supranational security body. This has driven Gulf nations towards strategic autonomy and bilateral partnerships. This fixation on sovereignty is complicated by friction between UN mandates and local state objectives. Operations by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon have raised concerns that international security zones undermine a host state’s authority over its territory and borders. The challenge is exacerbated by non-state actors that are deeply intertwined with national, political, and financial institutions (UN Security Council Briefing, 2026). International organizations attempting to mediate in these contexts often clash with both state and non-state actors resistant to external oversight.
This regional push for absolute control also extends into digital terrain. The rapid emergence of localized sovereign cloud infrastructures, designed to reduce reliance on foreign public cloud providers, reflects a regional campaign for data sovereignty (World Economic Forum, 2026). From UNSC veto deadlocks to fractured regional defense cooperation and digital borders, the international community’s ability to mediate conflicts like the Iran war remains constrained by assertions of regional and national autonomy.
Successes
Despite the many shortcomings of global and multilateral institutions, these organizations remain crucial in legitimizing the rules-based order, codifying human rights, promoting economic cooperation, and resolving conflicts through diplomacy. Multilateral organizations play an important role in maintaining the consistency of member nations’ political positions on the war. While individual governments may be prone to inconsistent messaging, international organizations provide a space for member states to pool their thoughts on a conflict to produce a unified, comprehensive message. This message can be much more impactful than one issued by a single government, as it showcases unity and amplifies the voices of states that would otherwise be less consequential.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprises ten member states, each with a separate and nuanced view of the conflict between Iran—a member of the SCO—and the U.S. and Israel, which are not members. Together, the member nations have used the SCO to express a degree of solidarity with Iran against the U.S. and Israel by releasing a combined statement (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2025). This diplomatic support lends Iran credibility to its claim that a significant number of governments across the world see the U.S. and Israel as being in the wrong. Uzbekistan, for example, rather than being just a Central Asian state with relatively little influence on global opinion, is one of ten nations conveying solidarity with Iran on this issue. This solidarity, or at least sympathy, may contribute to reducing support for the war among Americans and Europeans, to increasing support for the Iranian government among its own citizens, and to improving relations between Iran and many of the nations which have aligned themselves against the U.S. Better relations between these nations are crucial for Iran, a nation whose reputation as a pariah state led to the broad sanctions which have crippled its economy. The effects of the SCO’s support for Iran illustrate the role that multilateral organizations can play in shaping global public opinion.
The UN plays a significant role in defining and advancing international law and human rights. The UN Charter outlines the shared goals of the signing nations. Collectively, every nation of the world, at the time of its signing, agreed that wars of conquest are morally wrong, a principle embodied in the UN Charter (United Nations Charter 1). The UN itself emerged from the devastation caused by the Axis powers’ wars of conquest during World War II, reflecting a consensus that diplomacy should serve as the primary means of resolving international disputes. The UN plays a role in identifying nations that violate their promise to protect their citizens’ human rights and wage war for unjust purposes, relying primarily on the collective influence of its member states to encourage compliance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. This pressure can be exerted through diplomatic means via the General Assembly or, more rarely, through coercive measures passed by the Security Council. By establishing a forum through which states collectively condemn violations of international law and call for accountability, the UN has created a model for multilateral responses to international crises. This framework is reflected in the League of Arab States’ response to the Iran War, where the regional organization echoed the call to comply with the UNSC resolution and called for those responsible to assume full responsibility for the resulting damage and losses, including the obligation to provide compensation and reparation (Arab League News of the Secretary General, 2026).
Despite much criticism, the UN has shown some successes in proactive conflict prevention, one of its primary mandates. While enforcing resolutions has clear limits during active warfare, the UN has effectively channeled strength through its unparalleled convening power. During the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, the UNSC served as the essential anchor that unified an incredibly fractured global coalition under a single mandate of international law (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). In the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute, the UN’s swift mobilization of regional mediation frameworks, working with the African Union and the League of Arab States, averted a wider war, replacing military skirmishes with a monitored diplomatic channel (UN Security Council, 2008).
Ultimately, the necessity of this multilateral architecture is demonstrated by the current crisis. Clause 14 of the United States–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (Islamabad Memorandum, 2026) explicitly envisions a binding UNSC resolution to endorse and formalize a final peace deal (Arab Center DC, 2026). By embedding bilateral diplomacy within permanent international institutions, temporary truces become more durable, legally fortified structures, as seen in the 2015 JCPOA framework, which required Iran to limit uranium enrichment and accept international oversight in exchange for sanctions relief, thereby stabilizing the broader Middle East (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).
How International Organizations Can Regain Their Significance
To stay ahead amid new geopolitical realities, the overwhelming role of social media, the rise of powerful non-state actors, shifting tensions among major powers, and proliferating hot spots, international organizations must innovate through institutional reform, multi-sectoral partnerships, and digital diplomacy to improve their effectiveness and their reputations.
The United Nations will need to reform to reassure middle powers, including the Gulf states and Iran that it is a truly global forum with a goal of peace and conflict mediation, rather than an extension of the agendas of the five permanent UNSC members. One of the better of the proposed solutions was offered by Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India in 2005 to add “six new permanent members to the Security Council” (two seats each for Asia and Africa, one seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one seat for the Western European and Others Group) as well as “four non‑permanent members to the Security Council” (one seat each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, German Federal Foreign Office, 2005).
The UN must also modernize its operational architecture through multi-sectoral partnerships. By operationalizing economic diplomacy through the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN can tie the World Bank and the IMF’s post-conflict reconstruction and financial assistance to diplomatic compliance, similar to when the IMF, International Energy Agency (IEA), and World Bank coordinated their response to the Iran War in terms of policy advice, mobilizing aid, and assessing areas of need (Reuters, 2026). Formal alliances with non-governmental organizations, humanitarian bodies, and private technology companies will sustain international law on the ground, even when state bureaucracies are noncompliant.
IOs should also institutionalize advanced data analytics and early warning systems by synthesizing IMF and World Bank macroeconomic indicators with real-time digital monitoring. This would enable the UN to shift from a reactive arbiter to an active agent of conflict prevention. Comprehensive training for diplomats to counter disinformation, paired with nonproliferation of cyberwarfare, would ensure that the core principles of international law are upheld. By engaging civil society alongside tech architects in digital modernization, the UN can bridge the enforcement gap without weakening state sovereignty. This approach reinforces traditional multilateralism and underscores why bilateral agreements such as Clause 14 of the U.S.-Iran (Islamabad) Memorandum of Understanding must ultimately revert to UNSC oversight.
In sum, we will hopefully never have to write the obituary for international organizations and the post-World War II international order. While those institutions have been somewhat diminished by recent events and several are in dire need of reform, they remain an important tool for resolving conflicts such as the Iran War. The United Nations has negotiated and implemented over 170 peace settlements since 1945, but its failures are better known and amplified. There is still much to reform and improve. Increasingly, middle powers in a changing international system will be looking to these institutions to help them achieve their goals and to amplify their influence. It has yet to be revealed whether international organizations will help end the Iran War, but it would be foolish to count them out.
This project was conceived of and led by Dr. Naila Al-Sowayel, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations GCC Area Studies Program Director. National Council Senior Fellow Dr. William Lawrence assisted in later stages to the writing and editing of the article.
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