

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS

18TH ANNUAL ARAB-U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE

“FRESH VISIONS, OLD REALITIES, NEW POSSIBILITIES: THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGE ON ARAB-U.S. RELATIONS”

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2009

**RONALD REAGAN BUILDING & INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

“DEFENSE COOPERATION- ENHANCING REGIONAL SECURITY”

Chair: Dr. John Duke Anthony- President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

Speakers:

Mr. Christopher Blanchard- United States Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; author and co-author of, among other works, numerous CRS studies for the Congress, including reports on the Gulf Security Dialogue and related U.S. arms sales, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and regional perspectives on the Iraq conflict.

General Joseph P. Hoar (USMC, Ret.)- Former Commander, U.S. Central Command, with responsibility for planning and operations for 27 countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Horn of Africa. Upon retirement from his long military career, General Hoar formed J.P. Hoar and Associates, a consulting firm engaged in business development in the Middle East and Africa.

Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, (U.S. Army, Ret.)- Executive Vice- President, Advanced Technology Systems Company (ATSC), former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle East Policy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

Mr. Richard J. Millies- Vice President, International Strategy and Business Development, BAE Systems; former Deputy Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense and former Director of Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs.

H.E Mohammed Bin Abdullah Bin Mutib Al Rumaihi- Foreign Minister’s Assistant for Follow Up Affairs, State of Qatar; Qatar’s Ambassador to France and non-resident Ambassador to Belgium, the Swiss Federation, Luxembourg, and the European Union (2002-2003); Head of the Government Committee for Delineating Maritime Borders and the Working Team of the U.N. Security Council (200-2007).

Anthony

Chairing this session will be Christopher Blanchard, whose been long a productive member of the Policy Analysis Foreign Affairs Practitioners in the nation's capital. His works are required reading, highly regarded and respected, and because when you deal with policymaking issues it is unavoidable to factor in the congressional, national legislative reality and processes. And he's in that branch of the U.S. Government in the Congressional Research Service, that provides analysis based on facts and as Congressman Ellison said to be informed, and to be thoughtful, and to be responsibly knowledgeable about these issues before one votes. Christopher Blanchard.

Blanchard

Good morning, thank you Dr. Anthony for that kind introduction. I'm not sure, compared to our distinguished panel here, how long I've been a trusted voice on these matters but I'm happy to be in such distinguished company this morning. Welcome. This panel will be focused on defense cooperation; I had the pleasure of speaking on this panel last year when we were looking forward to trying to set the agenda for the new administration. To sort of review issues that we are going to be facing in the administration as it came in. So I'm looking forward to this discussion now that we are 9 to 10 months into the administration and there has been some significant changes, both in the region and in the administration's approach.

In Iraq, the U.S. transition continues, I'm looking forward to the parliamentary elections in January. The Iraqi security forces continue to develop and reconstitute their capabilities. The administration is pursuing new strategies of policies of engagement both with Iran and Syria, and obviously the engagement of the peace process has been welcomed, I think, by many of the U.S. - Arab allies and also embraced by our U.S. allies in Israel. The main focus of the moment as you know is a bit further to the east in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some very important strategic decisions about to be made by the White House and obviously U.S. defense cooperation with many of the Arab states will continue to be pivotal to the success of the strategic decisions that the Obama Administration makes.

Dr. Anthony asked me to make some very brief comments on the Hill's view of the defense cooperation issue. I should stress that my remarks this morning and also my role in the panel is my personal capacity and does not necessarily represent the views of the Congressional Research Center. But I would say that in general my work has led me to the conclusion that despite what we often hear maybe about a rocky relationship with the Hill on some of these defense issues, arms sales etc., the truth of the matter is that the leadership on the Hill, I think the majority opinion continues to recognize the value of the defense cooperation relationships that the United States has with its Arab allies. Continue to improve the line share of proposed arms and service sales to the allies in the region. Some 54 billion dollars in potential agreements from 2001 to 2008, and the Hill continues to view the issue of defense cooperation through these lenses. Obviously the issues I mentioned above, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran's role in the region and obviously the partnership with Israel and Israel's QME. Issues that I hope or know our panelist will touch on today, integration in the region, partnerships between the GCC countries. How to address non-conventional threats, including threats from Iran but also threats such as piracy and

proliferation. The transition I addressed in Iraq, the strategic decision, the pivot towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, the engagement on the peace process and hopefully something that Congressman Ellison mentioned, what the administration, their partners, and also the Hill can do to sort of create more understanding on this important subject.

