A man holds Syrian revolution flags in Aleppo, Syria as President Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year authoritarian rule has ended on December 8, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/ Karam al-Masri
The collapse of the Assad regime in November 2024 marked a profound turning point in Syria’s modern history, ushering in a complex and rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. The fall of Damascus to opposition factions and the escape of Bashar al-Assad dismantled the decades-long Syrian security architecture, leaving a volatile power vacuum. Initially, this moment was met with a wave of cautious optimism—particularly among Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which had long called for the stability of the Syrian state. These countries quickly rallied behind the interim government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, seeking to stabilize Syria and begin a long-overdue process of reconstruction and political normalization. However, what followed exposed the fault lines in the new political order, highlighting both internal mismanagement and external pressures that now threaten to derail the post-Assad transition.
A Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
Geopolitically, Syria is witnessing a recalibration of influence. Russia and Iran, the two primary backers of the Assad regime, have seen their leverage diminish significantly. Moscow, reeling from its protracted entanglement in Ukraine and burdened by sanctions, has scaled down its military footprint in Syria, while Tehran is facing increasing domestic instability and overstretched regional commitments, including continued support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, backing of various militias in Iraq, and entrenchment in Yemen’s civil war. This has created space for other actors to assert their presence. Türkiye has expanded its control over northern Syria, leveraging its relationship with select opposition groups and enhancing its buffer zones against Kurdish militias. Meanwhile, Israel has intensified its operations across Syrian territory, particularly in the south and near Iranian-linked installations, reflecting Tel Aviv’s intent to pre-empt any renewed Iranian entrenchment in the vacuum of Assad’s departure.
Disillusionment and the Erosion of Trust
The initial wave of optimism that accompanied the establishment of Syria’s interim post-Assad government has dissipated with alarming speed, giving way to a growing sense of disillusionment both domestically and internationally. This erosion of confidence stems not merely from the government’s early strategic missteps—such as its failure to articulate a coherent national reconciliation plan or to integrate adequately key constituencies into its transitional framework—but also from a dramatic resurgence in sectarian violence that has exposed deep fissures within Syrian society.
Particularly destabilizing were the gruesome massacres targeting Alawite populations in the coastal governorates in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s collapse. These attacks, widely seen as acts of retributive justice by hardline factions within the government affiliated forces, cast a shadow over the transitional leadership’s capacity to uphold the rule of law and ensure the protection of minority communities. More recently, the brutal assaults against the Druze population in al-Suwayda further compounded fears that the country is sliding toward a cycle of revenge killings and communal fragmentation. These incidents have not only dealt a severe blow to the moral authority of the new governing order but have also undercut its claim to represent a unifying national project.
Internal Governance Failures
Adding to the deepening instability of Syria’s post-Assad landscape are the serious internal governance failures that have plagued the interim government since its inception. Chief among these is the flawed national dialogue process, which was launched prematurely and without sufficient groundwork. Instead of laying the foundation for a truly inclusive political transition, the dialogue was marked by narrow participation, tokenistic outreach to marginalized groups, and the conspicuous exclusion of key civil society actors, minority representatives, and independent technocrats. As a result, the process failed to generate the kind of broad-based consensus that could have lent the new political order the legitimacy it so urgently needs.
One of the most consequential outcomes of this rushed and insufficiently inclusive process has been the interim constitutional declaration, which has drawn widespread criticism both within Syria and abroad. The document grants expansive, largely unchecked powers to the interim president—including authority over the military, judiciary, and key aspects of the legislative process—raising immediate concerns about the concentration of power and the potential for authoritarian backsliding. Instead of signaling a decisive break from the centralized, autocratic style of rule that defined the Assad era, the declaration has fueled fears that the post-regime order may merely reproduce the same patterns of dominance under a new guise.
Compounding these worries is the elevation of multiple militia commanders—many sanctioned or flagged for extremist affiliations—to top posts in the restructured Syrian military under Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Most notably, Mohammed al-Jassem (Abu Amsha) has been promoted to Brigadier General and given command of the Hama Division, overseeing regional security coordination; his prior leadership of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade in Afrin has been tied to corruption, forced displacement, and systematic rights abuses documented by UN and human rights groups. Also, Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib, a Jordanian HTS foreign fighter under international scrutiny, now heads the Republican Guard—a role widely criticized by U.S. and European diplomats as legitimizing jihadist actors within the state security structure. Equally controversial is Seif Bulad (Abu Bakr), appointed commander of the newly formed 76th Division; recently sanctioned by the EU for involvement in the 2025 massacres of Alawites, his inclusion consolidates the presence of divisive militia figures in the military hierarchy. These appointments blur the boundary between rebel militias and formal state institutions and have provoked alarm among minority groups, civil society, and Western governments. By entrenching ideologically rigid and sanctioned actors into the core of Syria’s security apparatus, the interim regime risks cementing a coercive, hybrid military order that undermines legitimacy, pluralism, and efforts at inclusive reform.
