Syria in Transition: Charting a New Path for Regional Stability and US Policy

Introduction

The Syrian conflict, ignited in 2011 amidst the fervor of the Arab Spring, has been a theater of relentless upheaval and shifting allegiances. What began as a peaceful demand for democratic reform under President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime swiftly descended into a labyrinthine civil war. Thirteen years later, the conflict reached a historic turning point with the fall of the Assad regime, achieved by rebel forces in a remarkably swift 11-day campaign beginning on November 27, 2024. The following analysis evaluates the latest developments in Syria, emphasizing the United States’ evolving policy, the implications of Assad’s removal, the emergent complexities within the opposition, and the broader geopolitical currents shaping Syria’s future.

The United States and the Syrian Conundrum

From the outset of the Syrian uprising, the United States adopted a posture of cautious engagement, delicately balancing its strategic imperatives with an aversion to deep military entanglement. Initial declarations of support for the opposition and calls for Assad’s ouster gradually gave way to a more tempered strategy, focusing on humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and the imposition of economic sanctions.

A watershed moment in the U.S. approach emerged in 2013 when the Obama administration opted for diplomacy rather than military intervention following Assad’s deployment of chemical weapons, crossing Obama’s “red line.” This decision, while averting direct conflict, underscored a shift away from prioritizing regime change toward mitigating the broader humanitarian and security repercussions of the war. In the years to follow, economic measures such as the Caesar Act became central to U.S. strategy, targeting key sectors of the Syrian economy and regime-affiliated entities. While these sanctions aimed to coerce Assad into a political settlement, their efficacy remained contentious, as they compounded civilian suffering without achieving decisive political concessions. On the other hand, when the United States issued a temporary license easing sanctions on Syria to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts in the wake of the devastating earthquake in February 2023, critics argued that such concessions risked undermining the broader objectives of economic pressure, particularly given the regime’s propensity to exploit international aid for its own ends.

Adding to the economic dimensions of the conflict, the Assad regime had notoriously exploited the illicit trade of Captagon, an amphetamine-like stimulant that has become a significant revenue source for the regime. According to reports, the Captagon trade has burgeoned into a multi-billion-dollar industry, with revenues estimated at $5.7 billion annually by 2021, dwarfing Syria’s legitimate exports. This narcotics trade not only augmented Assad’s wealth but also entrenched corruption and criminality within the regime’s structures, exacerbating regional instability and undermining international efforts to counter trafficking networks.

The Fall of the Assad Regime: A Seminal Moment

The precipitous collapse of the Assad regime in an 11-day insurgent campaign marked an epochal shift in the trajectory of the Syrian conflict. This development not only concluded over half a century of Assad family rule but also initiated a new and uncertain chapter in Syrian history. The regime’s demise resulted from a confluence of internal dissent, sustained rebel offensives, and the erosion of loyalty within Assad’s military and political apparatus. Last-minute retreats among key military units in Damascus and a well-coordinated insurgent strategy were instrumental in precipitating this dramatic shift.

Undoubtedly, the broader geopolitical context has significantly influenced the shifting dynamics within Syria. Notably, Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, and Iran’s escalating skirmishes with Israel—directly and through proxies—have indirectly weakened Assad’s principal allies: Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia, tilting the balance in favor of opposition forces. Iran faced significant setbacks due to Israeli airstrikes targeting its military assets and supply lines in Syria, disrupting aid to the regime. Targeted assassinations of IRGC commanders and mounting financial strain from regional proxy commitments further weakened Iran’s capacity to sustain Assad, contributing to his regime’s collapse on December 8, 2024. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s deep involvement in the Gaza conflict has stretched its operational capacity, diminishing its ability to maintain a strong military presence in Syria. As a cornerstone of Assad’s external support, this redeployment weakened the regime’s resilience. Simultaneously, Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has drained its military and financial resources, curtailing its ability to project influence in Syria. This reduced Russian engagement has further eroded Assad’s position, creating a vacuum increasingly exploited by opposition groups and regional powers seeking to shape Syria’s future.

