By Dr. William Lawrence and Ms. Nicole Beres
“Most of us educated women have illiterate mothers. The conservative wave against women in the Muslim world is a defense mechanism against profound changes in . . . sex roles.”
— Fatema Mernissi, Beyond the Veil (1975)
Fatema Mernissi, the Moroccan sociologist and world-renowned pioneer of Islamic feminism, penned these words as Morocco was experiencing profound changes regarding gender. As a result of these changes, literacy among adult women climbed from approximately 38% in 2003 to 65% today. Women now make up over half of university students and now occupy a quarter of the seats in the parliament—a percentage only slightly under the female representation in the US Congress.[i]
At this pivotal moment of social change, traditional expectations and interpretations of acceptable roles for men and women are no longer compatible with nor reflected in reality. For nearly seventy years since Morocco’s independence in 1956, activists and reformists have been calling for governmental action to address the country’s laws to better suit its needs. Reforms related to the status of women began to accelerate in the 1990s and culminated in a new Family Code in 2004. The need for even greater harmony between the law and society was the guiding principle invoked by King Mohammed VI when he announced last December the first updates to the Family Code in two decades.[ii]
Known as the Moudawana—the Arabic word for “code”—the Family Code or Personal Status Code is the law that governs all issues related to the family. Like most countries, the family in Morocco is considered the most basic and fundamental unit of society. Issues relating to the family reverberate throughout society at large.[iii] Moreover, the Moudawana is essentially the vehicle which determines the rights of men and women in the private sphere and, by extension, the degree of gender equality. As a result, the Moudawana has significant implications not just for women but for everyone, as illustrated by decades of occasionally heated debates around reforms.
The proposed amendments to the Moudawana aim to address persistent gender disparities, clarify legal ambiguities, expand women’s rights in custody and divorce, and improve protections for children. However, these changes have proven controversial, as they reveal the delicate balance between the country’s commitment to its conservative values and traditional Islamic heritage and the push for progressive change and development.
History of the Moudawana and the Status of Women
The Moudawana is a set of laws that deal with marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, and guardianship, as well as general protections for women and children. Its principles are based on the Maliki school of Sunni Islam, founded in the 8th century by Malik ibn Anas. Malik’s collection of hadiths—the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad—became the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence in Morocco in the 10th century.[iv] France and Spain took control of Morocco in 1912, imposing their own colonial jurisprudence for forty-four years which is still the basis of most of Morocco’s legal system. After Morocco gained independence, King Mohammad V—the current King’s grandfather—directed and supervised ten high-ranking religious scholars, or “ulema,” in writing the first Moudawana.[v] The Moudawana is the only part of Morocco’s law and constitution that is not based on secular French colonial civil codes. It is based in Islamic law, known in Arabic as sharia. Codified in 1958 just two years after the French and Spanish protectorates departed, the Moudawana served as a significant symbol of independence and legitimization of the Moroccan and Islamic identity separate from the French and Spanish imperial systems.
The Moroccan woman’s movement began to gain steam in the 1980s, exemplified by the first woman’s magazine Kalima, which means “word,” or the “act of speaking (out).” The magazine argued that “gender roles, sexuality, and even division of labor were neither divinely prescribed nor ordained by nature but had a historical origin.”[vi] It was the first Moroccan magazine to deal with taboo subjects like single mothers, abortion, prostitution, drugs, and sexuality. One of the most famous articles in Kalima, was an analysis showing that over 90% of the Moroccan laws that the author considered sexist were based in the French Napoleonic Code, not in Islamic law. Kalima’s Editor-in-Chief Hind Taarji was one of the finest journalists of her generation, and Fatema Mernissi was a regular contributor. The magazine was closed down in 1989 over an article on male prostitution. But journalists across the sector began to write more and more on these subjects in other publications, first indirectly, then more directly by the end of the 1990s.
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, social pressure continued to grow to reform the Moudawana, culminating in the first round of changes of the 1990s, followed by creation of an entirely new code in 2004. One of the world’s leading and best-known scholars of North African women, Dr. Mounira Charrad, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, describes these reforms to the National Council as the “result of a social problem combined with international pressure combined with feminist demands.”
