

**NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS**  
**16<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL ARAB-U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE**

**“REVISITING ARAB-U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONS:  
GEO-POLITICAL, ENERGY, DEFENSE COOPERATION,  
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DYNAMICS”**

**9:20-10:15: “DEFENSE COOPERATION”**

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DR. JOHN DUKE ANTHONY: Ladies and gentlemen, we have an extraordinary session and panel of specialists today on an issue and a policy challenge fraught with implications for American national security interests and by definition, also Arab national security interest, and the key foreign policy objectives of both peoples. And it would be hard to imagine having a more knowledgeable session with specialists presenting this package of accumulated experience and empirical education on the ground by their long service in the region, their long service in the United States government, and in the case of Dr. Peterson, in the case of Oman and its ministry of defense, to focus on issues that go beyond and behind the headlines and deal with facts.

And facts are stubborn things. They have implications for policies, for needs, for concerns, for interests, and objectives. And chairing this session is Major General William Nash, who I've known for more than a decade. And he will be introducing the speakers, Dr. Cordesman, Dr. Peterson, and General Dempsey, in that order. And all three of these individuals are friends and colleagues now for quite some time.

General Nash's biography is in your book. Read it. He's an individual who has crossed from the military to the civilian and remained in touch with the former and provided invaluable contributions to public service in that regard. General Nash.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM NASH (USA, RET): Thank you, John Duke, to you and your crew and all of the sponsors of this conference. Thanks very much for number one, having it; number two, inviting me. And before we get started this morning, I'd just like to pay tribute to the most important person in my life, with respect to U.S.-Arab Relations. Since this conference was last held, we've lost Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Mohsin al Tejari, who was the Deputy Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. That title belies the importance of an individual who served his country from the time before Abdul Aziz became the first king of Saudi Arabia up through King Abdullah as an advisor and as a mentor to a series of program managers that worked with the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

He is, in fact, I consider him my Saudi father. And after I guess 90 ninety years, we lost him. So I pay tribute to him. Today, we're going to talk about defense cooperation. We're going to begin with Tony Cordesman, who's going to give us an overview. And then, Dr. Peterson is going to talk about some British experiences with counter-insurgency in the region. And finally, General Dempsey is going to tell us what's going on these days in the Central Command and the considerations for defense cooperation in the years ahead.

Tony Cordesman will lead us off. I would give very flowery introductions to all three gentleman that are going to speak this morning, but they all yielded their time to Tony so he could go through his presentation. And we'll extend it up a couple of minutes. I will warn you that he will not give you much time to read all of the slides that

he's going to show you. But before the week's end, they'll be posted on the website for all of you to see. So John Duke is going to take care of that. Tony, it's a great pleasure to have you here.

DR. ANTHONY: I'd like to remind the audience to fill out your questions on the three by five cards and the usherettes and ushers will bring them forward to Dr. Peterson.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN: As General Nash mentioned, they have suddenly cut my presentation from six hours to 12 minutes. (Laughter.) And I am going to race through a set of slides. They will be on the web. But one of the key points here when we talk about security cooperation in the Middle East is, it is extraordinarily complex; it is extraordinarily diverse; it is not a matter of dealing with the region. It is a matter of dealing with subregions in countries. It is occurring at a time when we are making fundamental shifts away from a focus on conventional forces and conventional conflicts to issues like counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare, where not only the United States, but its friends and allies, have to make major changes in the way they organize and plan their security forces.

And let me stress that one phrase; this is not a matter of cooperation anymore with armies, navies, and air forces. It is a matter of cooperation which must extend to the security services, to the groups which deal with counterterrorism. And it must include, at least at some level, elements of the police. Without that integration, you do not have forces training and equipping to deal with the reality of what they face. And there is no clear line between counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, and conventional warfare. We all try to categorize that; we all try to find definitions which somehow separate them.

They have, in practice, neither a meaning in terms of probability or operations. And what I have listed in these three slides on the changing strategic environment is simply a listing of those factors. To this, I would add one other dimension. We face a level of ideological division and tension within Islam and the Arab world, which has to be reflected in the way we look at security cooperation. It acts out in terms of the risk of terrorism, insurgency, ideological struggles linked to force throughout the region.

It also acts out in terms of U.S. relations with states in the region. We have to be extraordinarily sensitive to what this really does in terms of the armies, security forces, and motivations in the region and their perceptions of the United States. And security cooperation is not something where we somehow take the initiative. To work, it has to be partnership, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

All of this, again, makes the point; we are no longer talking about conventional war. We are talking about a spectrum which can range from sabotage to the use of weapons of mass destruction. And security cooperation must anticipate that fact. We also face a world in which extremists have no constraints on the use of force. But steadily, the use of force in every aspect of security operations – counterinsurgency,

counterterrorism, conventional warfare – has to be far more sensitive to civilian casualties and collateral damage than ever before.

We see this sensitivity in Iraq; we see it in Afghanistan. We would see it in any conflict in the Gulf, in North Africa, or in the Levant [Israel, Jordan, Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria]. One thing that I think is terribly easy to forget is what are some of the motives for security cooperation. One is the military strength and the level of resources our friends and allies in the Middle East offer us. This is not a relationship which somehow is the United States providing gifts to the Middle East. It is a relationship which has strong motives for partnership.

Now, I've divided this up in a somewhat unusual way. And I won't walk you through all of these slides, but I do want to make the point; security cooperation is something that varies by country and region. There is basically no conventional threat. There is, as yet, no ongoing proliferation in North Africa. The problem, essentially, there is internal stability. It is to prevent feuding and pointless adventures across boundaries in the North African region. It is to limit the cost of military activity so that development and stability can be achieved as a substitute.

That second bar is Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. We are essentially here talking about aid, military cooperation primarily as a means of securing peace, not as a means of preparing for war. We can argue whether this is desirable, but the fact is, the key priorities here are stability, maintaining and expanding the peace arrangements and again, helping with the issues of internal stability. Israel and Syria are a different story. There is the risk of war. I know that many people here may have their own criticisms of Israel and of U.S. support for Israel.

