Security Cooperation in the Middle East

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The US is going to have to rebuild and modernize the structure of its security cooperation in the Middle East over the coming years. It must adjust its methods of security cooperation to deal with major changes in the threats and military requirements in the region, to the outcome of events in Iraq, and to the need to deter, contain, and defend against Iran. It must reassure its friends and allies that it seeks common security, rather than its own unilateral goals. It must rebuild confidence in US restraint and willingness to consult its allies as true partners. It must show that cooperation with the US will provide tangible improvements in regional security rather than be a source of instability and risks.

These problems are compounded by the backlash from the Arab-Israeli conflict, resentment of US mistakes in Iraq, the feeling in much of the Middle East that US anti-terrorism has been anti-Arab and anti-Islamic, and war scares involving Iran. With the exception of Israel, virtually every country in the region now sees security relations with the US in terms of liabilities – not simply advantages. Being a superpower is not enough, the US must also show that cooperation with the US offers far more benefits than costs, and that it is a partner and not a liability.

The Political and Diplomatic Dimension

The military dimension of security cooperation is only one aspect of such cooperation. Military cooperation can only succeed if the US can deal effectively with the diplomatic and political sides of security cooperation. This will require major new efforts to rebuild trust between the US and its regional friends and allies, to improve US military engagement with its friends and allies, and to improve the quality and content of US public diplomacy.

If the US is to build the political and diplomatic foundation for security cooperation, it must do a far better job in several important areas:
The US must show that it respects the sovereignty of the states in the region, and the values of its peoples. Its efforts at political and economic reform must be evolutionary, not transformational, and be based on working with local governments and reform at the pace they can absorb. It must accept the fact that its recent efforts at “democratization” are sometimes seen as either efforts to impose US values or create governments the US can control or dominate: an indirect form of regime change. It must understand that institutions take time to build, that democracy cannot function without moderate political parties, and that a focus on economic reforms and the slow, but steady improvement of the rule of law and human rights is both far more acceptable to the regimes and peoples of the area, and a far sounder basis for stable progress than a rush towards elections.

*It must show that the US focus on counterterrorism is not anti-Islamic and anti-Arab, and does not put counterterrorism before the same values in the rule of law and human rights that the US seeks to encourage throughout the world.* The US should build on its very real successes in quiet bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, and publicly recognize regional successes as well as point out occasional delays and failures. It must also recognize that every country in the region has a different set of threat perceptions than the US, defines terrorism and terrorist in different ways. Cooperation means cooperation, not imposing a US view or issuing threats, sanctions, and demands.

*The US must constantly seek a full Arab-Israel peace settlement.* The US cannot solve the Arab-Israel conflict, or force a peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, between Israel and Syria, or within Lebanon’s competing factions and confessions. It also, however, cannot build a stable basis for security cooperation in the MENA region unless it is seen as constantly proactive in seeking to help the nations and peoples involved move forward. Near-term success may be impossible, but a constant, visible, and serious US effort to create a lasting set of peace settlements is an absolute necessity.

*The US must show that it will keep its military presence as limited as security conditions permit, and show it has no desire for bases or a military role that does not help bring security and stability to its friends and allies.* The US needs forward basis and a forward presence for the foreseeable future, but that should always be in the context of providing mutual security in areas where it is necessary, and efforts to build up regional partners and reduce the need for US forces.

*The US cannot ignore the needs of Iraq or the threat posed by Iran. It must recognize, however, that the US must avoid unilateral action wherever possible, and must consult, discuss, and listen rather than act unilaterally.* Partnership is a two-way street, and the US cannot succeed by ignoring friends and allies or assuming that they must follow the US lead.

*The US must introduce full transparency and support security cooperation with far more effective public diplomacy.* It needs to constantly explain and justify its threat perceptions, efforts at security cooperation, military actions, and diplomacy in far more detail. It needs to use far softer and less US-centric rhetoric. The US needs to be far more responsive to regional and local concerns and perceptions, rather than assuming they should follow the US lead.

*The US must explicitly explain why security cooperation benefits the MENA nations involved, rather than focus on its own domestic concerns and politics.* This includes the use of military facilities, arms sales, and every public aspect of cooperation in counterterrorism.
of military cooperation in areas ranging from counterterrorism to conventional warfare to countering weapons of mass destruction which are only possible through significant improvements in partnership and trust.