HTS and the Challenges of Opposition Unity

For the United States, the post-Assad landscape presents a dual-edged challenge. While the opportunity to influence Syria’s reconstruction and political realignment is evident, the path to stability is fraught with risks of fragmentation and extremist resurgence. Ensuring a balanced and inclusive political transition remains a critical test for Washington’s diplomatic acumen.

Among the myriad actors vying for dominance in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) occupies a prominent yet controversial position. Emerging from both the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, later turning against and fighting both, HTS now wields significant control over Syria and a linchpin in the interim government in Damascus. Despite attempts by the U.S.-terrorist-designated organization at rebranding itself as a pragmatic actor emphasizing local governance, HTS’s dominance within the opposition raises critical questions in Washington about the feasibility of a cohesive post-Assad political framework and the international community’s willingness to engage with rebel factions defined by the U.S. as extremist.

Amid these challenges, the United States is exploring new avenues of engagement with Syria’s emerging leadership. In an unprecedented meeting, Barbara Leaf, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, held direct talks with Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto leader. The discussions focused on Washington’s interest in fostering inclusive leadership and governance in Syria that prioritizes political reconciliation and human rights. The U.S. has expressed its readiness to engage with a new leadership structure that incorporates diverse ethnic and political factions, provided it moves away from the authoritarian legacy of the Assad regime and marginalizes extremism. This shift signals a potential recalibration of U.S. policy, balancing skepticism with a strategic openness to dialogue under a framework of international accountability.

Prospects for U.S. Policy under a New Trump Administration

As Syria transitions into a post-Assad era, the contours of U.S. policy under a second Trump administration will merit critical examination. During his first term, President Trump exhibited a preference for disengagement, focusing narrowly on counterterrorism while minimizing the U.S. footprint in Syria. This approach, exemplified by the controversial withdrawal of U.S. troops from northeastern Syria in 2019, drew sharp criticism for its perceived abandonment of allies such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its empowerment of other actors like Türkiye and Russia. While Trump promised in his campaign to focus his Middle East policy on seeking regional peace, a potential minimalistic approach to Syria will present significant challenges.

The first challenge relates to Türkiye, a NATO ally, that perceives the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a terrorist organization due to its close ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged an insurgency against Türkiye for decades. This perception has driven Türkiye to launch multiple military operations along its southern border to prevent the PKK from establishing a foothold in northern Syria. Meanwhile, the SDF has been a crucial ally for the United States in the fight against ISIS, playing a pivotal role in liberating large areas from the militant group and in holding 60,000 ISIS prisoners and family members. This divergence in priorities between Türkiye and the U.S. creates a significant challenge in reconciling their conflicting interests.

At the same time, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, enacted in 2019, imposed sweeping sanctions on the Assad regime and its supporters to deter Syria’s brutal actions against its people, including widespread human rights abuses. The U.S. aim was to pressure the Assad government to end its repression and engage in a political resolution to the civil war. However, with Assad’s removal and the collapse of his regime’s infrastructure, the rationale for maintaining these sanctions has significantly waned.

Compounding these challenges is Israel’s escalating activity in southern Syria and across its territory to attempt to counter Iranian-backed militias and prevent so-called Islamist threats. These actions, including frequent airstrikes, aim to secure Israel’s northern front but add another layer of complexity to Syria’s already volatile regional dynamics. Together, these interconnected challenges demand a nuanced and strategic approach from U.S. policy in a post-Assad Syria.

The Path Forward for the U.S. in a Post-Assad Syria

In determining its policies for a post-Assad Syria, the U.S. must reconsider the Caesar Act and other sanctions. The entrenched support from Russia and Iran, which actively circumvented sanctions to prop up Assad, highlights the limitations of economic measures alone. As Syria navigates a post-conflict phase, U.S. policy should adapt by pairing adjusted sanctions with proactive diplomatic initiatives aimed at facilitating reconstruction, refugee return, and broader international engagement to foster stability.

Also, as the U.S. faces the intricate challenge of balancing its alliance with Türkiye with maintaining its reliance on the SDF as a counterterrorism partner, navigating these competing priorities requires careful diplomacy to ensure that Türkiye’s security needs are addressed while stabilizing SDF-controlled territories, which remains pivotal in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist groups. Failure to reconcile these interests risks both alienating a NATO ally and jeopardizing the fragile security in northeastern Syria.