But I would make the point to all of you, consider, for a moment, what a weak Israel armed with nuclear weapons without U.S. support would be. Would this be more stabilizing? And consider, too, what you have seen about Syria over the last 10 days. I don't think anyone today is going to argue; there was a serious effort to create a nuclear program and that program has now failed.

When we talk about the southern Gulf, we face a very different situation. We have strong southern-Gulf friends and allies. We have Iran with very large military forces, uncertainty in the future of Iraq and Yemen. There is the risk of a whole spectrum of conflicts directly involving the vital strategic interests of the United States. The issue is oil. No one should have any illusions about that. It is also political ties, historical ties. And those figures do become far more favorable when you look at anything other than manpower.

Our allies can bring, potentially immense military assets to the problem of securing this region if we can improve the quality of cooperation. That's true of armor, of aircraft, but above all, look at the economic resources involved. The fact is, when you look at Syria, which to some extent at least is a question mark, Syria's economic power is negligible compared to that of its neighbors. When you look at the southern Gulf relative

to Iran, you get an idea – that is the tall bar there relative to the blue bar – of just how much we could draw on with the proper levels of cooperation. And when we look at military spending in the southern Gulf, it is approaching \$40 billion a year and will exceed it in 2007. And Iran is expending at a level of less than \$7 billion.

The question is, can you make cooperation effective? Can you really draw on this? Another basic figure here is arms deliverance. Look at, again, that tall bar. The southern Gulf has been importing over the last seven years – six years, sorry – some \$60 billion worth of arms. Iran imported less than \$2 billion. When you look at new arms agreements, and these do not yet reflect the impact of massive new oil revenues, we're talking \$35 billion for the southern Gulf States and about \$3 billion for Iran.

These are figures it's easy to forget when we talk only about politics and we only talk about strategy. But cooperation is not a matter of symbolism. These are not toys. We know all too well that these are forces that get used; they sometimes deter; they often defend. And here, let me just briefly take you quickly through the priorities. Almost all of the forces in this region still have a strong orientation for conventional warfighting on traditional terms: a lack of jointness, stovepipe operations, within the military, a lack of combined arms.

They need to change focus and they need to change content. Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, for most countries, have a higher priority than conventional warfare. The days in which the number of major weapons platforms determine military capability are over. Most forces in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and to a lesser degree, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are still about a quarter of a century out of date and becoming obsolescent steadily over time.

Without new sensors, networks, new approaches to the problem of warfare and approaches which cut across service lines and cut across countries, nations are investing in obsolescence and incompetence. And there is a fundamental need for change where we can bring fast capabilities to the table that are really needed by our friends and allies. The same is true in each area of military capabilities – land, air - particularly the conversion to new battle management systems, precision warfare, to helicopter mobility and the use of transportation for counterinsurgency.

Naval capabilities – these are areas where they need us. And frankly, we need them. Our counter-mine capabilities, our ability to develop and defend against low-level asymmetric threats in the Gulf, do not, in any sense, match the capabilities we have in virtually every other area of naval operations. Special forces need to change their missions. They need to cooperate far better with internal security forces. They need to be able to cooperate with police. They need to learn, too, the problems of limits, of better preservation of human rights, of avoiding an unnecessary political conflict, backlash, and tensions in the areas where they operate. We face the problem of proliferation. There is the challenge, what is the response going to be? Missile and air defense? Conventional deterrence? Extended deterrence by the United States? Proliferation by friends and allies in the region?

Can passive defense be a partial substitute for active defense and long-range strike systems? This is a critical issue which will play out over a decade or more. It is not going to go away. Even if we can somehow suppress the current Iranian efforts at proliferation on the nuclear level, advances in areas like biotechnology and other areas ensure you simply cannot put this genie back in the bottle. CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear] terrorism becomes a real possibility. One critical area that many countries have not addressed in this region is civil and passive defense.

Let me just give you one obvious set of targets. In the southern Gulf, the dependence on desalination facilities has created a level of vulnerability which has created a whole new target complex far more important to the peoples involved than oil facilities are to them as distinguished from us. When you look at the level of passive defense and security measures on commercial satellite photographs, unfortunately, many of these are cookie-cutter operations which become remarkably vulnerable and targetable because they are so predictable and repetitive.

As yet, the threats have not focused on this. They will. A point here – the United States is having its own struggles between each military service, for resources, as to who gets sensor assets, netcentric capabilities, and battle-management assets. But one of the key lessons of both Afghanistan and Iraq is - for Australia, Britain, and the United States – we cannot operate with each other unless we have common netting, common information systems, integrated, secure communications, and forces trained to use them.

One great question for the Gulf region, for our allies and friends in this region is, can we create similar systems that allow us to cooperate with them which they will feel preserve their national sovereignty and security and which allow us to operate without a fear of compromise of the system. This is an issue which we have to address in the future. It has not yet been addressed and it is also, frankly, one of the continuing failures of the Arab world.

There has been a great deal of expensive nonsense purchased in areas. It serves almost no functional military purpose. It will not support the cause of warfighting. It represents one of the greatest single failures of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it is an area where fundamental change is required. Throwing money down a rathole in these areas is the current way in which every Gulf country approaches cooperation with other Gulf countries and most approach cooperation between their own services.

This is not the way of the future and it is not the model for cooperation. I won't walk you through these slides, but I do want to make one last point. People talk a great deal about international cooperation. I read all the time conceptual discussions of new security structures and new ways to bring countries in the region together. There is a natural limit to intellectual rubbish.

This kind of vacuous nonsense has been going on for a quarter of a century. It has produced precisely no benefits and it borders on the edge of surrealism. If there is to be

better cooperation between countries, it cannot be a matter of slogans; it has to be measurable capability in terms of clear force plans, real exercises, and proven capabilities. If that is to happen, it has not really begun yet even at a very limited level.