The Military Dimension: The Changing Strategic Environment

As pages 12-15 show, the US and its friends and allies in the region must respond to a complex mix of major changes in the strategic environment in the MENA area. Each bullet or topic in these pages could be the subject of a lengthy analysis, but several factors have special importance:

- The emergence of ideological threats and non-state actors now affect virtually every state.
- There is a clear need to look beyond conventional war fighting and include counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-WMD, and defense against asymmetric warfare in every aspect of security cooperation.
- The US and its regional allies must look beyond the narrow definition of Joint warfare as cooperation and joint operations between armies, air forces, and navies, and include internal security, police, and intelligence operations in jointness.
- The US must explain every aspect of security cooperation through an active public diplomacy effort and demonstrate its value to the countries and peoples concerned.

“Success” by past standards is failure in meeting present and future needs. There are major ongoing changes in the strategic environment, and the US can only succeed if it works with regional friends and allies to deal with asymmetric warfare, non-state actors, proliferation, terrorism, and the threat of Islamist extremism.

As pages 16 and 17 show, security cooperation must be refocused to look beyond conventional threats, and to tailor military forces to show growing restraint in the scale of force they use and in taking the risk of inflicting civilian casualties. Security cooperation must meet the challenge of placing steadily greater political constraints on the US and allied use of force at a time when non-state actors and some possible national threats show steadily less willingness to show such restraint in either the use of force or they weapons systems they are trying to acquire.
Differences in Need and Resource by Sub-Region and Nation

The US must also base its security cooperation on the fact that security cooperation in the Middle East involves three different groups of states and sets of issues, as well as different needs and interests in each friendly and allied state. Pages 20-26 show the size of the different military forces and military resources in each subregion, and the relative size of the forces and resources of both US friends and allies and those of potential threats from nation states.

Differences in Need by Subregion and Allied or Friendly State

One key to success in security cooperation is to recognize that no two states in the region have the same perception of their interest, the threat, or how to deal with security cooperation with the US. It is to accept the fact that they see their region in a very different way from the US. At the same time, pages 20-26 reflect the fact that both the US and regional states in North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf do have broadly different sets of needs by subregion.

- **In North Africa, the US focus should be on security cooperation in achieving regional stability and in counterterrorism.** The tensions between states, while real, have no reason to escalate into conflict. There are, however, good reasons to encourage security cooperation with North African states, help them develop their capabilities for counterterrorism, and seek to avoid new competitions in acquiring arms at the expense of internal stability and development.

- **In the Levant, the US must largely compartment security cooperation with Israel and cooperation with friendly Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, but can improve security cooperation with all these states.** The risks of a new Arab-Israeli conflict are real. The 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, and Israeli-tensions with Syria, present major challenges in terms of building up capabilities for conventional war, counterinsurgency, and cooperation in counterterrorism. The Iranian effort to acquire long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and possible Syrian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, also creates the need for cooperation in areas like missile defense and dealing with the problems of proliferation.

- **In the Gulf, the US must deal with the strategic importance of a region whose petroleum and growing gas exports fuel key elements of the global economy.** It must be able to offer security and partnership to its Southern Gulf allies, deal with success or failure in Iraq, deal with Iran’s growing asymmetric capabilities and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and provide security for the flow of some 25 million barrels a day of petroleum through the Gulf and Red Sea.
The Military Forces and Resources of Allied and Friendly States

Pages 20-26 also show that America’s friends and allies have solid base of military forces and resources for developing security cooperation. This is particularly true in the Gulf region, which is the only subregion involving immediate military threats to US interests.

There are no direct meaningful military threats to North African states, and each state in the area has the resources, capabilities, and need to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. There is no immediate risk of proliferation, and states have the resources to buy the conventional warfighting capabilities they actually need. Asides from the lingering struggle in the Western Sahara, which is now more of a human tragedy than a significant conflict, the emphasis should be on internal security, stability, and development. Arms are far more a luxury than a necessity.

For all of the tensions and uncertainties involved in the Levant, the security relations that the US first established at Camp David have stood the test of time, and Jordan has become a partner in peace along with Egypt and Israel. These US allies also have vastly larger military resources than potential threat states, and the military balance and impact of comparative military expenditures and arms transfer sharply favor the US in cooperating to strengthen Egyptian, Israeli, and Jordanian forces.

The future of security cooperation in the Gulf is less clear, driven largely by the uncertainty at to whether Iraq will become a strategic ally or drift towards instability and some form of partition. Once again, however, the US has strong friends in the Southern Gulf, and active bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar and contingency facilities in the UAE and Oman, Saudi Arabia provided substantial military support to the US in the Gulf War and invasion of Iraq. The South Gulf states also have more major weapons than Iran, far more modern weapons, and much larger GDPs and military budgets.

