24th Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference

U.S.-Arab Relations at a Crossroads: What Paths Forward?

Washington, D.C.
October 15, 2015

“GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS: EGYPT & NORTH AFRICA”

Chair:
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Speakers:
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Dr. William Lawrence – Director of Middle East and North Africa Programs, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
Dr. Dirk Vandewalle – Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth University
Dr. Paul Sullivan – Senior International Affairs Fellow, National Council on U.S. Arab Relations
Remarks as delivered.

[Dr. Abderrahim Foukara] It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to this panel, which as you all know is about the dynamics, the geo-political dynamics - Egypt and North Africa. I will quickly go through the names of our panelists while you’re making yourselves comfortable in your seats. So we will talk about Egypt, how what’s happening in Egypt affects the rest of the North Africa region, but also we’ll talk a little bit about the dynamics of the Egypt-U.S. relationship. It gives me great pleasure to introduce our panelists. Far end is Dr. Paul Sullivan. I will not go into a lot of detail about who the guests are because you have all of those biographical details available to you.

Dr. Paul Sullivan is a senior international affairs fellow at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and professor of economics at the National Defense University.

Here next to me I have Dr. Dirk Vanderwalle. He’s associate professor at Tuck School of Business.

Sitting right next to him, Ellen Laipson. She’s president and CEO of the Stimson Center and former vice chair of the U.S. National Intelligence Council and former special assistant to the U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations.

Last but not least, Dr. William Lawrence. He is the director of the Middle East North Africa program, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy.

Now, let me very quickly give you the lay of the land, what we’re going to do here. Each panelist is going to make some introductory remarks. Because it’s the end of the day we asked them to keep those remarks to about five minutes each, and once they’re done with their introductory remarks I’ll do a quick round of questions, just rumble through the panel.

One round based on what the panelists would have said, and then we’ll open it up to you, Q and A session. During that session because it’s a long day, because it’s been a long day I would ask you to make your comments and questions to the point and very brief. I will police the time allocations very stringently all around. Thank you.

So I will start with Dr. Paul Sullivan.

[Dr. Paul Sullivan] Salam Aleikum. Good afternoon. I have to give a caveat whenever I speak in public. These are my opinions alone, do not represent those of the National Defense University, the U.S. Government, Georgetown, or any other organization I may be a part of. Now I can get myself into trouble.

U.S. relations with Egypt are complicated. I think that’s one thing we all understand, but the best part of this is military to military without a doubt and has been all the way through the multiple revolutions in the so-called Arab Spring. The militaries get
it. They understand the situation. Military aid to Egypt was cut off for a while. That was a mistake. I’ll get a little bit more into that as we go on.

Economic aid to Egypt has been cut down to about 130 million to 150 million, and also the U.S. has not been investing enough in Egypt to get it out of its insecurities that are being developed because of a weak economy. Even with the Sharm al-Sheik meeting this is insufficient for a country with whom we have had an alliance and friendship for decades.

Our defense attaché in Cairo, General Hooper, gets it. Economic relations at the official level are insufficient. I can’t repeat that enough. The real weakness of Egypt today, along with the threats coming from Fa’esh - as Prince Turki would say, the obscene ones - is the economic situation, unemployment, slow economic growth, inflation, food security, water security, and energy security.

There is also, we must admit, a great deal of mistrust between the Egyptian people and the American government. Recent polls show the Egyptian people see the U.S. as the biggest source of instability in the world. Should we be surprised?

U.S. policies are an issue, but it also opened up a door for the Russians, a door that the Russians walked through as we cut Egypt off from its military aid at a moment when Egypt needed help the most, and this was kind of one of the beginnings of an increase in Russian leverage in the region. The Russian advisors are back for the first time since the time of Sadat. Russia’s moves into Egypt essentially prompted by U.S. policy toward Egypt also gave an indication to the Russians that there were other openings in the region. Egypt is a vital place, it’s a place of leverage, and we handed it right to the Russians.

Our policy in Syria did pretty much the same thing, and Putin walked right into to. I was trying to describe this to some people the other day. The Russians are famous for being great chess players. Putin makes seven moves. We’re looking at the table. Putin makes four more moves. We’re looking at the table. When will we start to make our moves? Excuse my theatricality, but please do remember the caveat that I had.

The questions are later, thank you. I have a lot more to go here.

So the Russians are gaining a foothold - well, how much more time do I have Abderrahim?

[Foukara] You have thirty seconds.

[Sullivan] Thirty seconds. Let’s tie this into the GERD dam project in Ethiopia. This is partly a source of instability and fragility for Egypt in the future because it has not been a fulfilled deal in the negotiations on even the documentation of what’s going to happen with that dam haven’t been finished yet. A famine has hit Ethiopia.
Climate change is kicking in. This could be an issue of fragility for the entire region along the Nile, and this has yet to be solved.

And I think my time is up even though I could speak about this for another ten hours. Thank you.

[Foukara] Thank you, Paul. Thank you very much. I give the floor now to Dirk.

[Dr. Dirk Vanderwalle] Thank you very much, Abderrahim, and thanks first of all to Dr. Anthony and to the Council for the invitation to speak. I was asked to make a few comments in the five minutes that Abderrahim has given me about Libya and kind of the implications for the United States about what is happening in Libya. As we sit here and as you know what has been a very complex situation in the country and that we thought had almost been solved as we were moving towards a government of national accord, and has in many ways been upset by a number of intervening factors, most of course bickering between the different factions over what the spoils will look like in that national government.

The agreement, the way it has been negotiated for almost a year by UNSMIL and by Mr. Leon in particular is in essence a self-referential document in that it does not really allow for any interpretation. It’s a final text and Leon has made that abundantly clear. So that means that in many ways nothing to it can be changed, and by implication that means that there is an enormous role for the international community and for the United States to be played here.

The bottom line is that, I think as I’ve watched this develop and I’ve watched Libya for several years, that Libya by itself that this government of national unity really doesn’t have much of a chance unless the international community and unless particularly the United States and the Europeans really step in.

Libya as you know has had a number of enormous institutional deficiencies that go back way into history, were exacerbated by the Ghaddafi regime, but then the civil war has added to those kind of a number of infrastructural weaknesses that we see, particularly going into Libyan cities. So from a straight building perspective I always like to say both software and hardware were missing in Libya.

So that leaves an enormous amount of challenges as we move ahead hopefully with a government of national accord. The first issue that will need to be solved is physically creating some safe zones, kind of an idea that of course started in Baghdad, but in which the U.N. and through the U.N. perhaps other countries.

You’re probably aware of what particularly the Italians have been saying about getting into Libya. I did a tour last year of European capitals talking about the need for a presence of physical troops, which was at that point still very much disputed and is now coming back as a real possibility.
Of course the militias will need to be controlled. Another unexpected result of the war has been that Libya has become a truly decentralized country, particularly economically speaking. Think of city states like Misarata, and so one of the questions is how do you bring these - what incentive can you give to let’s say Misiratan elites to come back into a national government.

And then finally also enormous difficulties in the reconstruction, for all of which of course the international community will be needed.

There is a possible bright point in which the United States has been instrumental in terms of providing technical advice, and that is the constitutional assembly that is drafting the Libyan constitution. Again, we don’t know yet if that will be adopted, will be acceptable to all the parties or not. There will probably be some wrangling, and here also there will be some need for pressure to be put on the different parties.

Since my five minutes are virtually up let me just say you’re all aware of President Obama’s remark about his regret not having followed up in Libya. I truly think that this government of national accord is probably the last best chance for Libya either to succeed or to really descend into a full-fledged civil war that could take months if not years to resolve.

