Category: security architectures

Gulf Security Architectures: Process and Structure

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Published in partnership with the King Faisal Center on Research and Islamic Studies.

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The views and opinions presented here are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the United States Government, the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, or the King Faisal Center on Research and Islamic Studies.

Summary

With a transition in Washington, discussions in Western capitals will inevitably turn to the issues of how to deal with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the wars in Yemen and Libya, and so forth.  Alongside those issues, almost underpinning some of them in a sense, is the matter of reassessing the security architecture in the Gulf and in the region more broadly.  Policy planners in Western capitals will have their own ideas for desired outcomes in the region, but as they weigh their options they should consider how the format and structure of a security architecture can inadvertently shape and limit its effectiveness.  The design and process of convening partners in the Middle East for a dialogue about peace and security is just as important as the execution and implementation of the vision that brings them together.

Definitions and Parameters

One often thinks of a regional security architecture as a forum with a secretariat and working groups, but it is important to recognize that security architectures usually encompass a wide range of activities.  These could include strategic dialogues, financial sanctions, joint military exercises, or nuclear inspections.  The architecture is not located in a single event or institution, and tensions can arise if diplomatic goals are not in alignment with military posture.[1]  It exists as a conceptual framework accompanied by various diplomatic and security arrangements, which a country adopts in order to guide and shape its relationships with regional partners.  It is due to the fact that there are so many different elements at play that different U.S. administrations over time have been able to rework and refashion individual activities to suit their overall policy needs even as the desired policy outcome changes.  Just as policy planners in Washington, London, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing hope to use their efforts to build partnerships in the region, so too do these Great Powers hope to guide and shape the relationships of those nations to one another.  Building peace and security in the Middle East while extending the influence of a Great Power state around the world is achievable, but there is a tension between the two objectives that must be carefully watched.

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Assessing Gulf Security Architectures

Remarks delivered by His Excellency Dr. Abdel Aziz Hamad Aluwaisheg at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations 28th Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference on 23 October 2019, in Washington, D.C. An abbreviated version of this article was published in Arab News on 25 October 2019. The views expressed here do not reflect the official views of the Gulf Cooperation Council or its member states.

Last month, during the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly, world leaders came up with numerous proposals, some new and some refurbished, about Gulf security.

Some ideas were advanced with good intentions as a response to Iran’s drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil installations on September 14. Some probably had ulterior motives. The Russian concept was based on effectively internationalizing Gulf Security, and does not take into consideration local alliances already in place. Although most proposals were motivated by those attacks, President Rouhani cynically proposed a security system to be led by Iran.

What most proposals had in common was the denial of local agency by the countries most threatened in the Gulf, ignoring their work in recent decades to establish a fairly robust collective security system. The peace and security of UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (and others) have been repeatedly threatened by Iran, its proxies, and terrorists it has trained, armed, and funded. The GCC was set up in 1981 as a security organization in part as response to Iran’s threats. The GCC is a political and economic body as well but during the past 38 years it has established an elaborate security architecture, which was crowned last November with the appointment of General Eid Al-Shelewi as the General Commander of the GCC Unified Military Command (GUMC). Overseen by the joint chiefs of staff of member states, the GUMC coordinates the work of all military services, including land, naval, air force, and air defences of member states. Despite the recent intra-GCC difficulties, the joint chiefs of staff and other officers from the GCC six member states have been meeting regularly, intensifying their efforts since May, with Iran’s escalation of aggression against international shipping in the Gulf and oil installations on land.

Counter-terrorism is a task handled by several GCC organizations, including the Secretariat in Riyadh and the GCC Police in Abu Dhabi, overseen by the ministers of interior, who have been meeting despite intra-GCC differences. GCC counter-terrorism efforts include addressing terrorism financing and extremism as well as targeting and apprehending suspected terrorists, both foreign and domestic.

The GCC security architecture is based on collective defense. For example, Article II of the Mutual Defense Treaty, concluded in 2000 and ratified by all member states, stipulates that GCC security is indivisible and obliges all member states to act jointly to repel external aggression. The GCC Emergency Summit held in Makkah last May invoked this treaty and joint action has since intensified.

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