As pages 20-27 show, the Southern Gulf states collectively spend more than seven times as much on military forces as Iran and some 30 times more on arms imports. The challenge is not more resources, it is to use existing levels of resources more effectively and in ways that not only improve US cooperation with the Southern Gulf states but also improve cooperation among them.
Cooperation and Force Modernization

Effective security cooperation will require major changes in the ways most friendly and allied military states carry out their force planning and military modernization, as well as in the ways the US structures its forces, advisory efforts, and arms sales. These changes affect the priorities for conventional forces, dealing with asymmetric threats, counter proliferation, and counterterrorism.

Conventional Force Modernization

The broad priorities for changes in conventional force modernization are summarized in page 28. They affect key issues like jointness, a focus on systems quality rather than systems numbers, changes in manpower policy to emphasize training and leadership, and the need to improve interoperability at a broad level. They also highlight the need to shape regular military forces to give a new emphasis on defense against WMD, asymmetric attacks, and carrying out missions in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

These priorities vary by subregion and by individual country. A standardized, or “one size fits all” approach to security cooperation, would ignore the very different security priorities and threat perceptions of every state in the MENA area. There are, however, some broad common priorities:

- *Every regional state has the need to improve its counterterrorism capabilities and to prepare for the risk of some form of counterinsurgency* – if only to help neighboring states. As page 29 shows, the US has an equal need to focus security cooperation in ways that will assist friendly and allied states in dealing with these missions and requirements.

- *Improved capability and interoperability is needed in situational awareness and the capability for net centric warfare in a broad range of areas and missions.* Page 30 summarizes some of these needs, but cannot reflect the different needs and priorities of individual MENA states, or the broader issue of developing cooperative force plans and architectures for improving battle management systems (BM); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and command, control, communications, and computer systems (C⁴). These improvement are particularly vital in the Southern Gulf where a lack of strategic depth relative to critical targets and infrastructure, and the need to secure Gulf waters and their approaches, requires an new degree of systems integration and interoperability between the US and allied states and between Gulf states.

- *Changes are needed in land warfare capabilities that focus on counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare, and link the army to cooperative missions with the security services and police.* As page 31 shows, these include a new emphasis on urban warfare in friendly and politically sensitive areas, and the ability to provide lasting civil security once enemies are defeated at the tactical level.
Matching changes are needed in air capabilities. As page 32 shows, the priorities for regional airpower have shifted to include joint warfare that deals with terrorist threats and asymmetric warfare. The need to perform traditional missions like air-to-air combat and interdiction missions remains, but airpower needs to broaden its role and increasingly be part of integrated land-air-sea missions for asymmetric and irregular warfare.

New priorities are also needed for naval warfare capabilities. As is indicated in page 33, this is a particularly important area for developing the capabilities of allied and friendly states because of the limits in US Navy countermine warfare capability, the fact coastal defense must be largely a national responsibility, the strategic vulnerability of critical coastal and offshore facilities and shipping traffic in areas like the Gulf, and the need to deal with small craft, infiltration, and asymmetric attacks at the local level. At the same time, allied and friendly states cannot hope to match US capabilities in areas like missile defense and anti-submarine warfare.

Special and elite forces are emerging as key assets for counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare. The mission priorities for Special Forces are not changing as much as the need for Special Forces as a key element in force development and security cooperation. Page 34 shows some of the key reasons nations need to continue to expand and improve this aspect of their force structures, and why US ability to use its Special Forces in coordination with those of friends and allies is growing in importance and value.

The Challenge of CBRN Warfare and Missile Defense

CBRN warfare and missile defense represent perhaps the most technically complex and costly aspect of the need for security cooperation in the MENA area. Two key challenges drive this requirement. One is the possibility of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and a nuclear-armed long-range missile force. Another is the possible acquisition of CBRN weapons by non-state actors and extremist movements.

This potential threat, and the requirements for security cooperation, vary sharply by subregion and friendly or allied state. Page 36 does, however, provide a brief overview of the various ways the US and its allies can meet the CBRN/missile challenge. It is clear that these range from active to passive defense, and the possibility of the US expanding security cooperation to include extended deterrence – the kind of security assistance it had to provide its NATO allies during the Cold War.