Our first panelist this morning is familiar to all of you. He is currently serving as the Executive Vice-President for Advanced Technology Systems Company, formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, and also long served as a Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans at United States Central Command. I am pleased to welcome Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt.

Kimmitt

Chris, well listen, first thank you very much for that introduction but as we sort of connived among ourselves as old generals have a tendency to do. My sense would be more appropriate if we started off with General Hoar, I'm going to cede my time, initially, to General Hoar. Because he's going to give a sort of how we got to here which might be a better way to start this entire session.

Hoar

Thank you Mark. What we attempted to do was to prevent the two of us from saying exactly the same thing over the next ten or fifteen minutes. And so, I'm going to try and provide a little bit of a background to all of this and what has really been good in respect to defense cooperation. A bumpy road but nonetheless good, and then Mark is going to pick it up and talk about the current events in Afghanistan and Iraq and where we're headed. Defense cooperation as you know is not a new issue, going back to Mr. Roosevelt the Lend-Lease Program is probably one of the best examples of this. And in the wake of the Second World War as we saw communist expansion we became very involved in the existing friends and allies that were either under pressure from external communist sources or internal subversion. And that took place across Europe, Latin America, and of course along the Pacific Rim, with mixed results I might add. But the point is that this has been going on for some time and it's probably useful to remember that with respect to the Middle East context in 1968 the British produced a white paper that said essentially they were going to withdraw from east of Suez. And I remember being in Washington at the time and thinking, boy we should pay the Brits to stay on, this is going to be a big job. And I never realized exactly what a big job it turned out to be, and of course we've been at it in a very large way since.

And of course the single event as we became more enmeshed in the Middle East were the results of the Camp David Accords in which we produced military assistance in a big way both to Israel and to Egypt. 1.3 billion dollars a year for the Egyptians, 1.7 billion a year for the Israelis, which continues to this day. This is contentious but in various different ways, the point is that we provided that money for the defense of those two countries. You will recall that Egypt, as a result of this had already split their relationship with the Soviet Union but they were also viewed as an outsider by many other countries in the region for having made peace with Israel. And so shortly after that time we see that Saudi Arabia began to become more involved with American

equipment. But what has evolved over the years is a defense cooperation that has three separate elements. The first is training; all of our U.S. services are involved, to a greater and lesser degree, of helping with training in other countries. This may be very simple down at the squad, platoon, company level with army formations. It may involve seaman ship, aeronautical ability, but everyone does it. But there's a cost, and so when we do this for another country we expect to be paid for our time and our work. And as you know that can be handled through foreign military financing which is money that we give to other countries and they in turn give it back to us for goods and services or foreign military sales which of course the national money that is used. The one exception to the training, of course, is the U.S. Army Special Forces Troops which are organized and equipped for foreign training. As a result that training does not cost the host country any money. That money is borne by the Special Forces people and the object of this is that many of our friends around the region are not capable of defending themselves. But within their own capabilities they need to improve and be able to participate in coalition operations.

The second format here, of course, is the sale of equipment. This isn't to say that foreign countries don't make good equipment. They frequently make excellent equipment, the issue is that we believe that in a coalition context where the United States will be the lead organization, as we have seen in several other occasions, that it is important for interoperability that when possible our friends ought to have the same sort of equipment that we do, that we are able to talk on the radio to one another, that we may have commonality on spare parts and in items and so forth. And so the equipment business is important and it is important that the U.S. contractors work because it is to the benefit of the United States to sell American equipment abroad. The final piece of this three legged stool is of course professional education. One that is frequently lost in the discussion but some of us believe is perhaps the center piece of this whole program. Which is to take up and coming officers from countries around the world and provide them with opportunities to come with their families to the United States for an academic year to study. And that program over time has evolved so then it is not only a military experience but it's a cultural experience. Foreign students that come to a war college or to a command staff college are provided a sponsor in class. In many parts of the country they would also have a family sponsor in the community. During the academic year that the families travel to Washington, D.C. to visit the Congress, the White House, many of the things that are of interest here. They go to New York to see the U.N. and so forth.

