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**“REVISITING ARAB-U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONS:
GEO-POLITICAL, ENERGY, DEFENSE COOPERATION,
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DYNAMICS”**

2:00-3:00: “GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS (III): IRAN AND IRAQ”

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DR. ANTHONY: Please take your seats and we'll move forward.

Well, in the interest of time, I think we'll move forward and our moderator for this panel is Ambassador Ronald Neumann, recently returned from Afghanistan. And I will let him continue.

HON. RONALD NEUMANN: Well, it's a pleasure to be back – not only back at this conference, where I have been sometimes in the past in the earlier days, and it's a pleasure to be back in America. But I am – I would emphasize that I am no longer a serving government official, so I don't know if I'll say anything better or more intelligent, but at least it's my own. And I am now the President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, where we hope that a small group of senior retired diplomats will find some things of use to do for American diplomacy.

We have a broad subject in Iran and Iraq, despite the fact that it's only two countries, and not a great deal of time. We have four excellent speakers. Their biographies are in your program, so I will not go through this. I am – I apologize, Judy, I didn't tell you, but we're going to let you start, but you did this easily, so it's not a problem.

What we will do is let Judith start on her particular subject of Iraq where she and I have discussed – been on panels and private discussions and various things, I think, for a very long time. She really is very good on this subject. And then I'm going to ask Dr. Ghareeb to follow her. He was the first Mustafa Barzani scholar at the American University. He has a long experience in all of these parts, but he's going to particularly focus on Kurdish issues, a subject in which he and I have been engaged for a very long time.

And then Dr. Katzman will come in partly on Iran, but I believe has some broader aspects as well. And Dr. Parsi, who has just published a book, as many of you may know, on Iran, Israel, and the U.S. will follow.

And what I would ask my colleagues is they take this on, although obviously they have prepared the remarks and so they are unlikely to change very much, but there is an awful lot of dialogue today which is amazingly repetitive of people pronouncing with great vehemence the same views without bringing much intellectually new to the task. And so I would ask, as time permits, that we reflect a little bit on some of these big questions that we talk about all the time. We talk about Iran and the question of weapons, nuclear weapons. I've heard very little expression in more than the two sentence version of what is it you actually think Iran will do if it has a weapon that might be worth pursuing just a bit? What does it really mean in diplomatic terms and how great a danger is it?

There is a lot of talk, not just now, but for years about a regional security architecture in the Gulf. That's one of the points Dr. Parsi made in his book. But there is also the issue that Iran is inherently an imperial power whose dominance in the Gulf was resented and resisted by the Arabs, and so what is a regional architecture and what are you supposed to do with it and how are you supposed to contain these various different forces if you want to have one? And then there are any number of questions on Iraq, but I won't ask them because I think we will get more than enough.

I do have one great luxury in this panel: that there is no one of another culture to whom I need to be extraordinarily sensitive, and therefore I propose to enforce the time limits. With that, Judy – my ultimate desire was not fulfilled. I don't have a switch. I can't cut the mike off. So your say, Judy, please.

JUDITH YAPHE: Just try and cut me off. I've studied Saddam for a long time. I can handle this.

It's a pleasure to be here. I guess you can all hear me if you can't see me. You may have been expecting Phebe Marr. I'm not Phebe Marr. Would I like a box? Thank you very much, no. But trust me; I am somewhat of an Iraq expert. I've got the Saddam watch. I've got the cigarette lighter, and my sons gave me the book "Iraq for Dummies."

Put this down. Is that better? So you can hear me or you can see me and throw something. (Laughter.) Okay. It's all right. I'm told my big mission is to keep everybody awake, but it's fine.

Now, I'm not here and I don't think it pays, and I think Ron will agree with me, to go over history. Why are we there? How did we get in and we did it? Was it right or wrong? I'm not here to attack or defend the Bush administration or anybody else, but I do have some rather strong views. And let me say before I get started the usual disclaimer. Yes, I work for the United States government and I have for thirty-some years, most of the time spent on Iraq or Iran and the Gulf, but these are my own views and don't reflect the views, opinions, or whatever of the U.S. government.