So I think the United States in particular; but of course the Europeans also because in a way this is no longer their backyard, this is their front yard in light of how Libya has become this haven of destabilization and illegal migration. It may very well be the last chance for the international community to really intervene forcefully.

On the Libyan side there is already a Libyan expert group that is dealing with some of these issues, and I hope that particularly in the United States in cooperation perhaps with the Europeans or unilaterally, we will see the creation of a similar group to deal as Libya moves forward in the weeks and months ahead. Thank you.

[Foukara] Thank you very much. Actually you didn’t even reach the seven minute ballpark but that’s great. Next is I believe Ellen. Ellen, please.

[Ellen Laipson] Thank you, Abderrahim, and good afternoon to everyone. This year our panel is focusing on the regional dynamics, so while each of the countries of North Africa is very distinctive and has its own political trajectory, we’re really going to try to show you a pattern of where the countries are working well together and where they are perhaps on divergent paths.

I’m going to just make a few points on both Tunisia and Algeria, both of which I think aspire to be being responsible regional players. They are countries that to some extent could be preoccupied with their domestic and internal problems but they both see themselves at very difficult scale as playing a stabilizing and responsible role in the region.
On Tunisia it gives me great pleasure to say it’s probably the only panel in this whole conference where we could talk about Arab Nobel Laureates. So mabrouk to the Tunisians, really. Very uplifting, wonderful moment when Tunisian civil society activists were honored for the work that they did not in the most recent government formation process, but in the transition when the Ennahda Party conceded that it was not governing well enough and stepped aside to form a more technocratic government. So their role was really in late 2013, is the reason for the prize.

But it should be an inspiration to democratic activists in the region, not necessarily to governments in the region, and even the Tunisians themselves are debating whether it was mildly insulting that the award did not go to their elected officials but instead went to civil society activists. I personally thought it was a very pertinent and appropriate award.

So Tunisia is in between. It’s still on its trajectory to democracy, but it has reverted because of the enduring problem of radicalization of youth, recruitment to ISIS, terrorist incidents against tourism in Tunisia. It has reverted to an older model of a security establishment and this has drawn them closer to Algeria. So their relations with Libya have deteriorated and their relations with Algeria have improved.

There is very close security cooperation. I think the Tunisians are the dependent party. They are grateful that the Algerians have moved forces to the border. When acute episodes have happened and the Algerians have been able to augment and supplement some of Tunisia’s security requirements.

But back to the more positive agenda. You may have heard a news story this week where the Tunisians are being trained by some U.N. agencies to help stem to basically provide some humanitarian support to the migration crisis, the Africans that are transiting Libya to get to Europe. The Tunisians are now - even private fishermen in Tunisia are being trained to provide some humanitarian rescue to the migrants in boats on the Mediterranean. So here again is Tunisia’s I would say modest confidence that it can play a positive role in the region.

Let me turn to Algeria, and here what we are seeing is a reassertion of a very traditional old role that Algeria has always aspired to and has over the decades sometimes played very, very effectively, and that is to be the anchor or the pillar of a regional security environment, and I think the Algerians are feeling partly - for negative reasons - partly because they feel a bit threatened at the instability among their neighbors, but partly to reassert Algerian primacy if you will, to show that this is a country that has capacity to stabilize both the countries to its immediate south in the Sahel and its neighbors, particularly Tunisia and Libya.

So Algerians may be feeling a bit smug that they could have told us that the Arab Spring wasn’t going to work, but yet they’re playing a fairly nuanced role. In the case of Libya I would say they are taking the position that reconciliation is the way to go. In the case of Tunisia they have also been somewhat understanding and sympathetic
to a more inclusive government that includes moderate Islamists as opposed to the polarization and eventually the terrible violence that they themselves experienced.

One last point on I think how the Algerians would see their role in the region. They would like to show that the Maghrebis can take care of themselves, thank you very much, and that they don't want to see an expanded role for GCC countries and possibly even for Egypt in the region. Thanks.

[Foukara] Thanks, Ellen. It’s remarkable how we’re actually adhering to the allocated time. Bill.

[Dr. William Lawrence] I have all the rest of the time, right? So I’ve been asked to develop some of the Tunisia points a little further and then answer some other regional questions as well, but first I’d like to thank Duke for a wonderful conference as he’s getting cookies to reward him for the great job he does every year with the conference and for the organizers. As the last person I think standing, thank you very much for a wonderful job done.

First question. How can Tunisia resolve the problems of radical extremists on its soil and how can it prevent Tunisians from joining the ranks of Jihadist organizations?

I think the first thing we need to say on this point is that these networks are not new with the advent of Tunisian democracy - they’re old. They go back to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. In the mid-2000s, networks of Tunisians going to Iraq were well established through Syria and otherwise. So the flows of Tunisian fighters which you read about a lot about in the Washington Post infographic and elsewhere have long existed and weren’t particularly influenced by the advent of democracy in Tunisia except insofar as some young Tunisians saw the chasing away of bin Ali as something they could effect again in Syria with the chasing away of another tyrant. And so off they go.

The Tunisian government has prevented an estimated between 11 and 14,000 Tunisians from getting on planes. These numbers may be a little inflated because anyone that goes to Tunis Carthage Airport that wants to fly to Turkey I think is counted in the numbers and a lot of Tunisian informal economic sector actors do just that and they’re not going for jihad, but there have been huge efforts by the Tunisian government to restrict flows.

There’s also the very interesting issue of returnees. We’ve had hundreds of Tunisians return from the front and there’s the notable case of the e-jihadist, for example, a guy in a wheelchair with a technical education who went to Syria to be an e-jihadist got told by the Islamic State that he was going to be a suicide bomber. Complained to his family, they came to Syria and rescued him - this was covered on BBC and elsewhere - got back to Tunisia, and his brother was on BBC lamenting that even though they rescued him from Syria from the clutches of IS, he still wanted to find another jihad to fight.
And we’re finding a lot of the people, Tunisians returning are following back into the same economic and social ruts that propelled them to leave in the first place, and Tunisia hasn’t had the capacity or wherewithal yet to address those significant challenges and create opportunities despite a plan they have for social reinsertion. It hasn’t done much yet.

There is a growth and recent polls show it for jihadi Salafism among young Tunisians. Young Tunisians voted at about ten percent in the last three elections, and so there’s a lot of work to be done to bring Tunisians into the democratic success story of Tunisia.

I’ll also make a brief passing note to the work we did when I was at International Crisis Group. We came out with the first big report on security and justice sector reform, and the picture we painted of the Tunisian security services in 2012-2013 were security services that were either hunkered down in the barracks, afraid to go out and be accused of human rights violations, or going out and score-settling against defenders of the revolution in relatively brutal ways.

We have not yet seen Tunisian security and police that are able to police in a way that you would expect in a democratic post revolution Tunisia and the police unions in Tunisia - you say the word reform to them and they are highly resistant for obvious reasons. And so on the justice side corruptions on the rise in Tunisia and we need huge justice sector reform.

The justice system is overwhelmed, which happens after a revolution. Everyone wants their property back. So you have an overwhelmed justice system. All of that to say that there needs to be a massive international effort to shore up and preserve and protect and develop Tunisian democracy in every sector.

One of the organizations I worked for, we estimated that Tunisia needs about five billion annually, and that the U.S. assistance would rise from the 85 million the Senate’s talking about annually and the 135 million the Obama Administration proposed, up to an 800 million dollar U.S. investment, and all the types of reforms that I’ve talked and could talk about in the Q&A.