These developments suggest that the interim leadership has prioritized short-term tactical alliances—particularly with militarily powerful or territorially entrenched actors—over the more difficult but essential work of institution-building, transparency, and broad societal inclusion. This strategy may provide immediate security dividends or stave off political fragmentation in the short run, but it also risks entrenching a hybrid authoritarian order underpinned by illiberal and sectarian forces. Unless corrected, these foundational missteps could doom Syria’s transitional experiment to failure, not because of external pressures alone, but due to the very choices made by those now entrusted with shepherding the country into a new era.
Further, the persistent lack of transparency surrounding the interim government’s external negotiations—particularly with Israel and Russia—has added a troubling layer of uncertainty to Syria’s already fragile transition. With regard to Israel, talks reportedly touching on sensitive matters such as territorial arrangements in the Golan Heights, border demilitarization, and potential normalization steps have taken place behind closed doors, with no formal communiqués, public consultations, or parliamentary oversight. This secrecy has fueled widespread speculation and unease among Syrians, many of whom fear that national sovereignty could be compromised in pursuit of diplomatic expediency or external legitimacy.
Equally opaque has been the recent visit of the Syrian Foreign Minister to Moscow, where meetings were held with both the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin. Despite the high-level nature of these discussions, the Syrian public has been left in the dark about their substance and outcomes. Whether the agenda focused on residual Russian military assets in Syria, economic concessions, or Russian support for a new constitutional roadmap remains unclear. This information vacuum not only weakens public accountability but also raises questions about the nature of Syria’s post-regime foreign alignments and the degree to which national interests are being safeguarded in these critical bilateral relationships.
This pattern of secrecy is mirrored domestically by the creation of a new Sovereign Fund—established by presidential decree in July 2025 and fully controlled by President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his inner circle. According to a Reuters investigation, the fund operates under the direct supervision of al-Sharaa and is managed by his brother Hazem, who leads an unofficial economic committee that has quietly seized or restructured over $1.6 billion in assets from former Assad-era elites, including stakes in the country’s main telecommunications and airline companies. This operation has proceeded without public transparency, prompting legal experts and civil society leaders to warn that it effectively replaces one opaque oligarchy with another—even as Syria seeks to reintegrate into the global economy.
In a post-authoritarian context where state institutions are still struggling to establish credibility, such non-transparent diplomacy is particularly damaging. It reinforces long-standing patterns of elite decision-making insulated from public scrutiny, undermines nascent democratic norms, and risks alienating key segments of society who had placed cautious hope in the promise of a more open and representative political order. If the interim leadership continues to engage in opaque dealings over issues of national consequence—without offering transparency, consultation, or institutional checks—it may soon find its domestic legitimacy eroding faster than its diplomatic gains abroad.
U.S. Policy: Between Strategic Fatigue and Renewed Concern
Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, U.S. engagement with Syria has undergone a marked evolution—from initial detachment to cautious re-engagement, and now, more recently, to renewed apprehension. The early post-Assad phase coincided with the first weeks of Donald Trump’s second term, a period in which Syria barely registered on the administration’s foreign policy agenda. The prevailing mood in Washington at the time was one of strategic fatigue: after more than a decade of involvement in the Syrian conflict—whether through counterterrorism operations, humanitarian aid, or sanctions enforcement—many in Trump’s inner circle viewed Syria as a geopolitical sinkhole with limited relevance to America’s core interests. There was a brief window in which the U.S. signaled an almost complete disengagement from Syria, with Trump publicly stating, “Syria is a mess” and that “THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” reflecting a belief that regional actors, not Washington, should shoulder the burden of post-conflict stabilization.
Before Trump reversed course in May 2025, the U.S. had outlined a set of stringent conditions as a pathway for normalizing relations with Syria, centered on political inclusivity, accountability for wartime atrocities, and a clear break from Iranian influence. These demands were echoed in both congressional hearings and State Department briefings, emphasizing the need for credible transitional justice mechanisms, guarantees for minority rights, and the disarmament of Iranian-backed militias operating on Syrian soil. However, mounting pressure from key Gulf partners—particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE—and Türkiye coupled with shifting regional dynamics after the Gaza war, eventually convinced Trump to lift sanctions in exchange for promises of reform and a pledge to curb Iranian entrenchment and normalize relations with Israel.