Now, having said that, you're going to get I think a strong – you'll get a sense of my views. And one of my key concerns here is the question – my Arabic is terrible, but it's: *wein* Iraq? Iraq is not here. Where is it? I hear a lot of things here and in other meetings about how – here's what we think should happen. Here's what we think the Iraqis should do, and I always wanted to ask, "But have you talked to the Iraqis? Do you know anything about them or what they want?" So what I really want to do is I have four tasks and I'll talk fast.

I want to go over a few lessons. Six lessons I have learned from Iraq's past, how those lessons apply to the present, and might, but probably won't, shape U.S. policy. I want to talk about the influence of Iraq on its neighbors, because the influence is deep. What is happening there cannot be contained. And then so what's the answer? Is there

any answer? I'll have a few cautionary notes to both Americans and Iraqis as they think about where to go, and I intend to get through all of this.

I think Senator Hagel had it right when he said that he hopes that we have learned something from the past five years. I'm not so sure, but I hope he's correct.

Now, for my lessons, let me start with this one. The first one is it's only liberation for the first three days, then it's occupation no matter how welcome the regime change, how glad we are to see you, when are you going home, and to have assumed anything else was not – was naïve, let's say.

My second point would be perception is greater than reality. An Iraqi friend told me that a couple of years ago. And I would add to that what – lesson I have learned is that security is more important than democracy. I'm not saying it should be. I'm saying the reality of what we've seen on the ground in Iraq is that it is security that is driving Iraqis to support factions, groups, parties, leaders that they don't like, whose positions they find abhorrent, but who can provide a certain modicum of security and protection, maybe jobs, maybe help with finding a place to live.

My third point would be that past is present, or put it another way that our present is our past and our future. What does that mean? We've never learned the lessons of history and I think Iraqis have never forgotten them. And I'll just give you one example. In 2003, when the coalition force arrived, one of the countries that sent troops to Iraq was Mongolia. And the Iraqis picked up on it right away and an Iraqi paper said "second invasion of Iraq by the Mongols." The first one was in 1258. Now, we remember this. Yes, that was good.

The thing – as I said, Iraqis never forget them – what the other lessons – to get to more current history, for those of you looking for the exit strategy, the magic key that's going lift us out of there and everything's going to be fine and everyone will live happily ever after, I don't know what the exit strategy is, so don't look to me to solve that. But I do think, again, if you look for comparisons in history, consider what the British did 1918 till they finally left 1958. But in a period of the actual mandate from 1918 to '32, they did a lot of things. They did some things maybe well, some things really badly, and they had an exit strategy and that included elements based on security, defense, and assuring access to bases – things of that nature. I think we need to think about how you shape these things. I'm not sure there's any simple way around it.

Iraq has factions, ethnic and sectarian. And here I think the basic point it's not just that we are responsible, it's all our fault. We need to take responsibility, but the Iraqis themselves have issues that we don't know how or can't deal with. And my point is this: that Iraqis, be they ethnic, sectarian, be they Iraqis of whatever kind are imprisoned in a past that they're not yet able to give up and unable to enter the future they refuse to accept. Why no national reconciliation? Why is the government dysfunctional? Why is there no political surge to correspond to the military surge that's ongoing?

Fourth point. We don't understand what's driving them and here I want to go back to – I stole this from an article by David Ignatius a couple of weeks ago. He quotes Isaiah Berlin and he was talking about – Berlin wasn't talking about Iraq, but he was saying, when you try to understand the surge of nationalism despite wars and revolutions and overthrows, whatever. Nationalism springs as often as not from a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the desire for recognition. The craving for recognition has grown to be more powerful than any force abroad today.