Part of the motivation to amend the Moudawana, Dr. Charrad explains, was addressing “the social problems that result from unequal divorce. Women were abandoned with their children and with no resources. That created social problems for the government to take care of women and children.” These issues forged an internal desire to amend the Moudawana within the government and political system. According to Dr. Charrad, “when social problems become big enough that they create a danger or a highly challenging situation for authorities, then the power structure has to pay attention. That’s one way societies change.”
The formation of civil society organizations and increasing international pressure also contributed to paving the way for reform. This escalated in the 1990s, when domestic women’s groups and global organizations pushed King Hassan II to enact the first changes to the Moudawana. Though largely nominal, these changes were significant as they indicated that the Moudawana was amenable to updates and not an untouchable piece of religious jurisprudence.[vii] Towards the end of the century, opposition political parties in partnership with several women’s groups such as the Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes—the Moroccan Women’s Rights Association—joined together with funding from the World Bank to produce the Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development (PAIWD). PAIWD drew sharp criticism from many parts of society for its basis in a secular, rights-based approach and its focus on development without mentioning Islamic values. In March 2000, protesters gathered in Casablanca and Rabat both in support of and opposition to the PAIWD.[viii] These protests were among the largest ever seen in Morocco, mobilizing roughly half a million protesters in Rabat favor and as many as a million in Casablanca against.
King Mohamed VI came to power in 1999 and implemented a wide array of reforms, most notably the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), a truth and reconciliation commission which addressed human rights claims during the Years of Lead under the King’s father. It awarded compensation to over 22,000 families. Before his death in 1999, King Hassan II had already instituted a number of reforms opening up the political system, allowing more political parties and politicians to participate, releasing political prisoners, closing the notorious Tazmamart Detention Center, signing human rights conventions, and implementing significant human rights reforms.
As a result of increasing women’s protests after his assuming the throne, the King proposed another set of reforms in 2001 like those in the 1990s. But the protests continued in 2002 and 2003. In an interview with one of the authors of this article, the Moroccan minister who first pitched the idea of a more substantial reform to King Mohamed VI, explained that he presented the idea to overhaul the code to the King and his advisors as a potential political win for the young sovereign.[ix] It would endear him to progressive forces in the country and to young people. A major aspect of his proposal was that parliament and the people would play a larger role in these reforms. At the urging of this Minister and others, in 2003 the King announced that instead of piecemeal reforms the code would instead be replaced by an entirely new version.
The 2004 Moudawana
The 2004 Moudawana was revolutionary in Morocco and perceived as such across the Arab and Muslim worlds and beyond both in its content and in the process of its creation. Rather than codified simply by royal decree, the law was deliberated on and ratified by the Moroccan Parliament.[x] The code forbade forced marriage, increased women’s rights to refuse their husband taking a second wife and placed divorce proceedings in a secular court rather than a religious one. The new law also protected women from abandonment and violence and children in custody from unsuitable accommodations. It granted inheritance to a man’s daughter’s children as well as his son’s children, allowed children born out of wedlock to acknowledge paternity, and set the legal marriage age at 18 years for both boys and girls unless a judge allows otherwise.
The 2004 Moudawana was applauded by the international community and human rights groups for granting significant rights to women and for being amongst the most modern family codes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It was largely inspired by Islamic Feminism, a movement spearheaded by Mernissi and other scholars that used the Qur’an as a framework for social justice rather than a “rigorously secular and universalist” human rights approach, such as that preferred by Tunisian feminists.[xi] Despite this, the Moudawana’s critics still accused it of stemming from elitist activism and Western ideals and for violating Islamic principles.
Current Moudawana Reforms
Currently, the Moudawana is in the process of being updated and the process of deliberation and approval is even more inclusive than before. The amendments were drafted by a committee of experts from all aspects of society, including educators, sociologists, legal experts, parents, scientists, and others, as described by Professor Bouthaina el-Ghalbazouri, a specialist on family issues and Islam at Mohammed V University of Rabat.[xii] The High Council of the Ulema delivered their verdict of the proposed amendments, approving the majority of them.