Despite the Trump administration’s decision to ease sanctions in May 2025, the United States has remained adamant in its rhetorical commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity, fearing the rise of de facto zones of foreign influence that could Balkanize the country. This stance has come under renewed strain following Israel’s deepening military involvement in southern Syria, under the pretext of protecting the Druze population from escalating violence. In recent weeks, the region has witnessed a surge in violence, with pro-government security units and affiliated militias accused of carrying out systematic crackdowns against Druze protesters demanding autonomy and accountability. The Israeli government, citing both historical and kinship ties with the Druze community, has framed its limited cross-border operations as humanitarian protection missions. However, Washington views this narrative with caution, concerned that Israel’s security rationale is masking a long-term strategic objective: establishing a Druze buffer zone or friendly enclave that would serve Israeli intelligence and deterrence goals, while fragmenting Syrian sovereignty—an outcome most in the U.S. administration see as destabilizing and counterproductive to regional consensus on Syria’s post-conflict future.
Türkiye’s posture in Syria adds another layer of complexity to this already fractured landscape. Ankara’s overriding concern remains the containment of Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, which it perceives as an existential threat due to its linkages with the PKK. Since the Assad regime’s fall, Türkiye has consolidated its presence in northern Aleppo, Idlib, and parts of Hasakah, backing Arab and Turkmen opposition factions while maintaining control through both military and administrative structures. This Turkish entrenchment runs in direct tension with both U.S. support for Kurdish-led SDF elements and Israeli maneuvering in southern Syria, the latter of which Ankara increasingly views as an encroachment into its perceived sphere of influence. While Türkiye and Israel have normalized relations on some fronts, they remain at odds in Syria—where Ankara opposes any external empowerment of non-Arab or non-Turkic minorities that might embolden separatist claims, including Israeli support for Druze or U.S. patronage of the Kurds. As the lines of control harden and foreign actors entrench themselves more deeply, Syria risks becoming a fragmented theater of geopolitical rivalry, with the United States caught between its stated goal of preserving unity and the pragmatic alliances that now threaten it.
The Path Forward: A Strategic Reset
In light of the complex and interwoven challenges facing Syria’s transitional leadership—ranging from internal fragmentation and rising sectarian tensions to controversial foreign entanglements and institutional fragility—it is clear that the interim authorities must embark on a deliberate and far-reaching strategic reorientation. At the heart of this recalibration lies the urgent need to reclaim national legitimacy through the reconstruction of an inclusive political process. This begins with the convening of a genuinely representative national dialogue—not a symbolic exercise, but a substantive and participatory framework that brings together the full mosaic of Syrian society. This must include not only ethnic and religious minorities, but also tribal leaders from peripheral regions, women’s groups, civil society activists, independent technocrats, and members of the global Syrian diaspora, whose resources and perspectives remain vital for any sustainable recovery.
Equally critical is the overhaul of the current constitutional declaration, which has come under mounting criticism for entrenching executive dominance and failing to establish a functional balance of powers. A revised constitutional framework must prioritize the institutionalization of judicial independence, create effective checks and balances, and impose enforceable limits on the authority of the executive branch. Without such foundational legal safeguards, any aspirations for a democratic transition will remain hollow, and the interim government risks replicating the very authoritarian structures it claims to have displaced.
In parallel with constitutional reform, Syria’s transitional process must include the establishment of a broad-based technocratic government that genuinely reflects the country’s social and political diversity. This interim administration should prioritize the appointment of qualified experts to lead key ministries—particularly in areas such as justice, foreign affairs, interior, and defense—ensuring that decisions are driven by professional competence rather than factional loyalty or ideological rigidity. Such a cabinet must also categorically exclude individuals with histories of extremism, war crimes, or ties to sanctioned militias, particularly within the security and military sectors. A government rooted in technical expertise and public credibility would help restore trust in state institutions, foster inclusive governance, and lay the groundwork for a more stable and accountable post-conflict order.
Moreover, transparency must no longer be treated as a rhetorical ideal but as a structural necessity for governance. The opaque conduct of negotiations with external actors—whether with the U.S. and Israel on security arrangements, with Russia on military and economic matters, or with Türkiye regarding cross-border dynamics and reconstruction—undermines public trust and fosters a climate of political suspicion. To reverse this, the government must institutionalize mechanisms for democratic oversight, including parliamentary review, public reporting, and stakeholder consultation. By embedding transparency into foreign policymaking, the interim leadership can begin to shift away from elite-driven, opaque statecraft and toward a more accountable, participatory model of governance that reflects the aspirations of a war-weary population seeking genuine sovereignty and dignity.
Ultimately, the true measure of Syria’s transition will not be the mere absence of the Assad regime, but the absence of its doppelganger. What is needed is a political order grounded in inclusion, accountability, and durable institutions. The fall of the old regime created a rare window for meaningful transformation—one that could lay the foundation for national reconciliation and long-term stability. Yet that opportunity is now imperiled by regressive patterns of exclusion, opacity, and authoritarian reflexes. To reclaim the promise of this pivotal moment, the interim leadership must commit to bold, inclusive reforms that empower society, protect rights, and establish clear checks on power. Syria stands at a crossroads: it can either move forward toward a truly representative and resilient state, or risk replicating the very authoritarianism it has just overthrown.