Tunisia is very invested in helping solve Libya. Up until about 9 months ago most Libyans were very resistant to this idea, but with the degradation in Libya with the new civil war, the second civil war of 2014, Tunisian presidency has daily meetings on Libya, Tunisian political parties have daily meetings on Libya, and they want to help, and the Libyans are more and more amenable to a Tunisia mediation along with the efforts in [?] to help Libya out of its mess, and that could offer - I mean Beji Caid Essebsi himself is talking to Tobruk [??] himself is talking to Tripoli and there’s some opportunities there to help with the process that Dirk knows so well that’s going on in Sarat.
I'm skipping over some things here. I was asked to speak about Western Sahara, and I can do that in less than a minute. Nothing's happening and the negotiations are going nowhere, and as I published in a piece with [...] in Slate.fr for France, there's even a sacralization of the rhetoric now, so Algerians are talking about the sacred aspirations of the [...] and the Moroccans are tying it to the monarchy and religious themes, and it's a really unyielding rhetoric that doesn't look like it's going to bare any fruit soon.

There are lots of opportunities for Moroccan-Algerian cooperation. They do cooperate in counterterrorism and energy, but every time it looks like there can be another step forward there's two steps back because some foreign minister makes a comment on a trip to Moscow and then you go into another six month refreezing of Algerian-Moroccan relations.

Algerians, for example, want a lot of help with trafficking of all kinds, particularly drugs, all the drugs coming from Central America up through West Africa through Algeria. They want help with that. There are opportunities there and not a lot of cooperation, but there's no question that the biggest opportunity for Morocco-Algerian-Tunisian cooperation is in solving Libya. The Moroccans are invested in the Sarat process. The Algerians have been hosting civil society dialogues and everybody has a stake in solving the Libya conflict, which I would argue, is much more easily solved than Syria. Thank you.

[Foukara] It turns out you guys have made my job a lot easier, so instead of investing time and effort trying to cut you off I have your questions here. So we'll cut to the chase, and I will begin with you, Paul. I have a question here about Egypt. How can the U.S. help - since he talks about the economy in Egypt being the primary threat - how can the U.S. help Egypt rebuild its economy and stabilize the country? If you care after that to say something similar about Libya, but certainly Egypt.

[Sullivan] Well the U.S. has become somewhat circumspect in getting involved in rebuilding countries after certain events in the Gulf area that have proven to be far more complicated than they thought. However, a rebuilding of Egypt - I don't think I would use that term exactly. What I would use is trying to improve the economy of Egypt so they don't walk into another revolution.

If there's going to be another revolution in Egypt it's going to be a revolution of the hungry and hopeless, and that still exists in the country. Try walking around Shoubraat about 1 o'clock in the morning. I see that one of the top businesspeople in Egypt is here today. I'm sure he understands that the threat exists and that his investments can also help the situation as well as other Egyptian investments, but a lot more is needed because the population is growing and the problems are growing faster than are they being solved.

The Suez Canal was a brilliant stroke. The new Suez Canal, the speed at which it was done was amazing. In one argument I've heard against it, and I'll bring up a
counterargument very quickly so everyone in this room understands it, please take a
look at the maps. When someone says the Panama Canal is competing with the Suez
Canal they really should look at the size of the Pacific Ocean. It’s Asia-Europe trade.
There’s no choice but the Suez Canal. This could really make a difference, but U.S.
investments could make a difference.

The reinitiating of the Exim bank, making OPEC a lot stronger than it is, getting a lot
more people involved in understanding what’s happening on the ground in Egypt,
and having those people working in U.S. major corporations - it’s better to work with
the Egyptians than against them. It’s better to have a stable Egypt than another
revolution. Egypt is a pivot in the region.

[Foukara] Let me ask you a question, another question which actually ties into that,
and that is about Russia. Now, how could - the question is how could Egypt’s close
ties to Russia impact Egypt-U.S., the Egyptian-U.S. relationship?

[Sullivan] Well clearly the Egyptians are taking a look toward the Russians because
they have lost a certain degree of faith in our ability to work with them fully, but
there are possibilities that we could bring that back, but trust-building could take
time. The Russians are there.

Obviously it’s going to complicate all kinds of things because of the importance of
Egypt, but also could complicate what exactly happens on the ground in Egypt with
weaponry. The weapons that Egypt used today are mostly American and they’re
standardized; the ability to maintain and fix them comes from here. If you have a
mixture of equipment it makes things far more complicated for the Egyptian military
to do its job.

Also the training for the Egyptian military - I’ve had many of their generals as
students, including some of the folks in higher authorities right now. They get
trained in the United States. It’s a totally different perspective. The other generation
before them were trained in Russia and it’s almost like a different world.

[Foukara] Okay. By the way, if I direct a specific question to a specific panelist that
doesn’t mean that that specific panelist could not respond to something else that
another panelist has said, but Bill, Libya is your thing on this panel. Do you want to
elaborate a little bit on some of the things that you said in your opening remarks in
terms of what you think will work for Libya down the road?

[Lawrence] Let me maybe pick up on a point that was just made in regard to kind of
the U.S. being suspicious of getting too closely involved in state building for obvious
reasons, based on kind of what happened historically speaking, and Libya what we
really saw was in many ways the same thing in that we went in ... to some extent the
demand of the United States went in with a very light footprint, and that we had
made it very clear that we, the United States, that once the fighting was over that we
would step back and it would then be up to the Libyans to really build their own
In part I think that was because the transitional government and the people that represented the transitional government were really kind of less than trained elites, mostly lawyers from the Benghazî side, and so the model that they portrayed seemed to us almost a western model. They talked about elections, they did all the kind of - they talked about all the kind of things that we really wanted to hear. And then what we found out very quickly was that in a sense a lot of this had really put the cart before the horse in that it’s very hard and difficult to have elections if you have none of the prerequisites of those elections that are present, kind of interpersonal trust that you need to make a political system work; the kind of accommodation that losers get in normal democratic systems, et cetera.

And the other problem, of course, was that as opposed to Egypt that Paul just talked about, Libya didn’t really need money. It was supposed to be self-sufficient in a sense, and based on that of course, again, to go back to the remark that President Obama made about the regret about not getting closer involved, all of that. But the other point of course was that in Libya and kind of unexpected we thought and lots of us were quite optimistic at the very beginning - we thought that this western trained elite and so on would really carry the ball so to speak for successful state building and then we found out very quickly that in many ways Libya until really today has no effective government.

And so it’s very hard to do kind of state building under those kinds of circumstances. But overall I think the reason why Libya has not worked very well is really that it really represents an extreme example of a non-functioning and non-existing state in many ways, and that the kind of models of development that we thought we should use certainly were not appropriate in a society where modern state institutions that you find in every single country had really been effectively destroyed by a regime bent on doing that 42 years of the Ghaddafî government.

[Foukara] Follow up question - is building a state as opposed to re-building a state always necessarily a curse? Or a blessing?

[Lawrence] Very interesting question. It reminds me of - you may have seen the remark that Secretary Kerry made at the meeting at the U.N. in New York where one of his remarks was well we need to build Libya, and then he very quickly corrected himself and said no, no, we have to rebuild Libya.

And to go back to your question, Abderrahim, in many ways one of the reasons we were so optimistic about Libya was precisely for what was not present that Paul talked about that was present in Libya, the presence of these deep structural constrains that could present state building.

The army - I could kind of impose after periods of other political activity, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, could really replace, could really reassert themselves, and we thought there was no real deep state in Libya. I think what we found out very quickly was that the way that you can manipulate money, the way that you can create patronage systems in oil states like Libya is as effective as a deep state as any physical body like the army in Libya. So that was a real major difference.