My good friend General Mahaya whose the Chief of Staff of the armed forces in Saudi Arabia, and a very candid commenter on U.S.-Saudi relations, always speaks with great fondness of his three tours in the United States in Alabama or in Texas. And the friends that he made in the communities and people that he still stays in touch with. And this has been my experience throughout the world. That the top ranking officers in so many of our friendly countries are people that have attended command staff or war colleges or equivalent programs some place in the United States. Now with respect to the countries that we work with, many of them are not always capable of defending themselves. But they must do it in a way, we think, that is consistent with their capabilities and their organization. We had a very rich and important relationship with the country of Kuwait, a very small country. Iraq has always had irredentist claims on Kuwait as a result of the colonial period after the Ottoman break out. That's a very dangerous neighborhood and we got involved big time with Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq War

when we reflagged Iraqi tankers and the U.S. Navy provided convoy support as they moved up and down the Arab Gulf.

It is interesting; many of you may not realize that the largest naval engagement that was fought since World War II was fought in the Gulf in the late 80s. And Admiral Tony Less who may be here today was the commander of the joint forces. The final issue that is most important is of course the fact that in Desert Storm, Desert Shield that the Arab forces gave a great account of themselves. Particularly in the Khafji Battle with Prince Khaled bin Sultan as the commander of the Qatari forces, the Saudi National Guard forces, gave a great account of themselves. Subsequently in Somalia, GCC countries in Pakistan, and others in Egypt participated greatly and we see this continuing growth with UAE and Jordan currently operating within Afghanistan and we believe that some of those requirements are going to continue. This defense cooperation has continued to mature in the Middle East and is becoming more important and I am sure that Mark will bring you up to date on what we are doing now with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan. Mark.

Kimmit

Well General, thanks for that introduction and that historical overview on sort of where we got to today. Now 9 months into the administration there may be many that think that the new tone and tenor that is taken on by this administration is being helpful. And I would be one to agree as well. But I think it's also as important to recognize that the United States has been heavily involved in this region for the last sixty plus years and we're going to stay involved in that region for years and years to come. It is not a matter of any particular administration; it is not a matter of any particular president in power. America has a commitment to the Middle East; America has a commitment to its friends and allies in the region. And that will sustain itself for years and years to come. There may be many that suggest that since we're downsizing in Iraq and increasing in Afghanistan, that somehow as we leave Iraq that we are leaving in the Middle East. Although I am not a member of this administration I think I am on pretty firm ground to suggest that even though we are reducing in Iraq we will still maintain a strong and steady relationship with the countries in the Middle East.

Central to that strategic relationship is the defense relationship. There is probably no greater expression of America's involvement in the Middle East on a day to day basis than the tens and hundreds of thousands of American troops that are operating in that region. Some that are operating under combat conditions and a large number that are operating, as General Hoar said, to train, and equip, and support role throughout the region. And I would like to talk a little bit about that today but it also may be helpful to go back and review what America's strategic objectives are in the region. How does CENTCOM for example look at the objectives that have been put upon them? What are the defense objectives in the Middle East? We used to talk about six of them. Obviously we want to defend and enable our allies from both external and internal threats. We want to deter adversaries in the region, we want to maintain access to strategic materials and sustain those strategic relationships. We want to defeat terrorism forward, we want to adapt to new trends and opportunities, and more importantly we need to always be prepared for what we in the military used to call strategic surprise. If anybody believes that the Middle East in five years is going to look like the Middle East today or that we can predict all of the

strategic threats and strategic opportunities I'd love you to be on this panel because I certainly don't have those answers.

So with those being are objectives in the Middle East, how are those defense relationships built in order to sustain those relationships? And I think there are three areas worth noting; number one is are basing posture in the region. Number two is our security assistance programs in the region, and number three are the other defense and economic relationships that Rich Millies will be talking about. First on basing, again, we all know that we are leaving Iraq or reducing inside of Iraq. But there are still dozens of other locations where U.S. forces are either based or operate with friendly forces in the region to train, to assist, to enable, to equip. That basing posture does much for us; it would be wonderful if we could influence events in the region from the middle of America. But I think all of us realize if we want to be able to influence events in the region it is better done if we are in the region. I think, as General Hoar talked about, as the British Empire moved out of the region they lost a significant amount of influence. The presence of American troops working side by side with our friends in the region, based in the region, not only give us platforms by which to assist our friends and our allies but also stand as clear warning to those that would threaten our allies.