Professor Ilyass Bouzghaia, a specialist in women’s rights issues at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, explained that the “democratic and credible course” of the reform process is continuing now, especially after the ulema have examined the code, as “diverse actors from different social, religious and ideological sensitivities” consider the council’s modifications. Next, the Moroccan Parliament must ratify the code into law.
According to Professor el-Ghalbazouri, the process of reforming the Moudawana was guided by the principle of improving the function of society by improving the function of the family—the base of the society. While there is a great deal of consensus around many of the reforms related to the rights of women and children, covered below, the proposed reforms have also ignited controversy around two issues in particular, divorce and inheritance.
Divorce: Custody, Guardianship, and Alimony
The 2004 Moudawana granted women the right to petition for divorce and outlined the typical line of child custody, going first to the mother, then to the father, then to the maternal grandmother or most qualified relative. Whichever party gains custody of the children also keeps the marital house. But the law stipulates that women lose custody of their children if they choose to remarry. Also, while women typically receive custody of their children, men receive legal guardianship, meaning that a woman who has custody of her children still needs her ex-husband’s signature for matters as simple as enrolling the children in school.
The proposed Moudawana amendments aim to make both custody and guardianship a shared responsibility between the mother and father during and after their marriage. This will allow divorced women to remarry while maintaining custody and make decisions for their children without their former husbands’ permission.
This is significant—and controversial—because of the economic implications that come from changing women’s financial dependence on men. As only about a quarter of Moroccan women work outside of the household in the formal economy, many either cannot afford to divorce, leaving some stuck in situations of domestic abuse and mistreatment, or depend on alimony, the marital house, or familial assistance after a divorce. Therefore, women have to choose between either keeping custody of their children or remarrying and gaining financial stability from a new husband. If the proposed Moudawana reforms are passed, women will no longer have to face this dilemma.
The critics of the amendments accuse them of economically disincentivizing marriage for men. These critics, including many men, envision a scenario in which a woman divorces her husband, keeps the children and the house, and remarries, all while the first husband continues to pay alimony. Men are not the only ones who oppose the proposed law—even some women express concern that men will no longer seek marriage and worry about how this amendment could affect their sons.
Furthermore, critics also worry that by simplifying and increasing access to divorce, the new Moudawana will cause divorce rates to skyrocket. Dr. Bouzghaia notes that this criticism also arose around the 2004 Moudawana, and statistically, divorce rates did rise. However, Dr. Bouzghaia says “objectively speaking, we can guess that many women were suffering, and it was like a gate that finally opened, and many women were liberated.” Dr. Bouzghaia further states that divorce rates can be countered by “preparing and educating people before marriage” and “holding conciliation sessions with non-governmental help, which is one of the proposals that needs effective implementation” while also providing “economic incentives for married people.”
In other amendments regarding divorce, the government seeks to reduce the burden that divorce cases have placed on the court system by creating a non-judicial body to mediate disputes and encourage reconciliation and by allowing for mutual divorce to be agreed upon without court intervention and solved within a maximum of six months. The proposed reforms also include new guidelines for calculating and enforcing alimony, which some Moroccan women say is poorly enforced. According to Dr. Charrad, “a lot of alimony goes unpaid throughout the world, unfortunately. That’s why women need their own economic independence, rather than dependency on the husband.”
Inheritance
Perhaps even more contentious than divorce is the issue of inheritance. In Morocco, inheritance law known as “Irth” is governed by Islamic sharia and is “the most detailed legal injunction offered in the Qur’an” as stated by Dr. Charrad. Irth typically bestows male heirs with twice as much wealth as female heirs. Another piece of Islamic jurisprudence, “ta’asib,” prioritizes male extended family members over daughters in cases where the deceased has no sons. This rule is applied in most countries following sharia, but not all. For example, Tunisia does not use ta’asib, and if the deceased has no sons, daughters can inherit the whole estate.