But we are dealing here particularly with the problems of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. And here, let me say something about security cooperation. I have been through one conference after another on cooperation in counterterrorism. I have been in these conferences in the Gulf. I have been at them in the Middle East. I have been at them in NATO. The reality is that virtually all meaningful cooperation in counterterrorism is bilateral. When it happens, it is the United States, working with an individual Arab or regional government. That is not going to change, not in the critical areas of intelligence, not in the sensitive areas of political compromise, not in discussions of who is a terrorist, not in dealing with the problems of counterterrorism.

Sometimes, we can work with our British allies. Sometimes, we can work with our French allies. But this is something that we need to be honest about. It may be possible to have broader cooperation in conventional forces, but at least in the near term, if there are to be major improvements in counterterrorism capabilities in some aspects of counterinsurgency, in the real world, it will be U.S. cooperation with individual countries and talk about broad, strategic concepts and regional cooperation, however noble, has no functional purpose. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you.

(Applause.)

GEN. NASH: Thank you, Tony. And as expected, broad views and strong opinions. We appreciate that very much. Dr. Peterson.

J.E. PETERSON: Thank you. It's always rather intimidating to follow Tony. I'm afraid I do not have lots of slides and facts and figures to intimidate you with. But perhaps I can excuse that by the fact that I have a more historical paper and we're not really into Power Point and that sort of thing, not even a few quotations from Rudyard Kipling. (Laughter.)

As was announced, my remarks are going to focus on British experience in fighting insurgencies, particularly after the Second World War and in Third World arenas. Yesterday, mention was made of the earlier British experience in Iraq. That's been fully written about and I won't consider doing that nor the parallel between Vietnam and Iraq.

Instead, as I said, [I want to] focus on insurgencies that the British were confronted with after the Second World War. Although each one of these insurgencies had its own distinct and perhaps unique origins, they, by and large, tended to fit into a category of revolutionary war. That is, they were efforts to overthrow existing governments, to establish independent regimes, and they tended to rely upon guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts to achieve those aims.

We can cite a number of these, go through a litany that includes Palestine, the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, and the independence struggle in Cyprus in the 1950s, the Oman and the Sultanates effort to regain control of the interior in the 1950s, Aden's struggle for independence in the 1960s, and getting back to Oman, the war in its southern province of Dhofar during the 1960s and the 1970s. Perhaps because of Britain's imperial background and outlook, it tended to view each insurgency as a local problem to be countered by local solutions and efforts. And wide latitude was given to commanders on the spot. And this has been contrasted to an American experience which for decades saw insurgencies as part of a Cold War zero-sum game that had to be managed from Washington.

The collective experience of all, of fighting all of these insurgencies was the development, obviously, of tactics and strategies and the codification by a number of British theoreticians in the field, as it were. I don't have time to go through these. I'd just mention one or two: police, the primacy of police over the army in fighting insurgencies, particularly in intelligence gathering. After all, these were known for a long time as activities of imperial policing.

The essential attempt that gained the support of the local population was to pursue hearts and minds strategies. And I realize this has a negative connotation in this country because of Vietnam, but it was pursued with success in a number of these British experiences. And where counterinsurgency succeeded, it seems to be that it was due as much if not more to the achievement of political aims than military victory.

Now, my contention is that while Britain was indisputably fighting colonial wars, the situation in Iraq can and should be considered in terms of a colonial or imperial war as well, not in every area, but in some very essential ones. Even the multiplicity of insurgent groups and goals in Iraq, including the so-called negative goals of nihilism, should not detract from this argument because fundamentally, these factors have been present in these earlier insurgencies. And obviously, I can't go into the parallels of each one of them, but I'm struck by a lot of lessons that perhaps could be deduced from the experience in Aden.

What was Aden? First of all, we had this tremendous bifurcation between an urban setting, a sophisticated, economically advanced city-state of what was known as Aden colony and later, Aden state, and a hinterland that consisted of more traditional, unchanged, tribal, small tribal entities who were bound to Britain by treaties of protection so that when insurgency began in Aden, we had two aspects. On the one hand, there was a rural history of strong resistance to central authority. This multiplied in the 1960s into the Radfan Rebellion, when it became more organized and outside propaganda and agitation made it more of an anti-British experience which had, in other words, we had the appearance of guerrilla warfare which the British put down initially by the insertion of a full brigade. Even as there was limited success in the Radfan, at the same time, there was an increasing campaign of violence in Aden itself which was urban warfare beginning with acts of sabotage, moving into terrorism and assassinations.



Another aspect of Aden was the political unworkability of an attempt to create a successor state. We had two very disparate regions; the British decided to try to merge this into a federation of South Arabia with elected representatives both from Aden and from the hinterland. And it just never worked. There wasn't enough in common and the factors as the war progressed to drive those groups apart became more pronounced. We also had a number of different groups in opposition to Britain over the course of several decades with diverse bases and diverse goals, beginning with the People's Socialist Party in Aden which began as a trade union's movement. The South Arabian League, which was the federation of leaders from the hinterland, all of which were subsumed by the creation of the National Liberation Front with Egyptian support, based in North Yemen.

And when it turned against Nasser, the appearance of another pro-Nasser FLOSY [Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen] and all of these groups had fighting amongst themselves, particularly NLF and FLOSY in later years. And the struggle for supremacy between these two organizations made it sort of a triangular affair. They were not only fighting the British, but they were fighting themselves. This, of course, led to divided loyalties. There was no sectarian divide as in Iraq, but tribal differences played a very substantial role. And these threatened to destroy the efficiency of local security forces. The South Arabian Army, for example, was eventually paralyzed because it was caught between the chain of command, the federal chain of command and behind it the British on the one hand, and the growing realization that the NLF would take control and therefore, it had a neutral, hands off stance for the last year or so of the fighting.

The situation was complicated by uncertain resolve in London. As casualties mounted and opposition to the war mounted in Britain, various timetables for withdrawal were announced and even advanced as the situation worsened. This completely undermined the position of all of the politicians, proponents of the federal experiment, who were left out in the cold.