Simultaneously, the U.S. should focus on mediating between Israel and neighboring countries to create a cohesive strategy for southern Syria. This strategy should prioritize ending of occupation and counterproductive counterterrorism efforts while minimizing harm to civilians and maintaining regional stability. Enhanced intelligence sharing and joint security initiatives with Israel and regional partners, including Jordan and Türkiye, can reinforce deconfliction mechanisms that are essential to prevent unintended escalations. By fostering collaboration and emphasizing a balanced approach, the U.S. can contribute to a more stable southern Syria in the context of regional and international dynamics.

Conclusion

The removal of Bashar al-Assad has ushered in a transformative new period in Syria’s tumultuous history, presenting both opportunities and profound challenges. For the United States, the task of shaping a sustainable and inclusive post-conflict order demands a multifaceted strategy encompassing active diplomacy, improved counterterrorism, and sufficiently large humanitarian initiatives. The evolving dynamics of the Syrian opposition, the influence of internal and external conflicts, and the uncertain trajectory of U.S. policy under future administrations underscore the complexity of this endeavor.

As Washington navigates these uncertainties, it must adopt a principled yet pragmatic approach, leveraging its influence to foster stability, counter extremism, and support the aspirations of the Syrian people. Only through sustained and strategic engagement can the United States contribute meaningfully to Syria’s transition and the broader stability of the Middle East.

Kuwait’s Multilateral Approach to Syria

Introduction By Dr. John Duke Anthony

In pursuit of its educational mission, the National Council works to serve as an information clearinghouse. It is in this spirit that it provides the following essay. It does so as a public service. The author, Giorgio Cafiero, is the Founder and CEO of Gulf State Analytics. Mr. Cafiero is a keen observer and analyst of matters pertaining to the Arab region, the Middle East, and the Islamic world.

This particular essay has to do with two countries with which the National Council has long been associated, namely Kuwait and Syria. From the onset of the 1990-1991 Kuwait Crisis, when its vastly larger and more heavily armed northern neighbor smashed to smithereens Kuwait’s national sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity, no U.S. non-governmental organization was more closely associated with America’s nationwide Free Kuwait Campaign than the Council.

The National Council’s leadership was on the first civilian aircraft to land in Kuwait upon its liberation. In addition, each month following the restoration of its security, the Council organized and led delegations of American leaders to Kuwait to see for themselves the immense damage inflicted upon the country’s infrastructure, economy, and people.

Syria, an eastern Mediterranean country, is vastly different. It is the home of cultures and civilizations that birthed the internationally more renowned Greco-Roman civilizations. Its Christian, Jewish, and Muslim roots are, arguably, deeper, vaster, and more diverse than any other country. Its links to Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan, and the water and agriculturally rich Golan Province that Israel has illegally occupied since 1967, have long rendered it inextricably intertwined with the region’s geopolitics.

To no other Arab country has the National Council organized and escorted more delegations of American Congressional, academic, and student leaders – approximately 400 all totaled – than Syria. Each has returned enamored with the extraordinary richness of the country’s culture, its contributions to world civilizations, and the enormous importance which more than a million Americans of Syrian ancestry attach to their ancestral homeland.

As should be clear from anyone who reads the mainstream media, few countries are at once as important to the United States, the region in which they are situated, and the world beyond, or as little understood, as Kuwait and Syria. As is clear from what Mr. Cafiero has to say about Kuwait’s policies and positions regarding Syria, he does not shy away from addressing some of the more complex and controversial issues of the day as they pertain to both countries.

John Duke Anthony, PhD
Founding President & CEO
National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations

KUWAIT’S MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO SYRIA

By Giorgio Cafiero

Almost 12 years after the Arab Spring erupted in Syria, sensitive questions surrounding the (il)legitimacy of President Bashar al-Assad and his regime divide Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman favor bringing Syria back into the Arab League, and shoring up regional and international support for Damascus. However, as the GCC states most supportive of regime change at earlier stages of the Syrian crisis, Qatar and Saudi Arabia remain opposed to any moves aimed at rehabilitating Assad.