Dealing with the threat of CBRN terrorism – and its possible use as weapons of intimidation or in covert attacks and proxy warfare – creates additional needs for security cooperation. These needs are summarized in page 37 and they include efforts to prevent proliferation and to respond to attacks, not just efforts to counter terrorists during the attack phase.
Security cooperation also needs to give new emphasis to civil and passive defense, including critical infrastructure and facilities. These options are listed in page 38. They expand the concept of “jointness” to include both the design and modification of key civil facilities and cooperation with emergency responders.

The Challenge of Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism presents some of the greatest challenges in security cooperation. It involves some of the most sensitive issues in state-to-state relations, and can only be effective where there is mutual trust. The broad political and diplomatic contexts in which such trust must be built have been addressed earlier. Pages 40-44 summarize the complex mix of issue and options involved for the US and its regional friends and allies.

- **Real world cooperation must be built on an understanding and acceptance of how difficult it is to go from words and slogans to effective cooperation.** As page 40 shows, the MENA region is filled with conflicting national needs, tensions, and threat perceptions.

- **There will never be full cooperation in defining and prioritizing threats and in defining terrorism.** For all the reasons shown in page 41, the US, as well as its friends and allies, can only succeed if they accept this reality.

- **There national divisions create requirements that must be taken into account in going beyond political symbolism and exhortative efforts at cooperation.** These requirements are listed on page 42, and the US needs to be far more sensitive to allied needs and perceptions than has often been the case in the past.

- **There are, however, many different ways in which meaningful cooperation can take place.** These are listed on page 43, and it is clear from both regional efforts at dealing counterterrorism, and past successes in cooperation in counterterrorism, that these methods can produce substantial success.

- **Cooperation can take place even in sensitive areas like intelligence.** This is a difficult area for the US even in dealing with some of its NATO allies, and MENA countries find it exceptionally difficult to cooperate in these areas. As page 44 shows, however, there are a range of methods that have already been shown to work, and which provide a basis for steady improvement in the future.

Building Real Partnership

Both the US, and its regional friends and allies, need to change many of their past approaches to security cooperation if they are to develop more effective forces and mission capabilities.
• The US has sometimes failed to act upon proven ground rules for effective security cooperation, but there is no mystery as to what those rules are. The basic principles involved are summarized on page 46.

• Arms sales should be a way to enhance security cooperation, not simply way to earn export income or reduce equipment costs to US forces. The volume of recent US arms agreements and deliveries to MENA states are shown in pages 47 and 48. Most of these sales have clearly helped the buyer state develop more effective forces, and have involved sales under the Foreign Military Sales or FMS program that have ensured that the buyer gets sufficient sustainability and aid in absorbing the new systems. The US can, however, do much to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of its present FMS system and needs to do so. It also needs to work more closely with friends and allies to ensure that arms sales support clear concepts of force development and will produce high priority improvements in mission capability.

• US weapons, military technology, netcentric systems, and tactics need to become more “alliedcentric.” The US is just beginning to fully adjust its military development and procurement process to try to improve jointness among its own military services. It is clear, however, that if the US is to build more solid partnerships in security cooperation, it also needs to pay more attention to ensure that friend and allies can use its weapons effectively, and in ways that are interoperable with US forces. These goals are summarized on page 49.

• There is a range of areas where the US needs to work with regional friends and allies to develop mission focused modular cooperation. Needs will vary sharply by country, but page 50 lists some of the key areas for such efforts.

• Partnership also requires political, education, and cultural cooperation. There is a critical civil dimension to security cooperation that required support from both the US and MENA states, and which takes into account the immediate need to deal with terrorist and extremist threats. These priorities are summarized on page 51.

• The US and its regional friends and allies need to learn from Iraq and Afghanistan, and improve cooperation in armed nation building. Iraq already needs far more effective cooperative efforts, and similar cases are all too likely to arise in the future. Page 52 examines what in some ways is the most challenging case for security cooperation: The problem of armed nation building.
Changing Strategic Environment
QDR’06 Objective – Force Transformation Must Be Re-Defined

Capability Portfolio

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Disruptive</th>
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<td><strong>Defeat Terrorist Extremism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Counter WMD</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“Shifting Our Weight”</strong></td>
<td><strong>Defend Homeland</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Today’s Capability Portfolio</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shape Choices</strong></td>
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- **Irregular**
- **Catastrophic**
Changing Strategic Environment-I

- Struggles to deal with national threats, often of very different kinds and fought on different terms;
- International struggles to defeat terrorist movements that cut across national lines, and often cultures, political systems, and religions;
- An ideological and political battle against Islamist extremism, and tensions between the West and Middle East, that act as a breeding ground for terrorism and the tolerance or support of terrorist movements;
- A struggle to deal with new forms of national and global vulnerability such as proliferation, increasing dependence on information technology and netting; critical infrastructure, and the secure, just-in-time flow of global trade.
- Terrorism/insurgency cannot be separated from asymmetric warfare and insurgency, state use of terrorists as proxies or false flags, or terrorist use of states as sanctuaries.
Changing Strategic Environment-II

- Cannot separate forces or technology from need for humanitarian, nation-building, stability operations.