Now, in a sense it could be a lot easier, particularly in Libya because there are no encrusted political systems, there are no political parties for all practical reasons. They don’t really represent much. So on the one hand it would be much easier to start from scratch, but on the other hand what we’re seen also is the resurgence of kind of what I would call in an academic sense more primordial affiliations - tribes, families, and the regional groupings that have reappeared.

And that - when I talked, for example, about Misrata and Misrata emerging as this powerful economic city state, the kind of loss of power to the national government or a better way to put it would be to say the fact that the national government never really developed any power now in a sense makes it more difficult even if you start from scratch to really build institutions.

Because, again, how can you entice economic elites that do very well, for example in Misrata how can you entice militias to become part and parcel of institutions under which the patronage system that is so pervasive in Libya may not work to their advantage the way that it has in the past?

So it could go either way, and why? I said, that international support, particularly on these issues of political development. All the kind of what I call, again, the software of state building really needs to be brought home to the Libyans.

[Foukara] Ellen, did you want to make a specific point on this?

[Laipson] Yeah, on Libya. I just wanted to suggest that maybe what has emerged, taking the realities of Libya is the notion of decentralization. That you could imagine allowing kind of self-governance in whatever are the coherent geographic units. We used to think that it was a very natural division into three.

The same language is being used in Iraq again, that you can have a national government that provides certain functions of national security and managing the economy but that most other things get devolved to the regions. It’s happening in Morocco, it’s happening in Syria. We’re working with local councils in Syria.

So I guess we have to open our minds to the notion, but maybe Libya is an outlier because there isn’t enough quotient of national identity to create that functioning national state even though you might see a solution where you devolve power to the regions.

[Lawrence] I would absolutely agree. I think what we’ve seen is, indeed, this kind of
devolution that has taken place. I always put it if you remember go back to the Gaddafi experiment where he wanted to give power to the people. The people have never had more power than what happened after 2011 in many ways, and part of the solution, undoubtedly will be that some - there will need to be some solution of bringing in these sub-national units into the political systems.

These drafts that we’ve seen of the constitution in Libya so far does precisely that. It makes accommodations for what everybody expects will be a decentralized state. The problem is how do you that, again, in this kind of intense oil economy? How do you make sure that certain units don’t profit more at the expense of the others? Because if you do that immediately you create enmity within your system.

[Foukara] I want to bring Bill into this conversation based on a question I have here. In your opening remarks you talked about the talks in Sarat, Morocco. Now I have a question here that says how can North African countries aid each other in stopping conflict from arising within the countries in the first place, and I’m thinking here about Libya. I’m thinking Libya has Egypt on one side, has Algeria on the other side. How much identity of views do you think is there between Algiers and Cairo on how to achieve stability in Libya?

[Lawrence] A lot of questions in your question there, but let me start by saying the countries east of Libya have mostly staked out positions on Libya in support of one side or the other, whereas the countries west of Libya have been remarkably neutral, and therefore Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are in a much better position to seek the type of negotiated solution we all seek for Libya than anybody to the east.

Most of the disagreement between long regional rivals Algeria and Egypt, and of course this goes back to Nassar and Boumediene and that whole dynamic way back, is that Algeria, as Ellen said so eloquently, is reestablishing its role - it’s not really the policemen for the Maghreb, but the fulcrum, the stabilizing, central power that - at one point an Algerian leader said we will defend Libya up to the border with Egypt.

This is an extreme version of that rhetoric, but there’s a sense in the Maghreb that we don’t want Middle Eastern problems to effect us to the extent possible. And so this creates an opportunity for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, which they’re not taking. So we have an opportunity, for example, for Morocco and Algeria to come together over Libya. They’re not. Morocco has its own [Skida] track. Algeria has its own civil society track. And by the way when you talk about the Libyan border it’s not just Algeria and Egypt. You have the Tunisians, you have the Niger, you have Sudan - there’s six countries in Libya, each of which - even Sudan takes credit for the revolution - each of which has a stake and has a stabilizing or destabilizing effect back and forth across the border.

Let me just add one more thing back to Libya. While I don’t disagree that primordial affiliations are back, I would argue that they’re back in an instrumentalist way,
meaning people are seeking for primordial affiliations to solve the problem. So they’re reasserting tribal identities they didn’t really care about until 2011.

And so the way I look at Libya is armed municipalities and one hundred micro-conflicts around the country, and they’re not even coherent regions. You have a conflict in every town. Kufra, Sirte, Derna. There’s only in Sarata really hangs together. Not even Tripoli. There’s no area where you have uniformity of positions.

You have hundreds of little micro-conflicts. Why? Dirk gave you half the reason. Half to it is dividing up the spoils of the hydrocarbon economy. The other half is dividing up the rest of the spoils. What’s that? The rest of the Libyan economy. The huge informal sector. The huge trafficking of everything, right down to food and pharmaceuticals, and if you control the port you get a piece of the pie. You control an airport, a seaport, a border crossing, and entrance to a town, you get part of the action in Libya, and right now the zero-sum nature of Libyan politics is not just about Islamists versus secularists, or what Qatar or Egypt want. It’s who gets a piece of the pizza pie, right, that supports the local interests of a local group with no ideological basis to that dispute, and this is part of the mess that we’re dealing with in Libya.

[Foukara] I want to come again to Paul in a minute, but on the way back to Paul let me stop with Ellen one more time. Ellen, you mentioned Tunisia. You mentioned the Nobel Peace Prize. So we have that promising aspect of North Africa. The other aspect is the kind of violence that we’ve been seeing in Libya. How would you assess either - the prospects of either one or the other? The Nobel Peace Prize aspect or the violence in Libya spreading to other parts of the region and even further afield?

[Laipson] Well, I think that Tunisia’s already been influenced by Libyan violence, and so there’s a flow across the border in both directions, I guess we could say, that at various times Tunisians have worried that it’s one of these Ansar al-Sharia Libyan groups that stirred the pot, but to be honest as Dirk said there’s a long history of the Tunisians - or as you said I guess long history of Tunisians identifying with jihadi causes, and so we have to be honest about that.

Look, I think that what happens in the Tunisian elite political discourse is deeply about the Tunisian personality. They’re more focused on building consensus and on holding on to that consensus than they are at doing the structural reforms that they need to do. So that is Tunisia’s story, that it will look like a country that is more homogeneous at that top - the people who are politically active and who want to be part of Tunisia’s national life, consensus, and bridging the gap between Nahda and the secular parties that have kind of reemerged as a strong coalition.

I think it’s just a temporary thing. I think that Nahda still has deep legitimacy in the society, but that ability to work together is something they deeply value. That’s what they see as part of the Tunisian heritage and the Tunisian personality, but it’s not sufficient to solve the deeper structural - both economic, access to the modern
economy, access to credit, improving Tunisia’s attractiveness as a market in a
globalized in world, et cetera. Nor is it addressing the problem of youth
unemployment, particularly in the rural areas.

So I think we will have to hold both of these thoughts at the same time, that I don’t
think that Tunisia’s political success has much spillover to any of the current states
of the Arab Spring. I think it is still inspirational and aspirational for young people
who do want their own countries to become more democratic, but I think it’s a fairly
abstract point at this point. It’s not direct influence on the political behavior of other
countries.

[Foukara] Let me bring that to Paul. Paul, in the specific case of Egypt, how immune
do you think Egypt is to the one or the other? Either the kind of democratic promise
that Ellen talked about in Tunisia or the kind of violence that we’re seeing in Libya?