It is worth asking where Kuwait stands on this issue. Like most GCC states, Kuwait’s relationship with Syria quickly deteriorated after Syria’s Arab Spring protests picked up and the Assad regime resorted to lethal violence to crush the uprising. In December 2012, Kuwait closed its embassy in Damascus. During the previous year, Kuwait was the sole GCC state which refused to criminalize terrorist finance, resulting in the Gulf country becoming a hub for Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis to send donations to armed groups fighting Assad’s government.

Nonetheless, by 2014 there was a restoration of diplomatic ties at the chargés d’affaires level and Kuwait opened consular services for the 140,000 Syrians living in the Gulf country. In 2019, bilateral relations partially thawed. Still, there has yet to be a full rapprochement between the two Arab governments.

It is important to take stock of the history of Kuwaiti-Syrian relations, which were particularly warm in the 1990-2011 period. Of all GCC states, Kuwait was perhaps closest to Syria throughout the two decades preceding the Arab Spring.

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Syria’s Tragedy: A Different Narrative

Beyond all the reporting about Syria’s conflict and carnage and the fall of Aleppo to government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are important backstories and narratives that seldom, if ever, make it into print. Some of them provide background, content, and perspective supportive of Dr. Imad Harb’s recent essay for the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations’ Analyses and Assessments series.

Dr. Harb took issue with President-elect Trump’s allegations that Syria has no strategic significance for the United States. Beyond the numerous rationales to the contrary that Dr. Harb so effectively provided – his line of reasoning is powerful and persuasive – the following are further considerations.

Taken individually, these phenomena do not equal the force of the zeroed-in strategic perspective that is a feature of Dr. Harb’s essay. Considered collectively, however, it would be hard to argue that, beyond the immediate and dire humanitarian issues that cry out for an effective rescue and relief response, Syria, for so many additional reasons, is not of immense strategic importance.

Humanity’s Treasures

The classical and modern day country that is, or at least was, Syria – which for the longest time was one of the world’s richest open-air museums and which brims with archaeological treasures – remains at once immense and diverse. Buried in its lands are the relics and remains of those who paved the way before modern peoplehood came to be and whom those with ancestries rooted in the so-called West are the descendants of, including the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Elamites, Nestorian Chaldeans, Greeks, Romans, and many, many more.

In my sixteen visits to Syria in the 1980s and 1990s, one curator of its treasures after another declared that, of the nearly 450 archaeological sites in the country, the number that had been opened was only forty. When the dust of the rebels’ defeat subsides and a sense of normalcy returns to the country, it would seem fair to ask what, therefore, awaits humanity in the gems of insight into human history and heritage that lie beneath Syria’s lands?

With the devastation visited upon Syria these past five years still unfolding, the ensuing losses to knowledge echo the tragically near identical earlier and continuing ones tossed to the winds next door. Indeed, they bear an indelible footprint from the ongoing American-induced chaos – in Rafidain, or historical Mesopotamia, the land between the rivers – in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Palmyra, northeast of Damascus in the Syrian desert, contains the ruins of one of the most important cultural centers of the ancient world. Standing at the crossroads of several civilizations, its art and architecture married Greco-Roman techniques with local traditions and Persian influences. Palmyra was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1980. It has suffered significant damage during periods of occupation by ISIS. Photo: Dr. John Duke Anthony, mid-1990s.

In one of the first acts accompanying America’s trampling of Iraq’s sovereignty and ending its political independence in 2003, U.S. soldiers, ordered to seize control of the Ministry of Petroleum, sped past the country’s unsurpassed historical museum. In so doing, to the delight of vandals, they left not only the museum, but also the priceless remains of numerous other Iraqi archaeological sites, together with numerous weapons depots, unguarded.

The world’s immediate and lasting response was massive and pervasive disbelief. As if in one voice, many asked: “How could such a powerful America be so mindless of the moral and humanistic obligation to protect one of the world’s richest storehouses of knowledge and understanding related to humankind’s destinies and its earliest achievements and limitations since time immemorial?”

