Syria in Transition: Charting a New Path for Regional Stability and US Policy

Introduction

The Syrian conflict, ignited in 2011 amidst the fervor of the Arab Spring, has been a theater of relentless upheaval and shifting allegiances. What began as a peaceful demand for democratic reform under President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime swiftly descended into a labyrinthine civil war. Thirteen years later, the conflict reached a historic turning point with the fall of the Assad regime, achieved by rebel forces in a remarkably swift 11-day campaign beginning on November 27, 2024. The following analysis evaluates the latest developments in Syria, emphasizing the United States’ evolving policy, the implications of Assad’s removal, the emergent complexities within the opposition, and the broader geopolitical currents shaping Syria’s future.

The United States and the Syrian Conundrum

From the outset of the Syrian uprising, the United States adopted a posture of cautious engagement, delicately balancing its strategic imperatives with an aversion to deep military entanglement. Initial declarations of support for the opposition and calls for Assad’s ouster gradually gave way to a more tempered strategy, focusing on humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and the imposition of economic sanctions.

A watershed moment in the US approach emerged in 2013 when the Obama administration opted for diplomacy rather than military intervention following Assad’s deployment of chemical weapons, crossing Obama’s “red line.” This decision, while averting direct conflict, underscored a shift away from prioritizing regime change toward mitigating the broader humanitarian and security repercussions of the war. In the years to follow, economic measures such as the Caesar Act became central to US strategy, targeting key sectors of the Syrian economy and regime-affiliated entities. While these sanctions aimed to coerce Assad into a political settlement, their efficacy remained contentious, as they compounded civilian suffering without achieving decisive political concessions. On the other hand, when the United States issued a temporary license easing sanctions on Syria to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts in the wake of the devastating earthquake in February 2023, critics argued that such concessions risked undermining the broader objectives of economic pressure, particularly given the regime’s propensity to exploit international aid for its own ends.

Adding to the economic dimensions of the conflict, the Assad regime had notoriously exploited the illicit trade of Captagon, an amphetamine-like stimulant that has become a significant revenue source for the regime. According to reports, the Captagon trade has burgeoned into a multi-billion-dollar industry, with revenues estimated at $5.7 billion annually by 2021, dwarfing Syria’s legitimate exports. This narcotics trade not only augmented Assad’s wealth but also entrenched corruption and criminality within the regime’s structures, exacerbating regional instability and undermining international efforts to counter trafficking networks. 

The Fall of the Assad Regime: A Seminal Moment

The precipitous collapse of the Assad regime in an 11-day insurgent campaign marked an epochal shift in the trajectory of the Syrian conflict. This development not only concluded over half a century of Assad family rule but also initiated a new and uncertain chapter in Syrian history. The regime’s demise resulted from a confluence of internal dissent, sustained rebel offensives, and the erosion of loyalty within Assad’s military and political apparatus. Last-minute retreats among key military units in Damascus and a well-coordinated insurgent strategy were instrumental in precipitating this dramatic shift.

Undoubtedly, the broader geopolitical context has significantly influenced the shifting dynamics within Syria. Notably, Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, and Iran’s escalating skirmishes with Israel directly and much more substantially through proxies have indirectly weakened Assad’s principal allies—Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran—thereby tilting the balance in favor of opposition forces. Hezbollah’s deep involvement in the Gaza conflict has stretched its operational capacity, diminishing its ability to sustain its military presence in Syria. As a cornerstone of Assad’s external support, this redeployment has weakened the regime’s resilience. Simultaneously, Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has drained its military and financial resources, curtailing its ability to project influence in Syria. This reduced Russian engagement has further eroded Assad’s position, creating a vacuum increasingly exploited by opposition groups and regional powers seeking to shape Syria’s future. Iran….

HTS and the Challenges of Opposition Unity

For the United States, the post-Assad landscape presents a dual-edged challenge. While the opportunity to influence Syria’s reconstruction and political realignment is evident, the path to stability is fraught with risks of fragmentation and extremist resurgence. Ensuring a balanced and inclusive political transition remains a critical test for Washington’s diplomatic acumen.

Among the myriad actors vying for dominance in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) occupies a prominent yet controversial position. Emerging from both the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, later turning against and fighting both, HTS now wields significant control over Syria and a linchpin in the interim government in Damascus. Despite attempts by the U.S.-terroritist-designated organization at rebranding itself as a pragmatic actor emphasizing local governance, HTS’s dominance within the opposition raises critical questions in Washington about the feasibility of a cohesive post-Assad political framework and the international community’s willingness to engage with rebel factions defined by the US as extremist.

Amid these challenges, the United States is exploring new avenues of engagement with Syria’s emerging leadership. In an unprecedented meeting, Barbara Leaf, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, held direct talks with Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto leader. The discussions focused on Washington’s interest in fostering  inclusive leadership and governance in Syria that prioritizes political reconciliation and human rights. The U.S. has expressed its readiness to engage with a new leadership structure that incorporates diverse ethnic and political factions, provided it moves away from the authoritarian legacy of the Assad regime and marginalizes extremism. This shift signals a potential recalibration of U.S. policy, balancing skepticism with a strategic openness to dialogue under a framework of international accountability.