And of course I would just like to mention the important role played by sanctuary, in this case in North Yemen, and of external support in this case of Nasser's Egypt. Now, the relevance of many of these points to Iraq, I think, should be obvious. But let me just draw a few concluding conclusions.

- First of all, there is immense difficulty in creating successor governments. And I think the basic lesson is that these cannot be imposed from outsiders, but they must grow naturally out of the local environment.
- Second, there is a similar difficulty in the creation and administration of effective local security forces. A strong, sustained force very often is not enough. It did not work in Aden. It worked in Oman.
- Third, divisions among insurgent groups often have a way of working themselves out, generally through violence. And in this case, the more radical and extremist faction tends to win out.

- Fourth, the longer a conflict persists, the less successful or relevant a military response becomes. That is to say, continued resistance seems to legitimize and strengthen the opposition.
- Fifth, political concerns should have priority over military goals - hearts and minds again. And there are very strong political limitations on counterinsurgency operations, which I won't go into.
- Sixth, the lack or volatility of resolve at home creates facts in the theater and accelerates the process of withdrawal, but often this is not fast enough.
- Seventh, it is essential to know when to call it quits. This was perhaps easier for Britain because in that general atmosphere, east of Suez run down, withdrawal from the region was seen as inevitable. The question was when.
- And eighth, and finally, the imperial power should be prepared to deal with all possible opponents, to deal politically with all possible opponents.

To paraphrase Yitzhak Rabin, as many people have already, you don't make peace with your friends, you make peace with your enemies. And the peace of Britain, the attenuation of the British presence in Aden and its uncertainty whether to stay in Aden – after all, it was their last major base in the Middle East and it was the most expensive military construction program in British history in the early 1960s – and the idea that Britain was no longer a world empire and it had to withdraw, meant that all of the moderate solutions disappeared. And eventually, they were forced to treat with the group that contested the most, the National Liberation Front, the most radical, the most terrorist-inclined. And they invited them to Geneva to form talks about withdrawal and the formation of a new and independent South Yemen government.

And I suggest that many of these points are relevant to the situation in Iraq today. Thank you.

(Applause.)

GEN. NASH: Thank you, John; a historical review with very contemporary lessons. Thanks very much. Now, let's turn to General Dempsey. As we do, I would ask that you keep the cards and letters coming up here to John Duke so we can start out some questions as we get started.

General Dempsey is the Deputy Commander of Central Command and a great soldier who has served in peace and war our country for many years. Marty?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY: Thanks, Bill. If it's okay, I'll just sit here and share some thoughts with you. I, too, don't have any Power Point,

which I find very ironic. I think we invented it and now, we're trying to move away from it and the rest of the world is moving into it, I guess.

I'm glad you mentioned T1, Bill. Because he, like you, he was a father figure to me. And one of the very first things he told me when I went to him and said, what is it I think I should take away from this first meeting with you? And he said, well, General, remember that a camel is unaware of the curve of its own neck. Now, of course, I acted as though I completely understood what I meant, but it took me some time to actually figure out what he was suggesting to me. And what he was doing was sort of foretelling the fact that over the course of my time in Saudi Arabia, he would be trying to educate me on us [the United States] while at the same time educating me on them [Saudi Arabia]. And it was a very profound period of time in my life as I sat at the side of T1 to learn about us from the perspective of our friends and allies in that part of the world.

We continue to learn and we act at great peril if we don't continue to learn in the process of trying to advance our common interest. That's where I'd like to start actually. If Admiral Fallon were here, and he sends his regrets, he would tell you that this topic, security cooperation, is truly the key to long-term stability in the 27 nations that we describe as the Central Command area of operation. And there are 27 countries, as you know, organized into, really into three subregions – the “Stans” [Central Asia's former Soviet Republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Some definitions also add Afghanistan and Pakistan to the mix.], the larger Arab world, as you've defined it, and of course the Horn of Africa.

And when you look at a region that's that diverse, but at the same time has so many resources, and that's not just oil and natural gas, but rather human resources, you seek or try to find some common theme around which we can all coalesce and agree that there is goodness in working together. And about the only one you can really come up with with any consistency is stability. So then, the key becomes to try to approach these very diverse nations with the common idea of how can we help stabilize those parts of your country that are causing not only problems for you, but in the case of some of the ungoverned spaces where these transnational threats tend to gravitate and then emanate out of. And of course, there are many places in the CENTCOM AOR [Area of Responsibility] where that is possible.

And so, security assistance, or as he describes it, as CENTCOM describes it, as building partner capability against common or in support of common interest, is where Admiral Fallon sees his theater strategy building upon. So I think what I can bring to this group and this discussion today is not necessarily any more about the theory of security cooperation, but let me share some experiences with you on putting it into practice in various countries throughout the region.

The greatest challenge we have in establishing a common basis for security cooperation is actually agreeing on the threat. That's true whether you are in Saudi Arabia or whether you're in Iraq or whether you're in Afghanistan and I could list the other 24 nations. One of the bullets on Tony's slide said that the war on terror does not

lend itself necessarily to the, to a common identification of the threat. And that is absolutely true.

Inside Iraq, for example, as we discussed with Prime Minister Maliki's government, and we discussed the threat of al Qaeda; we discussed the threat of insurgents; we discussed the criminal threat. We discussed the threat of the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] presence of Iran. You can be sure that those conversations that at times we find common ground, but at many other times, we do not. And that's been true through the entire duration of our mission in Iraq and remains true today. Identifying the threat, agreeing upon the threat, and then agreeing what to do about it is the most difficult challenge of all in establishing a common base for security cooperation.

My experience in Saudi Arabia is also true. And of course, I was there – well, actually, I got there on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September, 2001. But it took several years – and Ambassador Jordan knows this – for the Saudi government, for the House of Saud, to come to grips with the fact that they had an internal problem as well as external threats.