[Sullivan] I don’t think Egypt is ever going to be a Libya, and I certainly hope I’m
right on that one, because if it ever is you’re going to have a country of 90 million
people fighting with each other. That I find is beyond a nightmare, but then again I
never thought Syria would end up the way it is, but Egypt has a certain
infrastructure, a soft infrastructure, a culture that mitigates against such behavior.
In many ways I don’t see that happening. It also has a very strong military, which
will contain the situation.

Libya did not have a strong military. Gaddafí made certain of that and had the
various militias counter each other. Essentially Gaddafí destroyed the country. He
ripped it apart and the only ministry that survived was the Ministry of Oil.
Infrastructure, soft and hard infrastructure for Libya really doesn’t exist. It never
really was a state as we think about it in the Westphalia manner.

Egypt has been a state since the time of the pharaohs, as any taxi driver in Cairo will
tell you this. It is a country that survives also, a country that survived through two
revolutions in the last few years. I went through it myself vicariously and actually by
visiting there. The feeling in that country right now is, my since is, we’ve had
enough, and the extremists on the street in Egypt, nobody wants them there.
Nobody wants them there except for themselves, and IS - they represent nobody.

I think Prince Turki is exactly right when he calls them Fa‘esh, the obscene ones. Do
not confuse this with Islam. It has nothing to do with it. And Egyptian society has
conservative Muslims in it, and I’ll tell you a short story just before the election
when Morsi was allegedly elected. I met with a very conservative Muslim on a deck
on his house in the delta, and I asked him what do you think of Morsi? And he said
this is an outside influence. It’s not Egypt. They don’t represent us. I did not meet a
single person when I was going through that country before the elections who
supported the Muslim Brotherhood. I really wonder what happened there.

And a nightmare that I think about every once in a while is what if Morsi were still in
charge? With the IS or Fa’esh and al Qaeda in the Sinai Province being so active it would be a nightmare for all of us if that were the case. The Egyptian military, excuse me, saved us. Saved the region. Thank you.

[Foukara] How durable do you think this immunity that you say the Egyptian military is providing for Egypt?

[Sullivan] The immunity is actually from the Egyptian people, not necessarily from the Egyptian military, but the Egyptian military is the most powerful in the region, and actually the Americans helped them get to that way. The Egyptian people are not extremists. They’re conservative, but they’re not extreme.

If you were to watch the TV in this country everyone with a beard is about to throw something at you, but everyone with a beard in Egypt is trying to survive a very difficult economic situation except for a very few, and those very few are the ones who end up on TV. I wonder why that happens? How come we don’t see on al Jazeera and Fox TV and CNN the old aunts who actually keep these countries together by taking care of the nieces and nephews and the extended family? How come we don’t see the nice people on the TV? This is the backbone of the Muslim world and the Arab world.

[Dr. John Duke Anthony] Can I add something on that? Having started my lifetime career of no graduation and series of incomplete studying of the Arab world and Egypt, and my father having been director of public safety in the city of Richmond, Virginia, I believe Egypt has long been a policeman’s dream with ninety-plus percent of the population living on four percent of the land, the same four percent of the land last year, last century, the century before that, century before that, century before that, century before that, century before that, century before that, Cleopatra, et cetera.

What inch or millimeter of Egypt does a policeman who’s spent ten, 30 years in the police not know? Not too many places where violent extremists could run unlike Algeria, unlike Iran, unlike Syria, unlike Arabia, unlike Yemen, unlike Morocco, unlike a lot of other places. Egypt is a policeman’s dream that buttresses what you mentioned about the military. The two combined are awesome in their potential and capabilities.

[Sullivan] We can’t forget the culture, a culture which is often misunderstood here, and that culture is - you talked about the time of Cleopatra, it’s a long state, but it’s a culture of family mostly, a culture of [lebe]. If someone gets out of line [lebe] kind of knocks them back.

It’s been weaker recently with the movement toward the cities, but I just can’t imagine something like Libya happening there, and I remember giving a talk here with the Libyan Ambassador Aujali in the audience and mentioning how optimistic I was about Libya at the time. Excuse me ladies and gentlemen, I was wrong, and this is a really sad fact. I really hoped Libya would move forward, and this is a threat to
[Foukara] On that let me cycle back to the situation in Libya and what it means for Egypt. How do you assess the risks that the Egyptians, the Egyptian military in particular, may get sucked into Libya, and how do you as a European view the U.S. position on that prospect, if it exists?

[Vanderwalle] I may be slightly broad because I was really struck by some of the comments that Ellen made. I think particularly for some of the neighboring countries in addition to whatever Ellen mentioned why for example Tunisia is really worried. I don’t think Tunisia is really worried from a military perspective about what is happening but I think Tunisia’s quite worried from an economic situation because you have an enormous influx of Libyans into Tunisia which has always prided itself on this kind of very strict socioeconomic contract between the government and the people with the labor unions stepping in and so on, and so this influx of Libyans into southern Tunisia, particularly into Djerba and so on has really had a profound impact on Tunisians.

My hunch is the same would happen on the Egyptian side, although the Egyptian side of course is marred by a very extensive smuggling. So the impact is really kind of diluted. And I’m not sure if your question was really hedging on would Egypt - would Egypt consider it’s in its interest to invade Libya because of course -

[Foukara] Invade or whatever other verb you choose to you.

[Vanderwalle] On the one hand you can see the immediate fantasies that it raises because Egypt of course Libya would represent economically speaking certainly rather from an employment point of view perhaps an attractive viewpoint, but I would think, and I’m not an Egyptian expert, I would think that there are so many reasons why Egypt would not want to venture into a country like Libya for all of the kind of nefarious consequences it could have to step into a country where - called it the [bita]?? phenomenon. You have massive groups of radical Islamists that could then easily infiltrate into Egypt. Besides all that I do think that any Egyptian move towards some kind of intervention, active invention, would really be met by enormous resentment and enormous pressure from the United States, but particularly also from the Europeans.

[Foukara] And you know in terms of the trust that - somebody talked about in their opening remarks the lack of trust, I think it was Paul, between Egypt and the United States. What would that mistrust do to a U.S. position against the Egyptian military thinking of intervention in Libya?

[Vanderwalle] I must say it’s not something I’ve thought about very carefully, but my hunch would be that the United States would see any kind of intervention into Libya, which is already such a precarious position and whereas I said international intervention will really need to be targeted. Any type of intervention, whether it
comes from the Egyptians - remember that the Algerians have also made a few noises about possibly intervening - that would be seen as highly deleterious to the position of the United States and of the west in Libya and therefore, again, I think would create a very strong reaction to avoid it.

[Laiplson] Unless there’s a scenario where though a U.N. process or some other means, that there’s some minimum receptivity on the part of the major Libyan factions to invite them in, which I think we all would agree at present, but there is this global trend towards regional solutions to regional problems and less expectation that western countries come swooping in with the scale of resources necessary. We don’t live in that age anymore.

So whether there would be ever the conditions where there’d be an acceptance of either a Libyan or an Algerian role to help stabilize Libya it would obviously require some acquiescence on the part of the Libyans, and maybe you’re saying that’s just not achievable.

[Vanderwalle] Just a final note on that, remember that when Gaddafi came to power one of the first things he said to Nasser was we made this revolution for you, and the Libyans never forgave him for that, so I wouldn’t think that anybody would want to repeat that.

[Foukara] I want to come to you if you have anything to add to what we’ve already heard, but I have a question here and I’ll loop in both Libya and Egypt into this question. The question we have here is how can Egypt and North Africa in general help with the global anti-terrorism initiatives? The issue of trust between the United States and Egypt, the Egyptian military doing what it says is the best for Egypt. You have the Obama Administration saying several times stringent measures in Egypt and elsewhere by the powers that be actually fan terrorism. What is your take on that?