So in CENTCOM in the Defense Department they go through a normal basing review very couple of years and I would be tremendously surprised if this administration changes are basing posture in light of any perceived changed objectives. If you want to know what America's defense relationship looks like keep an eye on where we keep our bases over there. The second area to keep an eye on, as General Hoar mentioned, are security assistance programs. Not only our training programs but our equipping programs as well. Yes we do have a large amount of those funds and troops going to two countries, Egypt and Israel, but there is still a significant amount of training that we give throughout the region. A very good example of a growth area is not only training in classic military relationships, in military organizations, but also the work that we are now doing, that we have never done before 9/11, helping countries in the region on providing for homeland defense. An area we call critical energy and critical infrastructure protection. There are a number of countries who are represented here today that have seen a very, very large increase in our assistance, either monetarily or in personnel to help them maintain and defend and secure their infrastructure.

That I believe will be, and continues to be a terrorist target as we've seen in a number of incidents over the past few years and given the countries in the region expertise, equipment, advice. Help partnership in the area of critical energy infrastructure and critical infrastructure protection. The lessons that we have learned in America about infrastructure protection since 9/11 that we can share with our allies and learn from our allies as well. So I believe that that type of security assistance is probably the growth area for the future and there might even be a bit of a diminution of the classic security assistance on the defense side. And then last is the area of robust defense partnerships which Rich Millies will talk about. Let's be candid, General Hoar said it is best to be able for our forces to be interoperable. To Rich Millies and the defense industry that is what we do. So in-between the two lies the truth which is--- F16's for instance, they fly them we sell them, our air forces can work together for mutual benefit so that if we ever have to take those to war they are flying our aircraft; they have been trained in our tactics; we know how they operate they know how we operate.

So let me conclude at this point to note that I believe that this administration is taking a new tenor towards the strategic relationships in the Middle East. But don't confuse the tenor, the tone, the willingness to talk with someone as a change in our strategic objectives as a nation to our friends in the region. We certainly don't see from the outside a change in the defense relationships; we want to assist our friends; we want to protect our friends; we want to defend our friends; we want to learn from our friends. That is the way it's been for the last sixty-five years, I don't anticipate that's going to change any time soon. We are looking for more friends in the region and trying to reduce the number of enemies that we have. I believe that the defense relationships are the clearest expression of the U.S.-Strategic objective and I know both on the outside of the government and the inside of the government we look forward to continuing these defense relationships with our colleagues, our friends. Those that we have fought shoulder to shoulder with in two wars in the last fifteen years to maintain the Middle East as an area where independent sovereign countries can continue to grow, continue to be neighbors, and continue to be friends. So thank you.

Blanchard

Thank you Mark, our next panelist is Mr. Richard Millies. He is the Vice-President of International Strategy and Business Development with BAE Systems. He is the former Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, so a wealth of government experience to bear as well. Richard.

Millies

Well good morning, I am very pleased to be here with my distinguished panel members on both sides and I feel kind of like I am the low guy on the totem pole here in that respect. I'm also a bit humbled when I look out at the audience because my first trip to the region was in the mid-90s. I've been a regular visitor there for the last ten years, but I know looking out at many of you you've been going there for twenty years, thirty years, and have made your life's work the region. So I am a little bit humbled by that. I have some prepared remarks but Chris has mentioned my background so I'd be very happy in the Q&A, if you want to get into some of the mechanics of how the system works in the U.S. Government, we can get into that as well.

I'd like to talk to you today in two parts, one part is factual, one part a little more thoughtful. The factual but shorter part will be the way that industry and government fit together in defense cooperation. The more thoughtful part looks for some of the larger themes that industry sees in the region and how it might approach them. The U.S. Defense Industry is very much a regulated industry. When we talk about cooperation with foreign governments the Arms Export Control Act is really a foundation for both the regulation and for the cooperation. And the act talks about such things as national security, common defense, interoperability, and defense cooperation between countries. Notably absent from that is anything about promoting the U.S. defense industry. This is in sharp contrast to those countries that actively promote their exports as a way to boost the industry. And I often have conversations with my colleagues on the British side of the company because the focus of their counterpart government agency is a little bit more to promote British defense industry as opposed to the United States promoting U.S. industry.