- All military actions have broader consequences, part of information warfare, public diplomacy, war of perceptions.

- More than local perceptions count: World opinion, world media, NGOs, UN, etc.

- Loss of limits on violence and choice of targets: Eschatological and extreme goals justify violence as an end in itself.

- Growth and exploitation of ethnic and sectarian conflicts: Kurds, Berbers, Turcomans; Shi’ites, Sunnis, Christian, Jews.

- Transformation of Arab-Israeli conflict into asymmetric war within Palestinian movement and potentially Israel and Lebanon; state exploitation of proxies and vice versa.
Changing Strategic Environment-III

- Ideological -- largely religious -- challenges to secular and moderate regimes: Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.

- Growing risk of use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons: “Superterrorism.”

- Efforts to create “clash of civilizations:” provoke religious tension and conflict between Islamic world, and West and other non-Islamic societies.

- Impact of US and Western intervention; Islamic immigration to Europe and US.

- Ability to exploit “weapons of mass media:” Instant satellite news, cell phones, internet; create loose, informal networks cutting across national and regional lines.

- Blurring of lines between State and Non-State Actors.
Beyond “Conventional” War

- Must retain core conventional capabilities, but
- Asymmetric capabilities are acquiring equal or greater importance.
- Proliferation, CBRN terrorism, precision strike, long-range missiles are changing lethality.
- Spectrum of unconventional warfare from terrorism to insurgency to mixes with conventional forces.
- Political and ideological struggles are linked to terrorism and asymmetric conflicts.
- No clear dividing lines between police, emergency responders, security forces, military forces and new need for jointness.
- Deal with unpredictable mixes of nation state, proxy, and non-state actors at local, regional, and international level.
- New forms of cooperation with allies often vital.
Evolving Constraints on Warfare

- Real time political and media dimension: “Effects based warfare” depends on political effect, not just military ones.
- Tactical victories can be meaningless without political, ideological, information, and media dominance.
- Steadily growing constraints on civilian casualties, collateral damage, friendly fire.
- Operations in civilian areas are steadily more political and sensitive.
- Must have politically correct solutions to dealing with interrogations, detainees, and prisoners.
- Equity in force protection and risk with all national forces and allied forces.
Different Requirements and Resources by Nation and Subregion
Different Requirements and Resources by Nation and Subregion
MENA Military Manpower: 2007

(In Thousands of Active Uniformed Military)

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2007
MENA Main Battle Tanks: 2007

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2007
MENA Combat Aircraft: 2007

Source: IISS, Military Balance 2007
MENA GDPs: 2006

(In SUS Current Billions)

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2007
MENA Military Spending: 2006

( In $US Current Billions)

Source:IISS, Military Balance, 2007
MENA Arms Deliveries: 1999-2006

(In $US Current Billions)

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, CRS RL34187, September 26, 2007
MENA New Arms Agreements: 1999-2006

(In $US Current Billions)

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, CRS RL34187, September 26, 2007
Changing Needs for “Conventional” Force Modernization
Reprioritizing “Conventional” Assets

- Having most modern weapons platforms lose importance, with possible exception of stealth.
- “Netting” and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities become far more important.
- Smart, precision, and more lethal weapons become critical.
- Armor shifts to force-wide protection.
- Fight on friendly territory/collateral damage/protection of civilian becomes much more critical.
- Systems must defeat *both* conventional and asymmetric enemies.
- Modular adaptive systems versus fixed long-service life systems.
- Interoperability needed at joint level with other services, security forces, police, and emergency responders.
- Optional interoperability with allies at every level.
- Adapt to CBRN and missile challenge.
- *Human skills, training, experience, and initiative more critical than things and nets.*
Complex Counterterrorism/ Insurgency

- Detect, characterize, and attack informal, affiliated, non-hierarchical networks.
  - Non-state actors cutting across national and regional lines with multiple centers of conflict.
- Support public diplomacy/political warfare: Give allies key role.
- Deal with reactive, delegated, disassociated cells and “amirs”
- Conduct joint operations with security, police, local authorities, emergency responders, other government agencies, and critical infrastructure/facilities.
- Standardize communications, reporting, display, and alert systems.
- Cooperate with allies, neighbors, and international organizations.
- Communicate insurgent/terrorist propaganda, political actions in real time; monitor public opinion.
- Monitor and warn of new tactics, actions, ideology on global basis.
- Restructure protection, weapons, equipment, and IS&R assets.
New Forms of Situational Awareness


- Effects-based warning versus Effects-based operations.