[Lawrence] Under the guise of fighting terrorism I think we need to focus more on the real terrorists and less on those who are associated with the terrorists, and this gets back to what I wanted to say on the previous point. One of the great unexpected I think in my case externalities of the U.N. process on Libya was that the Misratans created some distance with Tripoli and Zintanis created some distance with Heftar and there was a new negotiation and closeness between the strongest militia on one side and the strongest militia on the other towards a negotiated solution in the Libya case.

And this is exactly the type of thing you want happening despite all the talk about fracturing and fragmenting on each side it’s actually good that the moderates of each side who are lambasted on social media and in a lot of the traditional media rhetoric as evil terrorists actually there were if not moderates, dealmakers on each side that could offer a way out of the overall dignity conflict and the big conflict in Libya distinct from the micro-conflicts I talked about early.
I think the key is fight the real terrorists. So for example I spent a lot of time with people I work with encouraging Misrata to hit ISIS Sirte and there was resistance there. Why? Because just like in Syria nobody wanted to be attacking ISIS when ISIS was the ally against the big enemy, Assad, who was responsible for over 90 percent of the civilian deaths. Thirty-four thousand from the barrel bombs. So you don’t want to make a deal with the devil but the devil’s fighting the worse devil.

In Libya no one wants to be friends with ISIS or with al Qaeda types. Derna’s fiefdoms nobody wants to be friends with them, but if they get pushed by the worsening conflict to be friends with bad guys they’ll do it, and then everyone who’s aligned with the bad guys becomes a terrorist and your terrorist pools goes from three percent of the guys with guns to s60 percent of the guys with guns.

So what we really have to do is focus on counterterrorism on the really bad guys, and I would say for Egypt in the Sinai, right? Not the guys on the streets in Cairo whose relatives are in jail, no. The actual terrorists in Sinai, and I think the more we focus on the actual terrorists we create a space for eventual negotiated solutions to some of the big political issues.

[Foukara] Great. Now, before we started the panel Paul expressed a keen interest in the issue of the [Nabha??] Dam and what it means for relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. How do view the outcome of that, and how do you view the impact of that outcome on Egypt’s position in North Africa as a whole?

[Sullivan] And do you want me to write a Ph. D. on that.


[Sullivan] Okay, forty-five seconds. Well, to give quick background for those that are not familiar with it, the Ethiopians started building this dam in the middle of the Egyptian revolution, which kind of put them, flatfooted in the whole situation. Egypt is already using about 99 percent of its available water allocation. If you go down to the end of the Nile River near the Mediterranean it’s a trickle. Clearly Egypt could tighten up on its use of water. That’s something that the U.S. and Egypt have worked on for some time, but if the filling up of the dam is done in an inappropriate manner the Egyptians could be losing considerable water.

That’s part of the big negotiation that’s going on right now. It has to be filled up properly. If it’s not filled up properly then there’s going to be problems downstream, and that could cause some difficulty for Egypt. If you take a look at what happened in the 1980s when the Nile had low flow, Egypt had difficulties with its electricity production and also with irrigation. The best thing to do on this because it’s a fait accompli is for the Egyptians, the Sudanese, and the Ethiopians to work together on this and to try to figure out a way to resolve their conflict without increasing animosity, which is what I see going on right now. There is a way to do this and
actually there’s no alternative to this because the dam is there, it will be filled, and it has to be dealt with.

[Foukara] Okay. I have another question which I think needs a bit of a scalpel. It says how has the U.S. dealt with enemy organizations within North Africa while still maintaining a relationship with those countries themselves? Any takers?

[Lawrence] I’ll take a stab. I don’t think there’s any confusion between the U.S. relations with the states and the U.S. relations with enemies in the state except if the U.S. is seen to be transgressing, but when does that happen? For example, when the U.S. Marines stopped a Libyan oil sale out in the Med. People in Libya were very happy about that.

Now, when the U.S. went into Libya and went after al-Libi the terrorist involved in the Kenya - that created a lot of consternation in Libya, not that the U.S. had done it, but they’d done it one Libyan soil without permission, but then the - not that much consternation because the Libyans know there isn’t much of a government to push back anyways. So is the U.S. making incursions in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia independent of what the states want? Not really.

I’d like to make one other point I wanted to make earlier but we only had five minutes. There’s a lot of competence analytically in North Africa but not always the ability to get things done, and there are many examples of this. One for me was Mali. Hilary Clinton famously said after her trip to Algiers that the Algerians had the best analysis of what was going on in Mali and she really thought they had the way out. There were some things the Algerians were positioned to do and they failed, and they had quite a bit of egg on their face because the networks they had in Mali weren’t as strong as they used to be and there were some betrayals and some other things when the attack happened in Mali, and so this is one of my main concerns in North Africa. It’s not that the U.S. doesn’t agree with the states in the region. It’s when the states in the region say don’t come in, we’ll handle it, they often don’t have the capacity to handle it and then that creates further problems.

[Foukara] Dirk, given the U.S. interventions in Libya that Bill alluded to, how do you see the U.S. ability to actually maneuver in Libya and try to help the peace process?

[Vandewalle] There’s been a lot of work done behind the screen so to speak in terms of the constitution, in terms of thinking through possible ways of recreating some of the ministries and so on. So there is a good deal that is going on, but the U.S. has always said publicly that the countries that really should be at the forefront of all of this should be Europe of course because again Libya is no longer the backyard for Europe, it’s really the front yard in many ways because of what is happening.

As I described all the kind of challenges that this country faces that really needs to be built from the ground up, I would think that there’s an enormous amount of
opportunity. In many ways I think the United States has been a little too careful sometimes in Libya where it should’ve been a little bit more forceful in terms of pushing some initiatives though, and of course we remain wedded to the doctrine of no boots on the ground in Libya even under the current configurations that are talked about. To provide these safe zones throughout Libya where some of the local militias particularly will we brought in, the Zintani and the Misrata for example have allegedly agreed to help patrol Tripoli if a unity government is signed. We all know these are very unstable agreements.

Militias start fighting for very unimportant things, and so the United States in a sense should have a much more robust presence, particularly in cooperation with the Europeans, but the Europeans themselves as we all know have been rather reluctant in many ways in part because - part of it is institutionally, organizationally you’re dealing with a large number of countries in Europe. They couldn’t really reach an agreement, and certainly I felt as I was testifying in front of some committees and so forth a different parliament last year that they didn’t understand the real issues, the real challenges that were going on, and it was very, very difficult to really come up with a common solution.

We are starting to see that, and I think everybody in Europe understands that. If this unity government really is to function, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, there will need to be a robust international presence to make it work. My hunch is that would work best if also the United States could be engaged even more than it has been so far again by maybe creating some kind of group that could inform the debate, particularly working with this Libya expert group and so on. There’s a lot more that can be done and again since we have regrets not having done something perhaps its time to do something.

[Foukara] Okay, Ellen. I can’t resist the follow up. Ellen, the British were involved in Egypt, the French were involved in many parts of North Africa, the Italians were involved in Libya. The U.S. has no equivalent to that in North Africa. How much of an asset for the U.S. in that part of the Arab world do you think?

[Laipson] Well I think for the post-independence generations, from the 60s on it was hugely important that the United States had never been a colonial power in the region, but I think the disappointment with what they see is an American retrenchment or a shift in the absolute preeminence of the United States compared to other countries also means that there’s always a disconnect between what the countries in the region want or expect us to do and what we actually deliver I think.