Morocco’s religious authority, the High Council of the ulema, rejected a proposal to abolish ta’asib but instead approved “hiba,” the ability for men to transfer property and assets to their daughter during their lifetime. Hiba is entirely optional, and women will only benefit from it if their fathers choose to utilize it, leading to the criticism that hiba isn’t enough to create equality in inheritance law. Furthermore, the ulema approved the exclusion of the marital home from irth to prevent women and daughters from being turned out of the house when the father dies and a male relative inherits the estate.
“There are reasons why inheritance has remained the most difficult part of family law to change. You have to think of it both sociologically and culturally,” says Dr. Charrad. Culturally, Dr. Charrad explains how inheritance is rooted in the Qur’an. “The details are very, very precise about who should inherit what. If you reject injunctions given with extreme clarity and precision in the very text of the Qur’an, you are turning to becoming secular. You are rejecting the religious injunction.”
“Sociologically,” Dr. Charrad elaborates, “inheritance has to do with the distribution of resources in the social system.” According to Dr. Bouzghaia, the division of wealth in inheritance law is structured to match the “ideal social system in Islam, which ordains that the male members should take care of the female members in the family after the death of the father, and this is what entitles them two shares or ta’asib right.” However, Dr. Bouzghaia observes that this system “is not usually applied” in Morocco today, necessitating a father to bestow hiba and wills to his daughters “in case he fears they won’t live an appropriate life after his death.” Dr. Bouzghaia adds that “daughters can also resort to the court if they see injustice applied in the distribution of inheritance.”
Dr. Charrad characterizes the proposed 2025 changes to the Moudawana as “little changes at the margins, in relation to inheritance, but not really the core of it.” These changes “can create different conditions that are in favor of women, but it’s very different from saying ‘We’re going to change it. Men and women are going to have equal inheritance.’ That would create a different psychological situation, a different cultural situation, and a different conception of gender equality.”
Moroccan civil society groups are split on the issue of inheritance. For example, Forum Azzahrae for Moroccan Women, which has ties to the Islamic Party for Justice and Development and seeks to improve the rights and status of women within a religious framework, sees hiba and the exclusion of the home from inheritance as effective solutions to inheritance inequality. This group advocates for compromises of the like which can improve women’s situations while preserving Islamic heritage and values. Other organizations, such as Jossour Forum for Moroccan Women, are hopeful for the removal of ta’asib and creation of a more egalitarian inheritance law. This optimism is seldom shared by experts who expect inheritance laws to remain relatively untouched. Even Tunisia, which is considered the most progressive MENA country on women’s issues, has not instituted equal inheritance after years of contentious debate on the issue.
Protection and Rights for Women and Children
Beyond the contentious subjects of divorce and inheritance, the proposed Moudawana strives towards a wide array of reforms to advance the rights and protection of women and children. The new Moudawana will close the loopholes in the current law on child marriage. Although the 2004 Moudawana set the legal marriage age to eighteen years for both boys and girls, the rate of child marriage has actually risen in the past two decades, doubling from seven percent to fourteen percent.[xiii] This is because the law allows the marriage of underaged girls with a judge’s permission—which they give in the majority of cases, approving over 20,000 child marriages a year.[xiv] Child marriage occurs mainly in impoverished rural areas where girls lack educational and vocational opportunities. It is estimated that between 61 and 74 percent of girls in rural Morocco aren’t in school, due to both lack of access and social stigmas.[xv] This economic incentive combined with a cultural emphasis on female virginity encourages families to marry off their daughters as young as possible. Both opponents and proponents of closing the loophole agree that the law likely won’t be enough to reduce child marriage as long as girls in rural Morocco continue to face barriers to education and financial self-sustainability.
Another amendment requires all wives to be asked during the documentation of the marriage contract whether or not they refuse polygamy. If a wife objects, polygamy will be prohibited in that marriage. In the case of no objection, a man cannot take additional wives unless the court decides that polygamy is justified, for possible reasons such as infertility, serious illness, and other exceptional situations. While polygamy is permissible in Islam, it is uncommon in Morocco for both social and economic reasons; most men can’t afford to provide for multiple wives. According to statistics provided by Forum Azzahrae, about 3,000 to 4,000 applications for polygamy are submitted to judges each year, and only about 0.66% of them are approved, less than 1%. Only three in 1000 marriages are polygamous. The proposed amendment seeks to further decrease this trend.