Once they did come to that conclusion, by the way, they've acted very aggressively and very cooperatively to address that problem. But it took time to bring them to that point. Prior to that point, when I would approach them about building light armored vehicle units or a quick reaction capability, or whatever it was – there was a menu of things we discussed – we would always get into a discussion about the threat. And you can imagine prior to 2001, their definition of the threat emanated principally from the possibility that Israel would become expansionist or try to influence them in some way. And so, we didn't see it that way clearly, and so we constantly had to shape and merge and find common ground even with our allies, the Saudis.

We managed to do it. But make no mistake about it that some of those procurements that you're talking about that from our perspective were absolutely a waste of time, from their perspective were very much in their national interest. So there is that challenge of identifying a common threat.

Secondly, we tend naturally to mirror image those militaries and now police forces. I'm glad to hear you mention that we have to be more inclusive of all security forces, not just military forces. We tend to mirror image those other nations with whom we deal and expect of them similar agility, flexibility, deployability that we expect of ourselves.

We learned that lesson in Iraq, you may remember, the first time we tried to move a battalion from one part of Iraq to the other. And when it failed to move, of course, it was reported initially as just the complete mutiny on the part of the Iraqi army. It was actually anything but that. It was they'd never been trained to do that. They'd never done it in their history. There was no training plan to prepare them; no monetary incentive to incentivize them; no end date for their deployment. I mean, we actually, in

retrospect, gave them conditions that I don't think we would have been able to accomplish. And so, the risk of mirror imaging is a real one.

When we built the authorization for leaders in the Iraqi army, we built it at about the same ratio that we expect a leader-to-led ratio in our army. That made sense at the time until we realized quickly two things. One, we couldn't possibly fill it to that ratio, because those leaders were just simply not available. And secondly, that's not the tradition out of which they came. The Iraqi army never in its history delegated authority to the point where it might need 250 leaders in a battalion of 800 as we delegate authority.

We delegate authority to a sergeant that would absolutely cause a normal human being to crumble under the weight of the responsibility. That's not necessarily what our counterparts do. And so, where we find ourselves today is we'll often report that the Iraqi army is not ready because it doesn't have enough leaders.

Well, my contention is, yes it does, because it has enough leaders to run the military the way they will run it. And over time, they will begin to – they would like to emulate us, by the way, which is a very positive thing. But it's going to take time to do that. And in the interim, it doesn't mean they're incapable or it doesn't mean they're in any way dragging their feet. But we do mirror image in a way that I think can be problematic to our long-term development over there.

Third, I'll call it the sustainability imperative. Shame on us if we build something that then the host nation can't sustain. Now, in building these military capabilities across the region, we have to be careful with that, because, you know, we have a very robust economy and we have years of experience in sustaining that which we build, whether it's infrastructure, whether it's manpower, whether it's equipment.

What we found is that the Iraqi army that we brought back in – and we did bring back large numbers of it – had come from a history where you essentially used a piece of equipment until it broke and then you received another one. Or, if you needed three police cars, for example, you might procure five, because you use the parts from the other two to make sure three will run. And I'm not mentioning that in any pejorative sense. That's the way they did it.

And so, when they started to stand up on their feet, that's the way they started to do it. Well, we were, of course, aghast. Remember the mirror imaging issue. We mirror imaged. How could that happen? That's impossible. We must have preventive maintenance. We must have long supply chains of parts and warehouses filled with supplies. Well, maybe not. And so, what we've been trying to do as we adjust is determine what right looks like in their terms, not in ours.

But we continue to be aware of the fact that as we work with, for example, the Lebanese armed forces now or Pakistan's military, although they may aspire to a certain piece of equipment, if it's not sustainable, if they can't absorb it with their budgetary

resources, then we have a choice. And the choice is we will continue to sustain it in perpetuity potentially, or we will provide for them that which they can afford to sustain over time.

The third one or the fourth one, I should say, is balancing the ability of our host nations, our counterparts, to absorb what we're providing, and not maintain control of it so long that they become dependent. Again, that's not pejorative. It's human nature to suggest that if you will continue to do the job for someone, they'd be foolish not to allow you to do so. I think there is a parenting analogy here somewhere, and I'm not sure I got that right either as I raised my own children.

But the point is, as we help these countries build their militaries, there has to be a constant thought at transitioning it; that's obvious. And there's a delicate balance. It's a complex balance between their ability to absorb what we're providing or helping them provide and then not waiting so long that they become dependent on the assistance. And that's exactly what General Petraeus and others are trying to balance in Iraq right now, as I did for the last three years.

And finally, the thing that doesn't get much attention, but we have to be aware of is what I would describe as the potential for an erosion of trust. If you take all of the things I've mentioned previous to this – the mirror imaging challenge, the imperative of sustainability, the balance of absorb and depend – and then you put into position a young soldier, airman, sailor, or Marine who is on his fourth or fifth rotation into Iraq, and he may not perceive the kind of progress that he thinks he should see at this point in the mission, that generates the potential for an erosion of trust, because that young man and even some very senior men and women will begin to believe that our counterparts are just not trying hard enough. And when that happens, and trust erodes, then we're on the path to some genuine problems down the road.

And this is not unique to the Iraq experience, the Afghanistan experience. I think it is one of the factors we should always remember as we conduct security cooperation and then make it a point that we identify a potential problem for an erosion of trust and either consciously allow that trust to erode or stop the slide, because we have to be very careful of that.

Okay, let me break for a second there on that part and talk briefly about the mechanics of security cooperation, because there are some things that we do inside of our government that do not make it as easy to execute these programs as they should be. One of them is we have stove piped authorities. There's money available for police, for army, for special forces, for counterterrorism, and probably three or four other categories. They're all stove piped; very difficult for one person to access them all; done that way, I'm sure, for a purpose. That purpose should be revisited, in my view, in order to make the authorities available in a much more efficient way so that the person on the ground responsible for conducting these cooperative enterprises has access to the funding authorities he needs or she needs.