Now, Berlin was saying this in 1961 I think, but the quote that struck me was: it is no longer economic insecurity or political impotence that oppresses the imaginations of many young people in the West – in the East – excuse me – but a sense of the ambivalence of their social status, doubts of where – about where they belong and where they wish to or deserve to belong. And the point – the reason I quoted is I think much of what we're seeing in Iraq, it's not sectarian warfare plain and simple. It's not just ethnic conflict plain and simple. Iraq is a very complicated maze, if you will, of different kinds of conflicts, depending where you are. It is Shi'a against Shi'a in the South and Basra, and in Baghdad it is Sunni against Sunni, as we are well aware. It is Shi'a versus Sunni, and I worry about that ultimate great conflict that could come to pass, and that would be Arab and Kurd. The Turkmen Shi'a are fighting the Turkmen Sunnis. You describe the kind of conflict you want in theory and I think you'll find it in Iraq. And that's my sixth point – excuse me, my fifth point – it's not about sectarianism. It's not about religion or religious values, but it is all about identity, local power, getting something. Who are we? Who am I? Who am I loyal to? And it's about tribe, clan, family, sect, ethnicity – a lot of combinations of factors.

My last point is this. People don't like to be told what to do by outsiders. I would like to say this really loudly in Washington. Stop telling the Iraqis what they must do or else, especially these delegations that go off to Baghdad. The very presence of foreigners can stimulate the first sense of apartness and of group cohesion. Foreign intervention offends people's dignity. It's bad enough that Iraqis feel – feel bad, could not do anything to overthrow Saddam Hussein. And it's fine. You came in and did that for us, but don't treat us like people who really don't know how to do anything. We may not know how to do it well and I'm not – again, I'm not an Iraqi, but what I'm saying is there is a sense of – what? – of empowerment and pride that we talk a lot about, but we haven't done much, I think, to fulfill. And I think that's why insurgencies are so hard to defeat.

People will fight to protect their honor, especially when they have nothing else left. We should not be pushing them into a corner. You may not like this government. You may not like the politicians. It is dysfunctional, but consider the alternatives. You can't change a government like you change your socks every time you don't like it.

Now, moving along as fast as I can, Ron – yes, thank you. How does this explain Iraq and U.S. options? What is the solution? Well, the solution, as everyone said, and I think it's true; it's not in U.S. military victory. The surge is working in areas, but there is no political surge. I'll also come back to the fact that partition is not the answer either.

The answer is not going to be just in having the government of Iraq pass laws on paper. You've got to have a law on oil. You've got to have a law on de-Ba'athification. You'd better have some laws on national reconciliation. And the President and the Prime Minister both say, well, yes, we've sent laws on that to the parliament, but the parliament is ignoring them. It's not ready or willing to deal with that. What do you do? Issuing demands that cannot be met is not always a winning strategy. I'm a mother. I know this. I know how you – (laughter) – it happens in life.

I don't think that there's a solution here, especially as we see Turkish incursion, Iranian shelling. There a lot of pressures on Iraq that are going to change what is happening there, whether we like it or not.

Now, also the other issue that we can't fight is how do you prevent or get Iran out of Iraq. I will talk too much I fear. We can do all that in Q&A, but suffice it to say that that doesn't happen either. This is a 900-kilometer border – excuse me – 900 miles – 1,400-plus kilometers long border with two governments whether they like it or not, and I think many in Iraq are not comfortable with the Iranian presence, don't like what they're doing, and many of those are – were members of the parties that were hosted by Iran that are described as being pro-Iran.

I suppose my bottom line is never assume; you can't assume that because the Iraqi Shi'a are the same sect as Iran that this is all fine, that this is going to be an extension. You have to keep challenging those ideas. Iraqis I've talked to from all over the political spectrum, all say they feel uncomfortable, but they are also to afraid to say it in public.

