On October 18, 2013, Saudi Arabia turned down a hard-won invitation to join the United Nations Security Council. Riyadh’s rejection of the much-coveted seat on the world’s highest deliberative body was described by many Americans in highly unflattering terms.
The decision comes in the wake of Saudi Arabia’s long-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs, HRH Prince Saud Al Faisal, opting to forgo deliverance of what for decades had been his annual address to the United Nations General Assembly.
Following the announcement, the Kingdom’s Chief of General Intelligence and Secretary-General of the National Security Council, HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan, expressed his heightened concern about the state of the Saudi Arabian-U.S. relationship.
At the 2013 Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference days after the kingdom declined membership on the Security Council, HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal, a prominent member of the kingdom’s monarchy, quoted numerous derogatory comments that U.S. opinion writers have used to describe the country’s actions and the reasons given for its decisions in this regard.
Some Perspectives
More seasoned commentators provided background and context for what occurred.
Some cited the kingdom’s profound disappointment at the Council’s recent inability, lain at the veto-wielding feet of mainly China and Russia, to bring an end to the continuing bloodshed in Syria.
Others agreed but added Saudi Arabia’s astonishment and anger at the way the Obama administration was so quick to turn its back on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Additional commentators noted the country’s long-held concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including both Iran’s developing nuclear program and Israel’s stockpile of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
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HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s Chief of General Intelligence and Secretary-General of the National Security Council, with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Photo: Russian Federation.
Further commentators remarked on Saudi Arabia’s frustration over the perceived naiveté of the United States in moving to open a dialogue with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani despite Iranian meddling in the affairs of GCC countries, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen – this, after the gift of Iraq to Iran as a direct result of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq against the advice of Riyadh and the capitals of most of the other GCC states, plus the envisioned possibility that the United States might somehow eventually reach one or more agreements with Tehran at the kingdom’s and its fellow GCC members’ expense.
Still others cited Riyadh’s ongoing deep disenchantment with the continuing tragic consequences of the Security Council’s larger, more pervasive, and continuing failure, lain primarily at the veto-wielding feet of the United States, to settle the much older conflict between Arabs and Israelis.
Given the number, nature, and magnitude of the Security Council’s noted failures and shortcomings, what Riyadh did — the negative comments of critics notwithstanding — was hardly petulant.
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