Secondly, this is no surprise. Most of those kind of funding authorities tend to be one-year money. Most of the things we try to do with security assistance are not one-year programs. They're long-range programs. We're in the process of trying to work with Iraq on a ten-year program. Very difficult for us to articulate to them how we intend to help with that if I can only be guaranteed of money a year at a time.

And finally, the foreign military sales process – and this is common knowledge; it's been in the media that we're dissatisfied with the pace at which it progresses. Notifications, delays, contracting requirements under the foreign acquisition regulation – all of those things need to be streamlined so that as we identify this common threat, identify what we're going to do about it, that we can respond.

Many of these countries, as they approach foreign military sales, are not just coming to us to shop for a particular piece of equipment. It's a program. It's a long-range aspiration to end up with a military strategy. And so, they're actually looking at us as their acquisition strategy broadly from boots to armored vehicles. And when they look at us as their acquisition strategy and we continue to look at the process as isolated sales, we then set expectations – or they set expectations – that we can't meet. And that can become a problem, which leads to the other thing, which is the erosion of trust and we're off to the races. So that's kind of the mechanics of security cooperation.

It's been my pleasure to be part of this board. And I look forward to the questions.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Well, thank you, Marty. Thank you for your talk. But most importantly, thank you for your service, and your work for many, many years in the region about which we speak today.

It is time to shift to questions. We've got enough of them up here to keep us busy; but if there are more coming, let us see them. I've got three or four here that all talk about the issue of imperialism, whether it's real or perceived, and America's inability to come to grips with the necessity to behave in a certain way in order to conduct the operations. It is often perceived as imperialistic.

There is a question associated with that with respect to the tactic of humiliation of all or part of the region in order to pursue American interest and secure our country. And finally, the aspect of are we capable of the British model because of their historical context compared to ours?

And I guess I would add to that Tony's skepticism about the reality of cooperation taking place. And I would just say, maybe the standard that we need to look for is setting the conditions for specific cooperation in the future. So I've kind of given you about five different questions that are all kind of rolled into one that has to do about the manner in which America goes forward and operates in this part of the world, and how we pursue mutual interests. And Tony, do you want to start us off?

DR. CORDESMAN: I think that we have two issues here. One is security cooperation. The other is the broader issue of U.S. relations with friends and allies in the region. You have to begin with the idea that you are not there to have countries support you. You are there as part of a partnership. You are there in security cooperation to create additional stability and security, a point General Dempsey made. You are not there to reform them, to change their economies, to change their societies, or to change their political systems. If that is going to happen, it takes a lot of patience; it takes a building of trust. It is not something you do by using security cooperation as the tool.

If you have a system, which builds up strong national capabilities, you are not building up imperialism and you are building up trust. If people can see they are becoming effective on their own terms, then I think a lot of this gets defused. But to build up military trust in cooperation and trust in security cooperation, you have to build that trust up fundamentally at a different political level of engagement.

And I would think over the years, what I have often seen is we have far better military-to-military relations than we have political-to-political relations, in part because military professionals talk to each other on their own terms, and in part because when we actually operate in most countries, it is with people who have learned how to work with people in the country, rather than talk or dictate to them. So I think this is a very real set of issues. But I would hope one of the lessons of perhaps the last series of years is that when you deal with friends and allies, you deal with them as partners rather than exercises in ideology or transformation.

LT. GEN. DEPMSEY: I think the only addition I think I'd make to that is rather than – my preference – rather than worry about whether we're seen as something or other, what we try to do at Central Command in making our plans for future engagements is one of the objectives is how will this affect the next generation of young Arab – for the most part – Muslim – for the most part – men and women, because this generation is probably pretty set in its ways, and we are either going to succeed or fail in the near term based on our ability to find that common thread that I mentioned to you.

But the next generation remains to be influenced. And if we don't affect the next generation – and I'm not talking about necessarily psychological warfare – rather, I'm saying everything we do should be done with an eye on the fact that we are affecting that next generation. So if we want true stability, true security in the future, everything we do has got to be done not just to accomplish the near-term objective but to address that next generation.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: John, let me come to you with another one of these to kind of jump in on this a little bit. The question – we have a question that talks about Anbar and the effects of the actions that have taken place in one particular province of Iraq. And one of our audience is asking you, John, about the current Anbar tribal cooperation as an element of counterinsurgency doctrine, tactics, proven tactics, and your views of that.



And then, I want to kind of expand that discussion to both General Dempsey and Tony to talk about the translation of that tactical cooperation and the transfer to the political cooperation that we would hope that would be achieved between Anbar province and the central government or is the relationship really between Anbar province and multinational forces operating in the country?

DR. PETERSON: I would think that the application of Anbar would fall under a point that I didn't have time to mention in a very general way, the creation of a home guard; that is, to devise a cooperation and to encourage the formation of effective use of local forces; not to defend the entire theater of operations, but to defend their own local area in which they have a vested interest, obviously.

DR. CORDESMAN: I think this raises a question always. General Dempsey said, how do you determine a common view of the threat? One of the most critical issues is also how do you determine in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism what is a common view of the ally? For this to work, there has to be the confidence on the part of the people on the tribal side in Anbar that there is a future with the Iraqi national government. And the Iraqi national government has to believe that the rise of groups like the tribal alliance in Anbar will not create, once they defeat their immediate enemy, a threat to them in terms of sectarian or ethnic rivalry.

So to me, this gets back to a point General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have raised that ultimately all of these operations stand or fall at the political level, and whether you can move forward towards accommodation. The other thing, having been out to Anbar, certainly as a casual tourist – I don't want to discuss myself in any sense as an expert – but having watched too what's happening in Afghanistan. Very often, when these things begin, we can't support them with aid or governance. In Anbar, I think that has been different. In parts of Afghanistan, it has been just the opposite.