So as a result, U.S. defense cooperation decisions are about such things as foreign policy, regional stability, and technology transfer, not about increasing sales. Nevertheless industry is a willing and reliable partner with government and it takes great pains to make sure it is absolutely, and I mean absolutely, aligned with U.S. foreign and national security policy. While U.S. foreign policy does not take into account industry's interests, industry capabilities are a tool of U.S. foreign policy. As it seeks to promote capability, and interoperability amongst its allies the U.S. Government turns to industry to provide the kind of equipment and capabilities to friends and allies that will promote U.S. national security interests. These facts of defense cooperation, however, are a part of a much larger story for industry that goes beyond foreign or military policy. For some companies international defense business is the proverbial icing on the cake of the domestic order book. For others it's a defining feature of the culture. So what exactly does industry see when it looks at the Arab world? First, and I don't think anyone should hide from this, it sees opportunity. At a time of economic crisis and stretched defense budgets elsewhere the Middle East represents a very strong market. These countries seek to modernize aging forces and enhance their capability to provide for their own security.

But this is not the whole story and it is far from it. Industry wants to be in the region because the region itself is important. Certainly from a BAE Systems perspective, where I work now, we do not see the Arab world as simply somewhere to sell things. We see the region in its wider geostrategic context and believe that being there on the ground supporting our customers and their aspirations is where we should be. But more than this, industry recognizes many of the challenges faced by all governments in the region, and it is these challenges that will shape industry policies. It would be arrogant to suggest that we fully understand all the regional challenges but for example, we do see the demographic tidal wave of millions of young people entering the job market each year; the large scale of unemployment, up to 25% across the region as of 2009 according to the International Labor Organization. Industry also recognizes the desire to diversify the regional economies away from significant reliance on fossil fuels. The petrochemical industry accounts for roughly half the GDP for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and a fourth in the UAE largely because of diversification. And let's not forget the challenge of a globalized economy in all its many guises or the potential impact of climate change. And of course we continue to see security issues across the region from state to non-state actors--- Terrorism, piracy, territorial disputes, and so forth. With these many challenges in mind there is an opportunity to create a mutually beneficial relationship between the defense industry and countries across the Middle East.

Industry can provide the investment and technological know-how that promotes host country industrial participation and regional defense programs and services. This in turn diversifies economies, provides jobs for the burgeoning youth populations, and forges a true partnership based on mutual benefit. Companies willing to invest in the region, employing local staff and local facilities for the long term are seen as go-to suppliers of equipment and services. Industry does not pretend to have the answers to all the challenges but it can help. Large U.S. corporations have seen inherent potential in the Arab world as a place to invest. For example, GE has healthcare manufacturing and training facilities in Riyadh and other places in the region--employing more than 1700 people. Similarly as you may know my company, BAE, is supplying 72 fighter aircraft to the Royal Saudi Air Force. Not only is BAE supplying the

aircraft we have committed to having 48 assembled in country and are building a new final assembly plant to do so. While engaging with the indigenous defense ministry as a key part of the supply chain. In doing so we will create a significant number of highly skilled jobs and we hope to repeat this time and time again where it makes sense for both parties. The defense industry cannot provide employment for all who seek it but it can go some way to diversifying the economic make up of Saudi Arabia and allow Saudi Arabia to invest in its own companies and its own capabilities.