Prospects for US Policy under a New Trump Administration

As Syria transitions into a post-Assad era, the contours of US policy under a second Trump administration will merit critical examination. During his first term, President Trump exhibited a preference for disengagement, focusing narrowly on counterterrorism while minimizing the US footprint in Syria. This approach, exemplified by the controversial withdrawal of US troops from northeastern Syria in 2019, drew sharp criticism for its perceived abandonment of allies such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its empowerment of other actors like Turkey and Russia. While Trump promised in his campaign to focus his Middle East policy on seeking regional peace, a potential minimalistic approach to Syria will present significant challenges. 

The first challenge relates to Turkey, a NATO ally, that perceives the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a terrorist organization due to its close ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged an insurgency against Turkey for decades. This perception has driven Turkey to launch multiple military operations along its southern border to prevent the PKK from establishing a foothold in northern Syria. Meanwhile, the SDF has been a crucial ally for the United States in the fight against ISIS, playing a pivotal role in liberating large areas from the militant group and in holding 60,000 ISIS prisoners and family members. This divergence in priorities between Turkey and the U.S. creates a significant challenge in reconciling their conflicting interests.

At the same time, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, enacted in 2019, imposed sweeping sanctions on the Assad regime and its supporters to deter Syria’s brutal actions against its people, including widespread human rights abuses. The U.S. aim was to pressure the Assad government to end its repression and engage in a political resolution to the civil war. However, the utility of continuing these sanctions has largely evaporated with the ouster of Assad and the dismantling of his regime’s infrastructure. 

Compounding these challenges is Israel’s escalating activity in southern Syria and across its territory to attempt to counter Iranian-backed militias and prevent so-called Islamist threats. These actions, including frequent airstrikes, aim to secure Israel’s northern front but add another layer of complexity to Syria’s already volatile regional dynamics. Together, these interconnected challenges demand a nuanced and strategic approach from U.S. policy in a post-Assad Syria.

The Path Forward for the US in a Post-Assad Syria

In determining its policies for a post-Assad Syria, the U.S. must reconsider the Caesar Act and other sanctions.  The entrenched support from Russia and Iran, which actively circumvented sanctions to prop up Assad, highlights the limitations of economic measures alone. As Syria navigates a post-conflict phase, U.S. policy should adapt by pairing adjusted sanctions with proactive diplomatic initiatives aimed at facilitating reconstruction, refugee return, and broader international engagement to foster stability.

Also, as the U.S. faces the intricate challenge of balancing its alliance with Turkey with maintaining its reliance on the SDF as a counterterrorism partner, navigating these competing priorities requires careful diplomacy to ensure that Turkey’s security needs are addressed while stabilizing SDF-controlled territories, which remains pivotal in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist groups. Failure to reconcile these interests risks both alienating a NATO ally and jeopardizing the fragile security in northeastern Syria.

Simultaneously, the U.S. should focus on mediating between Israel and neighboring countries to create a cohesive strategy for southern Syria. This strategy should prioritize ending of occupation and counterproductive counterterrorism efforts while minimizing harm to civilians and maintaining regional stability. Enhanced intelligence sharing and joint security initiatives with Israel and regional partners, including Jordan and Turkey, can reinforce deconfliction mechanisms that are essential to prevent unintended escalations. By fostering collaboration and emphasizing a balanced approach, the U.S. can contribute to a more stable southern Syria in the context of regional and international dynamics.

Conclusion

The removal of Bashar al-Assad has ushered in a transformative new period in Syria’s tumultuous history, presenting both opportunities and profound challenges. For the United States, the task of shaping a sustainable and inclusive post-conflict order demands a multifaceted strategy encompassing active diplomacy, improved counterterrorism, and sufficiently large humanitarian initiatives. The evolving dynamics of the Syrian opposition, the influence of internal and external conflicts, and the uncertain trajectory of US policy under future administrations underscore the complexity of this endeavor.

As Washington navigates these uncertainties, it must adopt a principled yet pragmatic approach, leveraging its influence to foster stability, counter extremism, and support the aspirations of the Syrian people. Only through sustained and strategic engagement can the United States contribute meaningfully to Syria’s transition and the broader stability of the Middle East.

Author: Fadi Hilani

Dr. Fadi Hilani is a Senior Academic and Research Fellow-in-Residence at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. Born in Aleppo, Syria, Dr. Hilani was raised in the United Kingdom and Syria. In Syria, he served as a Professor of Linguistics at Aleppo University and as the Acting Director of the Languages and Translation Department at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus. He also served as a Professor of Linguistics at Isra University in Jordan before accepting a faculty position at Montclair State University in New Jersey. He completed his Bachelor’s Degree in English Language and Literature at Aleppo University in Syria and earned a Master’s Degree and Ph.D. in Linguistics from Essex University in the United Kingdom. Dr. Hilani also earned a Master’s Degree in Near Eastern Studies from New York University, with focus on Middle East foreign policy and U.S. relations.