So I think it has been an advantage historically. I don’t think it’s sufficient as a net positive for us anymore. We still have to show up at the party. We have to put something on the table, and I think that the meetings that take place on strategies for our aid and technical assistance and what should be - there’s a lot of smart thinking, there’s a lot of good will towards helping Tunisia, and of course the Egypt policy is fraught with other sources of friction. But I think on Tunisia it’s pretty
straightforward but we can never quite deliver at a scale that’s going to really, really make a difference on the ground.

So I think we’re living in a period where there’s always a sense of disappointment that the United States doesn’t have as robust a presence or commitment as people on the ground would like.

[Foukara] Okay. Paul, back to you on a question you addressed, at least you addressed one dimension of it. I have a question here which says, Egypt will always be a main strategic player in the Middle East or North Africa, depending on how people see it. So, how and why does the U.S. allow itself to go eastward – meaning to Russia? Do you agree with the premise of the question, first of all?

[Sullivan] That Egypt is a strategic presence in the region?

[Foukara] No, that the U.S. is pushing it to Russia.

[Sullivan] Oh, I see what you’re saying. Meaning that it’s going to be a proxy party in a Russia-US discussion, can we use that word? Because I wouldn’t put it at the level of conflict yet, and I certainly hope that it won’t turn into a conflict, because if it does we’re looking at a gathering catastrophe and that catastrophe is getting closer by the day, by the way.

Egypt is involved in Yemen. It has its supporters from the GCC. It’s marginally involved in the Syria situation. It’s getting a little bit closer to the Israelis it seems. It has marginal, indirect impact on many other countries in North Africa. One could hardly think of an Egypt where it’s placed with the Suez Canal and its strategic position with a major military and other organizations not being a strategic input.

This is one reason why the Russians are so interested. This is another reason why the Americans are so interested. But the last thing I want to see is this part of the world become another proxy Cold War battle zone, because, nothing good will come from this. Nothing good will come from it.

[Foukara] Okay, Bill, if I may circle back to you on the issue of what is happening in Egypt and how you think it affects the dynamics between two other countries in the region, Morocco and Algeria. Remember Algeria was the first country that Sisi visited.

[Lawrence] And Beji Caid Essebsi made his first trip to Algeria as well for all the reasons that Allen said, so articulately. But there’s a .. and of course there’s this rivalry between Algeria and Egypt. But Morocco has much more of a stake of what happens in Libya than what happens in Egypt. And I don’t think there’s a lot of daylight or difference of opinion between Morocco and Algeria on Egypt related things.
I think where Egypt comes to play is .. don’t forget Morocco has made a bet on the PJD. We have our own inclusive political process in Morocco that is not entirely distant from the Tunisian one. So the degree to which we eventually get to a place in Egypt where there’s a reconciliatory, inclusive politics, right, that strengthens the bet Morocco made on the PJD, that strengthens the whole Algerian reconciliation, which those who remember why Bouteflika came to power in ‘99 it was for reconciliation not for eradication. That Egypt moving in the right direction helps reinforce what Algeria and Morocco have been preaching all along, which is a Mahgreb style of politics, inclusive politics. Let me say one quick...

[Foukara] First of all, what do you describe as the right course in Egypt.

[Lawrence] Dialogue. Dialogue. And don’t get me wrong. Neither side is seeking it now. It’s not like one side is seeking it and the other one isn’t. But there’s no dialogue now.

But let me say just one other thing about Putin. Because I think this is important and I think it is lost. Putin is not operating from strength. Putin is operating from weakness. He’s made a bad bet on Assad in Syria, as Bill Burns said at U Maryland last week, a side that controls about one sixth of his own territory. And Putin was, Putin frames everything through this NATO competition. Ukraine, Syria and even Libya and Egypt is the same thing. It's reducing NATO's influence on the region. And I know because I briefed the Russians a lot when I was at the Crisis Group and I dealt a lot with the Russian questions.

Putin himself was obsessed, was interested to the point of obsession on how Qadaffi was killed because he wanted to know what NATO’s role was and what the big, strategic plans the U.S. had, which is so much different from our frame in the U.S. of Obama leading from behind and the French and the Brits out ahead on Libya. That wasn’t the frame through which Putin saw it.

And I think the essential story here is not about Putin ultimately having a very strong foothold in the Middle East based on any kind of legitimacy. He stepped into an I think I might agree with Paul, he stepped into a vacuum, right, and he’s benefiting while he can but I’m not sure he’s made very good bets.

[Foukara] Okay, I come back to Dirk for another Libya question. We talked about economic reconstruction in Egypt. Talk a little bit about how you see reconstruction in Libya. Can you fight and build the economy at the same time in Libya?

[Vandewalle] The obvious answer is no. And why the unity accord is so important because first of all no one will step in and the Europeans have made that clear. Unless the government of national accord is established the Europeans will not go in, not even in the safe zones that I talked about earlier. So obviously no company is going to come in with the record of the lack of safety. Most of the companies, virtually all have left even those that normally stay until the
bitter end, including some of the Turkish companies.

So that needs to be established, then beyond that, assuming that it can be established. Then you have, the Libyan expert who talked about this in great detail, what kind of direction do you want for the Libyan economy? This is an oil economy where roughly 50,000 Libyans are employed by both upstream and downstream activities in the oil sectors; where up to 80 percent of the active population is actually employed by the state. So you’re talking about hundreds of thousands of people who either get a check every month or sit home and still get that check.

The question is how do you turn that around?

Now Libya has experimented, even in the last years of the Qadaffi years by introducing a private sector and creating all kinds of incentives for international investment trying to create some free ports, etc. You know the big model here is Morocco that has moved much more rapidly and in competition with Libya on all of this.

But above all, the challenge also will be creating the rule of law and a predictable investment climate in Libya and that will only happen if you have a unity accord and also that you can ensure that the militias are actually going to abide by the rules of the law. You know, that to me is still a major question, a major issue that has been unresolved and will probably be unresolved for quite a few months into the future.

**[Foukara]** Thank you very much. Unless any of you has anything else to add I will come to Doctor Anthony for some final remarks and then I’ll close.

**[Anthony]** I found this fascinating and richly presented by specialists who have spent their lifetime on this particular region. About the American aspect in Arab North Africa, which people say is America-light, sort to speak, I guess, compared to the French, compared to the British, compared even to the Italians. But the following I would submit is significant and has had an impact, and indeed a legacy.

Following the American Civil War’s conclusion, 1865, significant numbers of both northern soldiers, most of of them engineers, almost all of them engineers, and from the south as well, were recruited by Egypt to help to develop Egypt’s water systems, irrigation works, small dams and the like. And so that was 160 years ago. So it’s not that this was a recent impact.

The American University in Cairo is second only to the American University in Beirut in terms of institutional longevity and its position and role in producing leaders not just of Egyptians, but others as well. Prince Alwaleed bin Talal established the first center for American studies anywhere in the Arab world at the American University of Cairo. It’s there. The immediate previous past president of Saudi Aramco is on AUC’s board, and went there as well as AUB.
The Naval Medical Research Unit known as NMRU, has existed or left its imprint in Egypt for decades and its work on schistosomiasis and parasitic diseases born from the Nile. Then in a perverse sort of way the United States had contribution to the non-aligned movement. Dulles was, John Foster Dulles that is, was militant in competing with Moscow and I think Elias Samo used the metaphor about the elephants there in the grass, and if I remember, Kwame Mfume and Nasser both agreed on that, when two elephants fight one seldom defeats the other, but what always happens is that the grass gets trampled underneath.