- Focus on lower-level hostile action: raids, sabotage, asymmetric attacks, IEDs, urban low-level, targeted killing, critical facilities, and infrastructure, allied protection.

- Rethink targeting, damage assessment, impact of collateral damage and political sensitivity.

- Political awareness: Internet, Media, Public Opinion.

- Near-real-time “fusion.”

- Reliable, non-hierarchical field distribution.
Changing Land Capabilities

- Respond to lower-level and asymmetric threats.
- Joint operations that are flexible and adaptive and include paramilitary and emergency response capabilities.
- Urban and MOBA capabilities in friendly and political sensitive territory.
- Netted IS&R and battle management systems for terrorism, insurgency, and proxy warfare.
- Force-wide protection against snipers, ATGMs, Manpads, IEDs, and low-level threats.
- Police and government capability to “hold” and “build” to support military ability to “win.”
- Identify, kill, detain terrorist and irregular forces.
Changing Air Capabilities

- Respond to lower-level and asymmetric threats.
- Joint operations that are flexible and adaptive and include paramilitary and emergency response capabilities.
- Support to police and security forces, not just army & navy.
- Air operations in Urban and MOBA areas and friendly and political sensitive territory.
- Netted IS&R, battle management, *targeting, and damage assessment* systems for terrorism, insurgency, and proxy warfare.
- Real time netting, retargeting, and precision ground strike capability with land forces.
- Identify, kill, terrorist and irregular forces.
Changing Naval Capabilities

- Respond to lower-level and asymmetric threats.
- Attacks on ships, naval forces by small craft, guided missiles, sabotage and infiltration.
- Coastal infiltration and low-level raids.
- Attacks on critical offshore, port, and shoreline facilities: Desalination plants and energy facilities.
- Mine warfare, raids and harassment by small craft, and other low-profile attacks.
- Restructured, netted, joint surveillance, intelligence, and communications systems, and displays.
Special and Elite Forces

- Respond to lower-level and asymmetric threats.
- Joint operations that are flexible and adaptive and include paramilitary and emergency response capabilities.
- Infiltration, intelligence, targeting, and collateral damage functions.
- Operations in Urban and MOBA areas and friendly and political sensitive territory.
- Netted IS&R, battle management, targeting, and damage assessment systems for terrorism, insurgency, and proxy warfare.
- Real time netting with other forces including security & police.
Meeting the CBRN and Missile Challenge
Meeting the CBRN/Missile Challenge

- *Multi-level response capability tailored to threat mix.*
- Netted ballistic, air, and cruise missile defense and warning.
- Precision conventional strike retaliatory capability.
- Nuclear retaliatory capability?
- Extend deterrence from US: Conventional and nuclear?
- Netted cooperation in intelligence, warning, detection.
- Stockpiling and pooling of emergency response assets.
- Characterization and triage capability.
- Civil and passive defense.
- Joint military, security, police, emergency response operations for all levels of attack.
- Immediate public information response.
Countering CRBN-Terrorism

- **Prevent Proliferation:**
  - Strengthen the NPT to include proliferation to terrorist organizations and stricter punishment for states with WMD capabilities that are considered sponsored of terrorism.
  - Protect fissile materials and their production from being used by terrorists organizations established under the Lugar-Nunn initiative.
  - Strengthen the NPT or introduce new measure stop any proliferation or enrichment of Uranium and Plutonium.
  - Protect ports from the transfer of materials that can be used for CBRN weapons.
  - Share best practices between states for screening materials and containers.