Furthermore, the amendments include court supervision over the assets of children with divorced parents, as well as new rules protecting housing and regulating visitation. There is also a proposal to establish a legal framework for recognizing women’s domestic housework contributions to the wealth and property accumulated during the marriage, although it is still unclear how the Moroccan government plans to implement this.
What the ulema rejected
In addition to the proposal to abolish ta’asib, the ulema rejected the passing of inheritance between Muslims and non-Muslims but only approved the transfer of property between spouses of different religions. (In traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim men are allowed marry non-Muslim women, who can maintain their faith, whereas Muslim women must marry Muslim men, including converts.) The ulema also denied an amendment that would allow the use of DNA testing to determine paternity. Parts of civil society are urging for the ulema to change their verdict on this in the future—even the religiously conservative Forum Azzahrae supports DNA testing to determine paternity on the condition that it is administered through a governmental body to ensure legitimacy and accuracy.
The Impact of the Reforms
The proposed Moudawana has the capacity to drastically expand women’s rights, but this hinges not just on the content of the law but its implementation—and, a true impact can only be achieved through simultaneous developments in other areas of law, in the economy, and in social change.
According to Dr. Rita Stephan, a well-known expert and author on MENA women’s movements who is currently a Visiting Researcher at North Carolina State University, “political and legal rights without economic rights will not level the playing field.” Different statistics show that between 20-25% of women are in the workforce, despite women’s education rising dramatically to the extent that there are now almost as many women as men with engineering degrees.[xvi] Dr. Charrad explains “economic independence comes from education and participation in the labor force. There’s been a lot of progress in the region. There is still much greater inequality between men and women in relation to participation in the labor force, however, even though the gap in education has considerably narrowed. Education is not enough. Education does not give you an income.”
Experts have found a multitude of different reasons for the gender gap in labor participation. Dr. Stephan first points out that “many women work in the informal sector, so their employment is not recorded” in statistics on the labor participation of women. Secondly, citing research from the SAWI Project, an initiative launched at the American University of Beirut for supporting and accelerating women’s inclusion in the workplace, Dr. Stephan identifies the lack of protections against workplace sexual harassment across the region. Addressing the deficit in promotion and retention of women in the workplace in Morocco and throughout the region, she says, “what we find is actually women leave the workplace because the government does not punish perpetrators of sexual harassment and because women are not promoted into management. They face the glass ceiling.” Beyond this, Dr. Stephan mentions unreliable childcare and transportation as affecting the retention of women in the workforce.
Dr. Charrad also explains the “variety of social and psychological reasons” for why women’s labor participation doesn’t match the education participation. “Some women choose not to work. Some women don’t work because their husbands don’t want them to work. Some women don’t work because nobody gives them a job and because men want to hire men.”
Some say that Morocco’s female labor participation is symptomatic of overarching economic challenges as the country faces high unemployment. Others also attribute the female labor participation to the concept of “nafaqa,” the responsibility for men to financially support the family while women are expected to raise the children and perform domestic labor. This demotivates women from seeking employment in the formal sector, as they are still expected to shoulder the domestic work in addition to working a job.
In a 2018 paper, Moroccan physician and writer Siham Benchekroun highlighted both men and women’s frustrations with nafaqa. Many men consider nafaqa “seriously unfair to men in this day and age” when women are increasingly educated and can provide as much to the household finances as men. Women, on the other hand, express that they are unequally burdened by domestic housework. This leads Benchekroun to posit the hypothetical question: “Would [Moroccan women] be willing to give up the nafaqa, in return for more equitable sharing of household chores and a more balanced distribution of property?”[xvii]
Activists have also called attention to other areas of Moroccan law that deeply affect women’s rights, mainly the penal code. In 2012, Morocco’s criminal law came under scrutiny after the suicide of Amina al-Filali, a 16-year-old girl who was forced to marry the man who had raped her under Penal Code Article 475, which allowed a rapist to escape prosecution if he married his underage victim. In 2014, the government repealed the so-called “rape marriage law.”[xviii] A similar outcry arose in 2020 when a 14-year-old girl named Meriem died undergoing a clandestine and unsafe abortion after being raped.[xix] More recently, French-Moroccan writer and activist Leïla Slimani argues in her book Sex and Lies: True Stories of Women’s Intimate Lives in the Arab World that the criminalization of cohabitation and premarital relationships limits women’s freedoms.