And some might say that industry is business and not a social welfare agency, and they would be quite right. But I believe that by demonstrating commitment and the willingness to invest industry will benefit in the long run. Again we come back to mutual benefit. Others may say that creating jobs in the Middle East will mean losing jobs in the U.S. Perhaps so perhaps not; however we live in an ever more globalized world and industry must stand ready to face the challenges that this brings. Including the movement of technology across borders. To my mind the Middle East is not simply a market blindly pursued by a greedy defense industry although there are plenty of media depictions that would suggest that. The defense business, like any other business, is a commercial enterprise. It seeks to deliver satisfaction to its customers and fair returns to its share holders. The manner in which it does this is changing and from my view that's for the better. Product and promotion are giving way to partnership and participation but we should ask ourselves what does a true partnership look like? What does participation mean and what is its impact? What do we need to do as organizations and individuals to achieve this? And a willingness to engage is key as is a willingness to accept that the answers may not come easily. On reflection you should perhaps also bear in mind that my views are those of a U.S. citizen representing a western company, and so there might be the question of do I get it? Are we making the right approach to give our customers in the Arab world what they need? What is needed is dialogue based on trust and commitment and I would suggest that who understands better the potential threats in the Strait of Hormuz better? Those who live there and depend on it, or perhaps a policymaker who is very, very important to the process but whose life blood does not depend on it?

I think maybe with that, maybe I should end and let the questions start.

Blanchard

Thank you Richard, we're joined now by a Major General, His Excellency Mohammed Bin Abdullah Bin Mutib Al Rumaihi from the state of Qatar. He'll perhaps offer some regional perspective on some of the issues we've discussed. And give his reaction to what we have heard from our panel.

Rumaihi

Thank you very much, good morning everybody. Today I would like to talk also about three different issues. The first of them is the regional security and stability and how to guarantee it. As you know, since the Soviet Union has disappeared and there is only one country in the world that is ready to engage and there is a guarantee that it could be engaged at any time with or without the allies to protect or participate in an operation outside. The other super powers, they

are not at the level of being ready to engage themselves in a defense or security agreement especially with the gulf region but with the Arab world as a whole. So what are we facing now? We are facing that there is no global war but there is regional conflict and regional crisis that threaten the region and it calls unto the super power, the United States and the allies, plus their countries of the region, the local allies let's say, to take care of any threats to their stability and security. Our role for the world is to guarantee protection of oil, to guarantee agreements outside and inside the region. And as you know the Arab world in 1920 was looking fully different from the Arab world we are seeing now. There are 22 countries now, there were only 3 or 4. The population is five or six times than what we had before. It was hardly 50,000,000. Today we are around 500,000,000 million and the incomes maybe increased by 2,000 percent or something.

So we are talking about a different area that we have to operate and to intervene at. At the same time what is the strategy important for the world here. Because if there is an engagement from the other side of the Atlantic or from Europe, to come and sign a security treaty or defense treaty with the region it is common interest to protect the strategy resources of the energy for all the world, including the United States. And at the same time participate in the stability of the region that it is not threatened by an outsider or insider because we are now facing the regional power more than the super power. We had also an example when we needed the United States to come to free Kuwait. It was a matter of a coalition, and a coalition could not have been placed without having the United States as a major grantor of the stability and the security of the region and bringing together all the allies who were not involved directly by military or defense cooperation agreements in the region. And they came by security counselor, by UN decision, or sometimes just by the United States' decision to come and to protect the development of the humanity. We are not talking about Kuwait but we are talking in large now. A lot of proposals that were proposed to the Arab world and the gulf regions about how to guarantee the stability and security of this region, one of them was not only the defense and security agreement but there was a proposal from Russian Republic that the security of the region should also be the responsibility of the regional power. And it looks like the security and cooperation agreement was signed in Europe after Versailles and for sure they do not want an international grant or a super power to guarantee this matter.

So it's a big favor as it was in Europe. Now we have the guarantee so we can't rely on regional cooperation and security agreement that protect or guarantee the stability within the region because there are a lot of differences between the region and the super power---and the countries neighboring each other themselves. And so we can't rely on what is called the regional powers, especially that there is no big similarity between Indians and Arabs in this case. So we always need to have this guarantee and to go directly into the cooperation and security and defense agreements although it is does not guarantee intervention over other countries because in other provisions there is no guarantees that the involvement is automatic. The involvement needs to go either to the Parliaments or to the head of the state concerned to involve its forces to an operation or to a security and stability operations. So this matter will take us back to the UN system because if the difference agreements they are not systematic, that means we need international solutions to start the stability and security operations over any areas. I would like also to talk about the agreements themselves because they have within the provisions three issues, as the General has rightly said, that is operation, training, and logistics--- logistics are a provision of government. To guarantee for sure continuance in physical protections and physical

stability and security guarantee we had within the provisions of the agreements something like continuous training and continuous deployment.