One of the great keys here is can you back this up with political support, economic support, government presence that provides services and creates a climate of stability; not simply of military security. I watched this fail consistently in parts of Vietnam. I've seen it fail in other efforts at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. I would hope that some of the concepts we have like embedded PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams], of increasing the aid level, of focusing on bringing accommodation from the bottom and the middle – not just from the top – are really going to sustain what's happening in Anbar. But there is a leaked version of a United Nations report on Afghanistan, which I think correctly describes this as a broad and consistent failure in most of Afghanistan, which is systematically undermining the efforts to create local militias and bring stability in the Pashtun areas. And I think you have to keep that perspective.

LT. GEN. DEMPSEY: Yeah, in terms of the local initiatives in Iraq, we have identified for a long time – it doesn't mean we've been able to do anything about it, but we needed to help the Iraqis create an interdependence among each other. In other words, we're not going to talk them into accommodation. They have to depend on each

other for something. Now, initially, we thought it would be governance at the national level. That hasn't played out the way clearly we intended it or would have preferred it to play out. But local initiatives are moving along. And the key, of course, is to tie them to something in the middle.

The two places where the potential for interdependence probably resides most prominently are in oil revenue, or revenue in general. And so we have focused a great deal of energy on that. And then, the second is in security. If you can get the people to understand that there is a common interest in security and that they all can share in a piece of it. Now, this briefs well; it's pretty hard to accomplish, I admit. But security is the second place. And that's why I was always and remain staunchly in favor of making sure that the Iraqis – the legitimate national Iraqi security forces are seen as an institution of national unity. They must be loyal to all the people. And that's the goal. It doesn't mean we achieve it in every case.

To the other parts of the region, and if we ever do this again, we always find ourselves somewhat schizophrenic about whether to empower the central government or the province. And the answer is, you can't empower either to the detriment of the other. They have to be developed simultaneously, not sequentially. And we've discovered that several times in the past few years.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: A couple of specifics here, the question has come up about the \$20 billion arms sale and the likelihood of that taking place and how that will impact on the assessments we've made so far. And what are the practical improvements we would see in security cooperation, and when would that occur, given that sale takes place?

DR. CORDESMAN: Let me say first, the sale will take place one way or another. The question is whether we make it or somebody else does. So that is a reality that has to be constantly kept in mind. The other issue is, we haven't seen the details of this as yet. I think that Mr. Kimmitt [Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury] is going to be presenting them in the near term. But when we talk about exactly what the impact will be, I think we need to be very careful and wait, perhaps, to see the details. Perhaps General Dempsey can provide more explanation.

But these are, after all, deliveries, which are described as taking place over time. It is not some sudden destabilizing massive set of deliveries, which will be rushed in, in the course of a year. When you offer a sale, the country doing the buying has the choice as to whether to buy. And we've seen in Taiwan that not everyone who is offered a sale buys. I do think that from the past set of U.S. sales, because these are tied to sustainability through the foreign military sales system in most cases, because they bring advisory groups, because initially the sustainment has to be supported by U.S. contractors, we establish, in general, improved relationships, a feeling of mutual trust. There have been a few exceptions I can think of. But they were few, relative to the volume of the program over time. And over the years, I have heard one fear after another

of massive transfers of arms, of people turning on us using our own weapons, of these weapons being used against other friends and allies.

And all I can say is that after half a century, the risk has somewhat diminished in my mind, because the only example I can think of really where these systems did fall into hostile hands was in the case of Iran. And it became apparent very quickly that without a partnership with the United States, it was not able to use these systems effectively or aggressively. And this great fear did not materialize.

LT. GEN. DEMPSEY: Yeah, the only thing I'd add is that I'm actually quite eager to see this initiative progress, because it allows us to assure our other allies in the region that we're not simply focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. That's an important message.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Okay, well, given that likelihood of the sales taking place, going back to Tony's charts that showed the overwhelming number of arms deliveries now and in the future and the manpower balances in the region, as Tony's charts describe to us, would you all help me think of alternatives Iran might have other than nuclear weapons or humiliation, as they try to move forward and pursue their own security?

DR. CORDESMAN: I think first – I'm going to make a mild plug – I just finished a book on this. And it got several hundred pages long, mysteriously. So any quick answer from any of us is going to be a little unfair. [See Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, *Iran's Military Force and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2007]

Iran has put vast assets into asymmetric warfare capabilities. It has, I think, done a good job of penetrating effectively in terms of services, advice, working with both local forces and often with their opponents in both Afghanistan and inside Iran. Its deployment of the naval branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards has shown a steady growth and sophistication. And it has been tailored to create threats, which are very difficult for U.S. forces to deal with, with anything like the efficiency that it can deal with in terms of conventional arms.

So I do not think in any sense from a defensive viewpoint or the viewpoint of asymmetric war, Iran has chosen a gap between being ineffective or going to nuclear weapons. And I would just extend this to say that when you look at Iran's defensive exercises – and they're sometimes hard to tell from offensive exercises and the counterattack phase – they do show that quite frankly, a U.S. land invasion of Iran would be, I think, to go back to one of John's historical precedents, a land war in Asia, and extremely inadvisable.

LT. GEN. DEMPSEY: Why are you looking at me?

DR. CORDESMAN: I was waiting for you to give all the details.

LT. GEN. DEMPSEY: No, no details. I will say that sort of the paradigm I discussed internal to nations about finding ways for disparate groups to become interdependent, I think also should work for us as we approach Iran. There's some very obvious places where we do have some common interests. One of them is counter-narcotics and the free-flow of resources and so forth. So I mean, at this point, I think it's important that we keep our eye not only on what they're doing that we find unacceptable but continue to try to find ways to find that interdependence that might break this spiral that we seem to be in with them.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: John, would you like to offer a historical comment on the question of the alternatives that Iran faces?

DR. PETERSON: No.

(Laughter.)

DR. ANTHONY: Just a question from myself, reflecting on any way to extrapolate a move fast forward, the previous cooperation between Iran and the other countries in the Gulf on environmental issues, whether that still has any relevance as sort of an apolitical or a-military or a-strategic route where you could find some common interests there? And secondly, Tony, maybe if you could address the sanctions thing that we were speaking about earlier, but superficially perhaps, in terms of how the U.S. sanctions, which are unilateral towards Iran versus – their origins rather – versus the ones on Iraq, which were universal through the United Nations. And the perceived intimidatory effect that that has had on the GCC countries themselves from having significant investments in Iran.