Some critics also decry the lack of provision in the reforms for extramarital relations and responsibility for children board out of wedlock. Beyond legal and economic matters, Dr. Bouzghaia believes that it is also important to “promote people’s sense of ethical duty and consciousness” in order to reduce injustices men commit against women. He also says that Morocco needs to utilize “all educational, media, social, political, religious, and legal measures to accommodate this reform [of the Moudawana] in the best way.”
What comes next for the Moudawana and Moroccan Women
The future of the Moudawana remains uncertain as the parliamentary debate continues to unfold. While the questions of when exactly it will be passed and what the final version will include are still unanswered, the process of ratifying the Moudawana will likely resemble that of 2004. Dr. Bouzghaia predicts that “there will be debate and adjustments” in negotiating the code but these modifications “will not touch the core of the proposals.”
Ultimately, the King has the final say, and many Moroccans feel confident that he will prioritize the best interests of children and families. Yet, history has shown that meaningful progress in gender equality requires both top-down reform and social buy-in. Dr. Bouzghaia says that “there is a massive misconception about the Moudawana among Moroccans” meaning that only time will tell whether or not Moroccan society accepts the new code.
If passed, the reform of the Moudawana will be another major milestone for women in achieving gender parity, which Dr. Stephan examines in the context of an overall backlash against this movement. “I would say women are in a better position today. Generally speaking, there are more women in the public sphere. There are more women in political spaces. But, the momentum after the Arab Spring was higher, and now we have the backsliding. In the years after the Arab Spring, we had highs, and now we have the lows.”
So, is gender equality—in Morocco, in the MENA region, and in the world—generally increasing? According to Dr. Charrad, the trajectory of women’s issues around the world is “in part a matter of what is in the interest of the centers of power. If it’s in their best interest to expand women’s rights, then we’re likely to see an expansion of women’s rights.”
Fatema Mernissi wrote in 1975 that the conservative wave in the Muslim world against reform is a “defense mechanism against profound changes in both sex roles and the touchy subject of sexual identity.” It is a defense mechanism against inevitable trends and transformations. Fifty years later, Morocco’s ongoing debate over the Moudawana shows that this tension persists—yet it also proves that society is not static. Afterall, the backlash against the Moudawana reforms would not have been unleashed if it were not for the initiative to reform it. The opponents of change are increasingly matched by those pushing for it, displaying Morocco’s general progressive trend on women’s issues, both in the Moudawana and in the overarching advancement of women.
Dr. William Lawrence is the National Council’s Director of North Africa Area Studies and a Senior Academic and Research Fellow in Residence.
Ms. Nicole Beres is a freshman at Stanford University and participated in the Council’s Washington DC summer program. This is her second of three articles to be published with Dr. Lawrence.
Ms. Bouchra Aquil Lawrence, Program Manager at the Arab Gulf States Institute, contributed to the research for this article.
[i] WorldBank. “Morocco.” World Bank Gender Data Portal, genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/morocco. Accessed 30 June 2025; “World Population Dashboard -Morocco.” United Nations Population Fund, www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/MA. Accessed 30 June 2025; “Current Numbers.” Center for American Women and Politics, cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/current-numbers. Accessed 30 June 2025.
[ii] “Sa Majesté Le Roi Adresse Un Discours à La Nation à l’occasion de La Fête Du Trône.” Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères, de La Coopération Africaine et Des Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger, diplomatie.ma/sa-majest%C3%A9-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-%C3%A0-la-nation-%C3%A0-loccasion-de-la-f%C3%AAte-du-tr%C3%B4ne. Accessed 30 June 2025.
[iii] Barakat, Halim. “The Arab Family and the Challenge of Social Transformation.” Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change, edited by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, University of Texas Press, 1985, pp. 27–46.