So where are we? I think we have to be careful of certain things. It is a question of identity, I think, and some are talking about the rebirth of nationalism. It never went away. It's there and many – I think Iraqis are coming – are looking for solutions that will allow them to cross over the lines that are so deeply dividing them, but these things don't happen overnight. You're not going to find the answer tomorrow. Let's have a grand coalition across the spectrum of Sunnis and Shi'a and Christians. Sadr has called for that. [EDITOR: Muqtada al-Sadr is a young Shi'a religious leader who has strongly opposed the American presence in Iraq and called for the creation of an Islamic Republic. His supporters have been organized into a loosely controlled militia known as the "Mahdi Army" and has been widely blamed for terrorist attacks on American forces as well as on other Sunni and Shi'a Muslim groups. More recently, while still opposing the American presence in Iraq, he has called for greater Shi'a-Sunni cooperation to create an "Islamic democracy."] Or let's have all seculars or whatever together. It takes time to build up these alliances and it may not happen even in this generation, but time is something we – (unintelligible) – is telling me to stop – that we don't have.

The issue of democracy – I'm sorry?

MR. NEUMANN: You've got two minutes.

DR. YAPHE: I got two minutes? Oh, okay, no problem.

I don't think partition, as I said, is the answer. Let me skip to that. Federalism is important and I know Edmund is going to talk – I'm sure he's going to talk a bit about this – but let me say that to the United States partition, especially as talked in the Biden-Gelb proposal – soft partition is a good thing. [EDITOR: A plan put forward by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Les Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations calls for federalizing Iraq into three regions – Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite – with Baghdad designated a federal zone. Regional governments would largely run their own affairs with the national government responsible for border defense, foreign affairs, and the collection and distribution of oil revenues.]

Think about – from my point of view that's one form, I guess, of exit strategy, but to Iraqis there is not any difference between soft and hard partition. Setting up really independent provinces going into partition for them, it is the end of Iraq. They see no difference between the two and they're very fearful that it will lead to civil war, and I think there is a great worry about that. To the neighbors, it's a very scary proposition. You know better than I do, many of you, how the new – what? – the new conflict in the region is being couched. If World War III or World War IV, depended on the media and the American political spectrum, you may believe that we're about to get into World War IV. I'm not sure, but the point is that these – people who talk about it's all about Sunni versus Shi'a or moderates versus extremists, or Arabs versus Persians, these things are taking a lot of coloration. My only admonition here would be I think the United States has to be very careful not to get caught in these kinds of attitudes and – or to feed these kinds of impressions.

Now, I think the question – there're a couple of questions that you have to ask, and one of them as we look at what seems to be what some of the better news that we've had in the Iraq in terms of the surge taking effect in certain areas, I think we have to be very careful if the surge is based on an assumption what we are reaching out to the Sunnis and supporting the tribes, working locally. They turn against al Qaeda because it's in their interest as well as ours. We have to be careful not to carry that too far. It does not mean that the Sunnis have accepted the government in Baghdad. It does not mean that they think that we are their best of friends and that's going to continue. It means that we have a mutual need and we are meeting it, but things can change overnight, as Ron well knows.

But the other thing is this. Can you replicate that surge elsewhere in Iraq? The Shi'a, the government of Baghdad tells us it can't be replicated, that Anbar and Arab areas are unique and what works there won't work anywhere else and, by the way, you are creating independent militias that are just making problems worse. Oh, okay.

Can you sustain this surge? People who are much more knowledgeable than I am about what the military – what stage our military's at this point – overextended, about to collapse – what do we have – this I don't know. If you want to have a successful surge strategy, though, military and political, you have to invest more resources out there. It seems to be a simple thing.

MR. NEUMANN: (Off mike.)

DR. YAPHE: No, not yet, not yet.

MR. NEUMANN: We will have no questions.

DR. YAPHE: No questions.

MR. NEUMANN: And we will cut off the end speeches because – (off mike).

DR. YAPHE: Boy, you are tough. Wait till I get you next time. All right, I said – okay. I will finish. I think I made most of my points anyway, but let me just end with this note. Nobody has asked the question “What is acceptable to Iraqis?” They don’t want in my opinion, educated opinion, occupation by – just shift it to another occupier, not Arabs, not Muslims, not the neighbors because they all have their own agendas about what Iraq should do, how weak it should be, what priorities it should have. And I will – I will – I will end with that note.