- **Protect after attack to minimize the damage:**
  - Build possible scenarios and contingencies plans.
  - Train and build capacity of first responders and investigators to manage a CBRN attack.
  - Governments must have clear plans to deal with public information and warning to counter panic, inform the media, and minimize economic impacts.
  - Share data and training methods with other countries.
  - Prepare disaster management agencies to deal with a WMD attack.
Civil and Passive Defense

- See civil defense as key element of operations.
- Identify and protect critical infrastructure and information systems.
- Design or modify to reduce vulnerability.
- Redundancy, rapid repair, “self healing” facilities and systems.
- Design to aid military, security, police, emergency response operations for all levels of attack.
  - Physical security and operational security should be interactive.
- Immediate public information response.
Meeting the Challenge of Counterterrorism
International Cooperation: Key Sensitivities

- The Arab-Israeli conflict: Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, Israeli extremists, role of Syria and Iran in using proxies.
- The impact of US intervention in the region: Role in Iraq and Afghanistan, ties to Israel.
- Post 9/11 tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia; US and West and Islamic world.
- Special needs to deal with ongoing struggles in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc.
- Sensitivity of Islamic extremism;
- Divisions between Sunnis, Shi’ites, and by sect.
- Berber issue in North Africa
- Cultural tensions over Islamic immigration to Europe, “culture shock.”
- Different views of reform; how to address the “causes” of terrorism.
- Views of threat or non-threat from Iran.
- The broader Kurdish issue: e.g PKK.
- Freedom of speech vs. counterterrorism: e.g. radical clerics incitement in the UK.
- The Chechens’ “struggle” for independence vs. Russian security; autocracy in Central Asia.
- Spillover of problems ion Pakistan, South Asia, East Asia, South Asia.
- Divisions between individual Arab countries in North Africa, Levant, Gulf and Arabia.
- Differences over control of charities, financial institutions, fund transfers.
- Differences over control of population movements; tracking individuals.
International Cooperation: Myth & Good Intentions

- Cooperation can be based on trust and common values: One man’s terrorist is another man’s terrorist.
- A definition of terrorism exists that can be accepted by all.
- Intelligence can be freely shared.
- Other states can be counted on to keep information secure, and use it to mutual advantage.
- International institutions are secure and trustworthy.
- Internal instability and security issues do not require compartmentation and secrecy at national level.
- The “war on terrorism” creates common priorities and needs for action.
- Global and regional cooperation is the natural basis for international action.
- Legal systems are compatible enough for cooperation.
- Human rights and rule of law differences do not limit cooperation.
- Most needs are identical.
- Cooperation can be separated from financial needs and resources.
International Cooperation: Dealing with Reality

- Cooperation cannot be based on trust and common values: One man’s terrorist is may be another man’s freedom fighter, proxy, or source.
- Intelligence cannot (and will not) be freely shared, particular raw and sensitive intelligence.
- Large numbers of other states cannot be counted on to keep information secure, and will often attempt to use it to national advantage.
- International institutions leak and are politicized. Unless specially designed for other purposes, and even then present unusual risks.
- Internal instability and security issues are political “crown jewels” and the resulting sensitivity leads to extensive compartmentation and limits on cooperation.
- The “war on terrorism” often does not create common priorities and needs for action.
- Bilateral, multilateral, and national clusters of cooperation – not international or regional organizations are the natural basis for cooperation.
- Legal systems often differ sharply and present major problems in cooperation.
- Differences in approaches to human rights and rule of law differences can sharply limit cooperation, and create a major political and media impact.
- Many needs are not identical, and national priorities are often sharply different.
- Cooperation cannot be separated from financial needs and resources, and many regional states have severe limits in terms of resources and/or specialized expertise.
Making Real World Cooperation Effective

- Strengthen bilateral and “cluster” cooperation in more sensitive areas according to national priorities and needs.
- Find approaches to international and regional cooperation that bypass national and regional sensitivities.
  - Compartment counterterrorism from ordinary diplomacy, limit open/transparent operations.
  - Avoid common lists of terrorists and organizations.
  - Avoid making counterterrorism another forum for regional disputes and controversies.
  - Avoid efforts to create a common definition of “terrorism.”
  - Avoid focusing on sensitive aspects of intelligence.