[iv] Dieste, Josep Lluís Mateo. “‘Demonstrating Islam’: The Conflict of Text and the Mudawwana Reform in Morocco.” The Muslim World, vol. 99, 2009, pp. 134–154. doi:10.1111/j.1478-1913.2009.01258.x.
[v] Tamanna, Nowrin. “Personal Status Laws in Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative Exploration of the Possibilities for Equality-Enhancing Reform in Bangladesh.” Feminist Legal Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, Dec. 2008, pp. 323–343. doi:10.1007/s10691-008-9099-9.
[vi] Fatima Sadiqi; Moha Ennaji (Spring 2006). “The feminization of public space: women’s activism, the family law, and social change in Morocco”. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies.
[vii] Wuerth, Oriana. “The Reform of the Moudawana: The Role of Women’s Civil Society Organizations in Changing the Personal Status Code of Morocco.” Hawwa, vol. 3, no. 3, 2005, pp. 309–333. doi:10.1163/156920805774910042.
[viii] Elliott, Katja Zvan. “Reforming the Moroccan Personal Status Code: A Revolution for Whom?” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 14, no. 2, 2009.
[ix] Based on a 2012 not-for-attribution interview by Dr. Lawrence, working at that time as North Africa Director for International Crisis Group, with the cabinet minister who was instrumental in pitching the idea of a new code to the King with substantial parliamentary and popular inputs to the process. Dr. Lawrence also discussed the women’s movement and Moudawana reforms directly with Fatema Mernissi in 1985 in Mohamedia, Morocco, in 1989 in Boston, and in 1992 and 2013 in Rabat.
[x] Bordat, Stephanie Wilman, and Saida Kouzzi. “The Challenge of Implementing Morocco’s New Personal Status Law.” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 8, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[xi] Eddouada, Souad, and Renata Pepicelli. “Morocco: Towards an ‘Islamic State Feminism.’” Critique Internationale, no. 39, 2008, pp. 7–26. http://www.sciences-po.fr/ceri.
[xii] El Ghalbazouri, Bouthaina. “Discussion on Moroccan Family Code.” Amideast, Rabat, 5 February. 2025. Lecture.
[xiii] Dinia, Saadia. “Why Child Marriages Continue in Morocco Despite Legal Reforms.” Morocco World News, 30 Dec. 2021, www.moroccoworldnews.com/2021/12/51506/why-child-marriages-continue-in-morocco-despite-legal-reforms/. Accessed 30 June 2025.
[xiv] Vagt, Sebastian, et al. “Morocco: Women’s Rights in Morocco.” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, www.freiheit.org/morocco/one-small-step-womens-rights-one-giant-leap-morocco. Accessed 30 June 2025.
[xv] “Haf’s Commitment to Girls’ Education in Morocco – High Atlas Foundation.” High Atlas Foundation – Partnering with Moroccan Communities, highatlasfoundation.org/en/insights/hafs-commitment-to-girls-education-in-morocco. Accessed 30 June 2025.
[xvi]Yaaqoubi, BySafae El, et al. “Empowering Women to Support Morocco’s Industrial Transformation.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/empowering-women-support-moroccos-industrial-transformation#:~:text=Programs%20such%20as%20Idmaj%2C%20Taehil,becoming%20a%20regional%20industrial%20leader. Accessed 11 July 2025.
[xvii] Siham, Benchekroun. “Inequality in inheritance. A view from inside”. Women’s Inheritance, A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Inheritance in Morocco. Trans. Empreintes Editions. 2017. P. 184
[xviii] Al Jazeera. “Morocco Repeals ‘Rape Marriage Law.’” Al Jazeera, 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/1/23/morocco-repeals-rape-marriage-law. Accessed 11 July 2025.
[xix] Zouiten, Sara. “Moroccan Association Declares Day of Mourning for Minor Dead After Abortion.” Morocco World News, 20 Sept. 2022, www.moroccoworldnews.com/2022/09/41387/moroccan-association-declares-day-of-mourning-for-minor-dead-after-abortion/. Accessed 11 July 2025.