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GCC-U.S. Relations Under a Trump Administration

By Dr. John Duke Anthony and Fahad Nazer

The results of the U.S. Presidential Election last month confounded most American political pundits and many professional pollsters. Donald Trump’s upset victory over Hillary Clinton also surprised many observers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (the GCC is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Almost immediately after the result was announced, though, it became clear that leaders from the region were ready to embrace the new President-elect and prepared to quickly adjust to the new political reality.

Within hours, GCC officials congratulated President-elect Trump. They expressed a desire to strengthen the decades-old partnerships between their respective countries and the United States. According to at least one Saudi Arabian news outlet, President-elect Trump conveyed a similar sentiment to King Salman. The two reportedly spoke by telephone within hours of the election results. Each side appears to be fully aware of what lies ahead. All appreciate how difficult it will be to overcome the unprecedented political violence and insidious sectarianism that has convulsed seven of the 22 Arab countries in recent years.

Proactive Aspirations

Numerous observers in the GCC countries have expressed hope that President-elect Trump’s administration will adopt a proactive approach to the turmoil in the region. Others are particularly eager to ascertain what, if anything, he may do differently than the Obama administration regarding the threat posed by militant groups like the so-called Islamic State. Just as importantly, there is anticipation that the new President will take seriously the GCC’s deep concerns about Iran’s policies in the Arab world.

Leaders from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at the recent 37th Gulf Cooperation Council Heads of State Summit in Bahrain. Photo: Saudi Press Agency.

The reference to the latter concern is especially Tehran’s support of militant non-state actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen as well as what further assistance it may extend to the government of President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. It is difficult, of course, at this early stage to ascertain the contours of what may, at some point, become known as the “Trump Doctrine.” Even so, important lessons can be drawn from history.

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Redefining the Syrian Predicament to a Trump Administration

A seismic change is taking place in the United States while important foreign policy issues confront its ascendant political leadership. From a resurgent Russia to a dangerous Chinese grab of international waters in the South China Sea, and from the troubled Middle East to uncertainties facing Europe, the new Trump administration – as heir to America’s leadership legacy – will have to hit the ground running on January 20, 2017. Among the insanely complicated challenges it will have to untangle and help resolve is the Syrian civil war and tragedy that has caused internal destruction and invited foreign actors to interfere and intervene in the heart of the modern Levant.

Syria the Unimportant?

President-elect Donald Trump made it clear during his improbable presidential campaign that the United States should just cede Syria to Russia and Iran and allow them to help its president destroy whatever opposition he faces. Incorrectly, and ignorantly, he claimed that the trio was fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, to the contrary, the evidence is that the brunt of Russia’s, Iran’s, Lebanon Hezbollah’s, and the Iranian-led Afghan Shia’s military action has been against the moderate opposition.

In Aleppo, Syria, four-year-old Esraa and her brother Waleed, three, sit on the ground near a shelter for internally displaced persons. Photo: UNICEF/UN013175/Al-Issa.

Candidate Mr. Trump also opined that Syria does not constitute an American strategic interest. This claim has actually been bandied about not only by Obama administration officials. Some Republican politicians and members of the foreign policy community in the American capital also adhere to this view. Neither claim – that Russia and its allies’ attacks have been directed entirely against ISIS and that Syria is of no strategic interest to the United States – was or is true. Mr. Trump’s analyses and assessments are therefore not only perilously flawed; in light of the facts, they are downright dangerous, the exact opposite of accurate, and, as such, constitute serious threats to American and American allies’ national security and related interests.

What Must Come

The first imperative the new administration will have to examine about Syria, come next January, should therefore be Mr. Trump’s claims regarding Syria. Some of the more misleading claims admittedly carry a grain of accuracy and for that reason are seductive, but at the end of the day they are half-baked and hardly the grounds for making sound and effective policy regarding the country. These include the assertion that Syria lacks sufficient hydrocarbon resources to make it a pivotal ring within the international economic chain that American global hegemony cherishes, a perception that is buttressed by the fact that, with the advent of shale oil, the United States’ need for offshore sources of energy has decreased dramatically. A second perception that adds to the confusion is grounded in the fact that, notwithstanding Syria’s having long maintained the peace on Israel’s north-eastern border, and despite its having administered the American-approved Syrian condominium over Lebanon during and after the latter’s civil war, no Damascus government has ever been a pillar of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

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