The Gulf is like a pond. People have skated back and forth across it for millennia. And there is a sense of us-ness amongst families, amongst tribes, amongst marriages. There are lots of people in Iran who speak Arabic as their native tongue. There are lots of people in the GCC region who speak Farsi as their native tongue. But the cloud that hangs over the U.S. sanctions towards Iran seems to be extraordinarily intimidatory for those people who would like to invest in Iran significantly, but feel that they may pay a price in their relationships with Uncle Sam and Aunt Samantha. Tony or John Peterson, Tony in particular.

DR. CORDESMAN: Well, I was just going to – I don't know whether you made a question or you made a statement of both of them.

DR. ANTHONY: Asking if there is anything relevant from the first that can be extrapolated to the present and how you would analyze the implications of the second question for what would seem to be a logjam or real obstacle in just Iran's own neighbors investing in Iran, let alone Japan, Taiwan, Korea and the others.

DR. PETERSON: Well, I just wanted to build on the point that you made first in the interrelationship between Iran and the Arab sides of the Gulf. Yes, there is a very

long history of links between them, and for better or for worse, they all live on the shores of the same lake. And that means they're going to have to be concerned about what happens in the future and the cooperation amongst them so that there wouldn't be hostility.

One thing struck me about the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council is that they have been mediators in so many conflicts, mostly in the Arab world, but not always. And it seems to me that there would be a very productive role. I mean, as important as arming themselves against a potential Iranian threat is the political undercurrent of accommodation with Iran, of conciliation, of working something out. And it seems to me that that is a possible avenue, which the United States could pursue on behalf of whether it be Saudi Arabia or some of the smaller Gulf states to enhance channels of communication.

DR. CORDESMAN: Well, let me pick up from what John is saying that I think that we already have learned from past efforts on the part of southern Gulf states as well as our European allies that having dialogue on their part with Iran and cooperation in civil areas with Iran does offer a possibility of making relations better over time and easing the security situation.

I think we need to be very careful about these sanctions. Secretary Rice and another, I believe, White House official – I'm sorry I'm doing a mental block – both said yesterday that these would not be enforced against second parties. That's a little ambiguous in the banking area. But it's a very important caveat. It is also true that for all the talk of the intimidating impact of U.S. sanctions, analyses by Ken Katzman [Senior Middle East analyst, Congressional Research Service] and quite a number of others have pointed out that the intimidating effect really isn't very high.

I do have to say that the main threat to Iran's oil investment, for example, is the incompetence of the National Iranian Oil Company [NIOC]. And it doesn't take outside sanctions until they get a much better realistic capability to make proposals. John, I think too, if you look at the latest statistics on investment from the southern Gulf into Iran, it's stepped up sharply, but it's stepped up sharply because there is more opportunity and more surplus capital. One of the problems as we're going back from a day in which people were still thinking about \$10 oil to, I think, a period in which they're pretty confident in \$60-plus, and that's changing Gulf behavior.

The last point I would make about these sanctions is I've been absolutely amazed at the way people have discussed these as if they were strong, decisive measures when I think they have been very carefully presented in very general terms as a designation of groups as terrorist. There have been no specifics – and Secretary Rice was asked about this repeatedly – about some kind of new dramatic enforcement regime. And it is important to note that the U.S. came to this position after having reached a compromise in the original U.N. resolution, which encouraged countries not to transfer missiles, advanced military technology, and nuclear technology, to draft resolutions where we could not get agreement – not from our European allies, but from Russia and China,

which are Iran's primary suppliers – as to strengthening the U.N. resolutions. So this is not something where you had unilateral action without a prior contact, and without the effort to act on a multilateral basis.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: General?

LT. GEN. DEMPSEY: Well, I've shared with you some things I think I know. I'd like to take this opportunity to share with you something I don't know. And in so doing, maybe – you haven't published anything in a long time, Tony; maybe you could take this on. (Laughter.) I used to sit in Iraq, and about every 72 hours, I'd get "boink". And I'd get this thing that overwhelmed my system from CSIS. And Tony'd say, hey, take a look at this for me, will you? Three hundred pages later, I'd write back. I can't do it anymore; you're killing me.

But here's something I don't know. We talk about Iran and how it behaves and how we behave toward it. And our assumption is that they are behaving in an essentially secular rational nation-state manner. When I left Saudi Arabia in 2003, a very, very senior member of the royal family, I asked him for advice. I knew I was going to Iraq. I said: what should I be aware of? What should I be alert for? What should I do?

He said, "General, be careful that you don't alter the face of Islam." Now, once again, just like with T1, I had no idea what he meant at the time until I got to Iraq and saw playing out inside of Iraq at some level – and I'm not exactly sure what level – underneath the surface and sometimes well above it, this somewhat something that you might describe as an internal reformation in Islam. And what I don't know about Iran is to what extent its conduct is intended to advance that issue, which is to say that Shi'a Islam will be the dominant form of Islam. And I think we better understand the degree to which that motivates Iran before we make assumptions about its behavior.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Thank you very much. That's a fitting note to finish on. I would thank you all for your attention and your good questions. I'm sorry we didn't get to all of them. I'll try to have the speakers walk slowly out of the room, so maybe you can catch them one on one. To our speakers, thank you very much. Well thought out and well presented thoughts that we all needed. And again, to you, sir, thank you very much for including me in this.

DR. ANTHONY: Thank you, both generals, and Tony, and John Peterson who I've known now for 35 years. We're former colleagues, as such, and ongoing laborers in this particular vineyard. Let's take 25 minutes for a break and come back at 11:00. But first, could we recognize the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, if he would please stand, who was a gracious and generous host last evening? (Applause.) Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That was a lovely occasion. (In Arabic.)

(End of session.)