So Nasser responded to that and the American heavy-handedness as did Nehru, as did Tito, as did Nkrumah, as did Sukarno. These were the five founding members of what became 130 non-aligned nations and they have had an impact and it had a lot to do with the action, reaction and interaction of the United States being heavy-handed and what it wanted to do for the Aswan Dam and back to the Russians.

It was the Russians that came to help built that. And if remember it increased Egypt’s irrigatible land by close to a third. It enhanced electricity, which enabled Egypt to become a manufacturing and an industrial power El-Magalla el-Kubra and elsewhere to a greater extent than certainly through the American involvement then.

Then we come to Tripoli and the Bay of Tunis and Thomas Jefferson’s involvement there and the Marine’s song to the Shores of Tripoli. It’s not Tarabulus in Lebanon, it’s Tarabulus in Libya in terms of the American Marines they identify with Arab North Africa.

Then in Tunis, not near Tunis, rather in Morocco, in Tangier or Tangiers as many people pronounce it, is TAMS, the Tangier American Legation Museum. It’s still there. Forty some rooms, every one of them is like straight out of Architectural Digest there. It’s a gem there. It’s a treasure.

And the American University in Morocco, between Al Fez and Maroush there that was built on the American standard there. And perhaps lastly, no back to Tunisia for a minute. We talked about businesses and investments. Tunisia had something called FIPA, Foreign Investment Promotion Authority and delegations I took there – I took 15 there – they would say within one whole day you can get your licenses to build whatever you want to build. And there would be one desk in a semi-circle for labor permits, one for water permits, one for sewer permits, one for electricity permits, one for environmental permits, one for worker permits, one for.. and they had a principal and a deputy and then a deputy assistant.

You could go to all of them in one day and get all the permits you needed. If any of us in this room wanted to build a building anywhere in Washington, DC, New York, Baltimore wherever, it would take us a year and a half to get those permits. The building would be all over the place. The codes would be complex in the extreme. So, Tunisia set the best example on that front, best seen of any developing country.
Lastly, is the Euro Med Dialogue to show how desperate the GCC countries were to have a strategic dialogue with the United States, and we kept refusing and refusing and refusing for reasons we heard one of the speakers give yesterday, they joined the Euro Med Dialogue even though the Gulf is nowhere near the Med. As a result of that, I know of at least once project, the GCC Secretariat has the name, address, email, telephone, and mobile number of every academic in all 27 EU countries that work on Arabia and the Gulf. And so do those in the 27 EU countries have the name, address, email, and whatever of every academic in the GCC region.

Now what does that mean? For the last five years there’s been an annual conference in Cambridge. It’s three and a half days, all on the Gulf. I’ve been to every one of them. The first one there were two hundred people, two Americans, all the rest were Europeans. The next year, four Americans, all the rest Europeans, the next year six, we’ve gotten up to around 16 Americans now, but 400 Europeans. They are swamping us, mopping us off the floor. And yet it is we who have mobilized and deployed tens of thousands of forces to that region, not so much the EU. They have the knowledge and the understanding and the requisite bearing of policies and positions and actions and attitudes towards that region better than we do and that is a big reason why.

[Foukara] Thank you Doctor Anthony. Thank you very much. Doctor Anthony has asked me to say something as an adjunct to this conversation about the colonial legacy in North Africa and I promise I will be very brief and also will say it on a personal level.

I am an Arab from Morocco, which is a former French colony as is Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt. There was some good things, there was some bad things in the colonial legacy. Look at this for example. Because I am from Morocco a former French colony, normally I would have ended up in a French speaking country like Belgium, or France, or Canada. There are hundreds of thousands of us, people from North Africa, people from former French colonies now coming to the English speaking world, including this beautiful country, the United States. And I think that the lesson here is that whether you speak Arabic, or English, or French, or whatever language you speak, the lesson here is that if we all speak the language of dialogue and respecting my rights and me respecting your rights, if we all speak a language where the military does not dominate me, I do not dominate the military, the Islamist does not dominate me, I do not dominate the Islamist, the liberal does not dominate me, I do not dominate the liberal – then it doesn’t matter what legacy we come from then we will be making headway.

Because poking, if you poke my eye and I poke your eye then we both end up blind. Whereas if we talk like we’re talking now, in Arabic, in English, in French, in whatever language we’re speaking then we’ll be making headway. I hope you will always have eyes and I hope you will always speak in tongues that promote the rights of us all as citizens, regardless if we come from a former French colony,
British colony, American colony, as some would like to talk about American colonialism in other parts of the world.

It's a legacy that has its minuses; it has its pluses. I think for me, for my generation we do not necessarily relate to that colonial legacy in the way that my father's generation relates to it. And I think that provides hope until we get a situation like Libya for example, then people in the region start talking about, are the Europeans coming back? What are the intentions, and so on? I think we all got to a situation like Libya precisely because we didn't have the kind of dialogue that I love and cherish.

Thank you, very much.

Before you go, I want to thank you all. Let me thank you in name.

Let me begin with Dr. Paul Sullivan to my left, Dr. Dirk Vandervalle, Ellen Laipson, and William Lawrence and also Doctor Anthony.

Thank you all, very much.

[Voice] And you, Abdulrahem Foukara.

[Anthony] As a tag on to that he was modest and self-effacing enough not to note that Morocco was America's first friend. When George Washington was still alive Morocco recognized the young fledgling republic. No one else came earlier. Oman sent the first Arab ambassador: Both were bookends of the Arab world.

Speaking of bookends the Palestinian issue has come up over and over again, at the margins, sometimes central – we had an entire session. But it does rank as the oldest, the most massive and the most pervasive of the obstacles in the stumbling blocks on the issue and level of trust and such. There was also the element of racism that lives on. Algeria got its independence after an eight-year struggle, with, correct me if I'm wrong, something like one out of eight Algerians was an orphan at independence. Not a typographical error.

The writings of Frantz Fanon influenced a generation of not just Arabs but American civil rights activists in terms of the merits and demerits of violence and non-violence with his “La Damnés de la Terre” or the “Wretched of the Earth” or the Moire De Theme De Molard [phonetic]. With the million man march anniversary this last Saturday and with the emphasis on Black Lives Matter, Frantz Fanon, he's relevant and he matters. And with his white faces or black faces and white masks, these are ongoing legacies between Arab North Africa and America.

In Algeria one of the best boulevards is John F. Kennedy Boulevard in Algiers.

We will bring this to a close with no remarks of any profundity. We've had them here. One of the people on the panel that we just had was Ellen Laipson and I’ve
known her for a long time and she because the number two in the spooky business over there in the CIA in the analysis and assessments, etcetera. So I count myself as one professor who would like nothing more than to follow in the shoes of the student. She has been extraordinarily productive as the head of the Stimson Center and a role model for many.

We talked about the media a lot and how what passes for exaggeration and violence and flamboyance seems to quickly become the consensus amongst overheard conversations in taxis among our elected representatives and some appointed ones as well. And the dangerous aspect of that for our needs, our respective Arab and US needs, Arab and US concerns, Arab and US interests, Arab and US foreign policy objectives.

So I think we’ve learned a lot. We started by saying that information is key, but it is not enough but it is linked to insights. And insights are key, but that is not enough, and they are linked to knowledge. But knowledge too is not enough, because it’s not the same as understanding. Understanding is key, but one more thing is needed and that is wisdom. But all four of these things are components of wisdom. But what we’ve seen is that no one here is an expert. At best we are specialists. We are students getting incompletes. None have a monopoly on the method. No one has a patent on the process. Not a single person has a trademark on the technique or copyrights on the concept.

Thank you all. We look to see you next year for the 25th. That will be a quarter of a century. Bye bye.

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