- Many areas of broad cooperation still remain:
  - National designation of organizations and individuals.
  - Selective international action in many areas: Controlling funds transfers, tracking movement, etc.
  - Sharing of training methods, defensive and response systems.
  - Legislation, efforts at reform and dealing with causes of terrorism, standards for law and human rights.
Intelligence Cooperation

- Sharing of intelligence that can be exchanged between friendly nations, and be supported on an international or regional level at some levels:
- Transfer of selected data, focused cooperation, in areas of common interest.
- Release of generic data at secure and open levels.
- Hierarchical secure, standardized systems for sharing finished data in agreed areas. Standardization of collection, reporting, content, and IT systems in select areas.
- Sub-regional “cluster” and specialized regional organizations; integrated and virtual staffs.
- Creation of Interpol-like “national” designation systems identifying organizations and individuals as “terrorist;” creation of common centers and/or data bases.
- Exchange of intelligence officers and common cells.
- Exchange training systems, less sensitive collection and analytic methods, IT system design.
- Agreements for common operations, especially in security areas.
- Exchange/sale/transfer of secure communications gear, collection gear (UAVs, etc.)
- Open source designation and reporting.
- Near Real-time exchange of critical data on IT system or “hotline” basis.
Creating Real Partnerships
Partnership

- Real security dialogue at the bilateral and regional level means listening and last personal relationships.
- Security cooperation should focus on security and stability, not political or social reform. Such efforts should recognize the legitimacy of different values and be the subject of a separate dialogue.
- Build trust by clearly seeking friend or ally’s security.
- Focus on building local self-defense and deterrence capabilities, not presence or dependence.
- Help friends and allies build forces in their own way; do not “mirror image.”
- Recognize the reality that other nations define threats and allies differently from the US.
- Arms sales must clearly benefit the buyer, not just the seller.
- Ensure sustainability, capability to operate own forces in own way.
- Responsive, time sensitive aid, deployment, sales, and transfers.
(In $US Current Millions)

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, CRS RL34187, September 26, 2007
# US Arms Deliveries: 1999-2006

*In US Current Millions*

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Source: Richard F. Grimmett, CRS RL34187, September 26, 2007
“Alliedcentric” Systems

- Shared systems/real-world interoperability.
- Not just military: Ministries, security, police, governance, courts.
- Compartmented security with maximum transfer
- Simple, maintainable, training built-in.
- Transferable legacy; affordable sustainment
- Faster decision-making loop, but:
  - People cheaper than IT.
- Accept uncertain status of “ally:” Risk of changing sides, ethnic/sectarian/tribal rivalries and shifts.
  - Time limit/off switch/IFF-self defeat/destruct
“Modular” Cooperation

Sharing of systems, tactics, technology that can be exchanged between friendly nations, and also be supported on an international or regional level:

- Help in design of national and regional counterterrorism centers; improving such facilities.
- Immigration management, ergonomics, personnel tracking systems.
- Training systems for most force elements.
- Tactics for most missions.
- Case studies and models in integrating regular military, internal security, and police operations.
- Case studies and models in dealing with human rights and rule of law issues.
- Equipment and systems design for many defense systems: E.g. CBRN detections and characterization; IED and bomb detection/prevention, IT defense, critical infrastructure defense.
- Equipment and systems design for many aspects of response: E.g. CBRN response; emergency medical response, maintaining civil order, etc.
- Threat assessment techniques; vulnerability analysis, lethality and damage assessment models, methods of risk analysis.
- Information Technology (IT) systems and subsystems.
- Law enforcement, counter-drug interface tactics, systems, and training.
- Financial regulation, control, and tracking systems.
- Educational efforts, dialogue, media outreach.
Political, Educational, Cultural Cooperation

Cooperation at the political level and in public diplomacy can be critical:

- Common efforts to condemn terrorism, label organizations and individuals as threats.
- Religious and counter-terrorism dialogues and meetings.
- Lead role for Islamic states in countering extremism and “deviants.” Support, not challenge from West.
- Cooperation in blocking movement of spokesmen and actors, reviewing requests for asylum, movement of propaganda.
- Cooperation in ensuring maximum freedom of movement for non-terrorists.
- Education and educational reform
- Religious efforts to counter extremism and intolerance.
- Mutual education of media; common briefings.
- Exchanges on values, perceptions, and popular reactions to counterterrorism efforts.
- Supporting role of legitimate human rights organizations.
- Cooperation in outreach to media.
- Cooperation in public diplomacy.
- Economic aid and assistance.
Armed Nation Building

- All operations have become stability operations, exercises in stability and “nation-building”
- Critical importance of political conciliation, ideological operations.
- Again, tactical victories can be meaningless without political, ideological, information, and media dominance.
- Governance and provision of critical services is critical.
- So is personal; security for the population and preserving/creating the rule of law.
- “Dollars are better than bullets:” Value of economic incentives and aid.
- Need incentives to convert, disarm terrorists, insurgents, irregular opponents, not just force: “Carrots as well as sticks”
- Conflict termination must treat the causes and not just the symptoms.