MR. NEUMANN: Thank you, ma’am.

DR. YAPHE: I won’t – I won’t be angry.

MR. NEUMANN: I’ll plead for forgiveness later.

Edmund, you’re on. (Applause.)

EDMUND GHAREEB: Good afternoon. Thank you. I am going to focus – I’ve been asked to focus on the Kurds and that’s what I’ll try to do. One of the main things is that the recent confrontations between the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] and the Turkish military and policy has shown how rapidly tension could escalate not only between the Turks and the Kurds, but between the U.S. and several of its allies in the region, especially an ally – an old ally like Turkey and also new allies such as the Kurds and the Iraqi government.

All of this shows that the Kurdish genie has emerged out of the bottle and it’s going to be very difficult to put it back in the bottle anytime soon. And what we’re likely to see is, as I said, basically is that even if that occurs, and it’s going to be very difficult to do so, we are going to see a great deal of violence and bloodshed down the road.

I’ve been doing a number of interviews with some of the – talking about this issue and several times I was on the panels with Turkish and sometimes Iraqi, Arab or other speakers, and one of the things that I kept hearing from several of them is constant reference to Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), which divided the Ottoman Empire and the Sèvres Treaty (1920). In fact, one of the Turkish analysts focus kept coming back to Sèvres, the Treaty of Sèvres, which promised the Kurds and the Armenians the right to

establish independent states if they wanted to do so and if they prove that they are capable of doing so. This shows in fact the volatility of this issue and we're hearing a great deal also because of the plans, the so called soft partition plans for Iraq which are probably dangerous and at worst and naïve at best. And so I – this is one of the – of the issues that we're hearing a great deal about.

[EDITOR: The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) was a secret understanding between Britain and France, with the participation of Imperial Russia, regarding the future of Ottoman territories in the Middle East following the expected collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. Britain would influence or control territories roughly congruent to Jordan and Iraq with an outlet to the Mediterranean at Haifa. France would control Syria, Lebanon, southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Russia would control Constantinople and areas of Armenia, as well as having unimpeded access through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The changing fortunes and convoluted diplomacy of World War I, however, would bring these understandings into conflict with British promises made to Arab leaders in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (1915-16) and with promises made to Jewish leaders in the Balfour Declaration (1917). The Russian Revolution (1917) and Ataturk's nationalist revolution in Turkey would also significantly change the diplomatic landscape.

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was the treaty signed by the World War I allies, with the exceptions of the United States and the Ottoman Empire, intended to format the break-up of the Ottoman Empire by ceding significant amounts of territory to Greece in the West, enlarging the territory of Armenia and allowing for an independent Kurdistan in the East, creating Italian, French, and British zones of influence in the South, and leaving a dramatically reduced residuum of the old Ottoman territory as the core of a modern Turkish state. Emergent Turkish nationalist forces under Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk), however, strongly resisted this carving up of Ottoman territory and the Treaty of Sèvres, which had never been approved by the Ottoman parliament before it was disbanded, was annulled to be replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which reclaimed for Turkey much of the territory lost in the Treaty of Sevres, made no mention of an independent Kurdistan and left the fate of Mosul to the fledgling League of Nations which would subsequently confirm Mosul as part of the British Iraq Mandate (1926).]

I think that aside from the Palestinian issue, the Arab-Israeli issue in general, we are likely to see in the 21st century the Kurdish issue emerge as probably one of the most serious, one of the candidates for being one of issues generating violence, tension in the Middle East for years to come. What we have on the ground right now is that there is an active populist movement in place with a growing sense of national self-consciousness and that is determined, that it's not going to be ignored again.

Kurds are dreaming of independence and/or autonomy and certainly of better rights for their people all over the Middle East. What's ironic, however, at this time is that at the same time that we are seeing that nationalist movements are declining, or are somewhat on the wane in a number of places in the area, we see that the Kurds are in fact

becoming determined nationalists and pushing their agenda forward along nationalist rather than the sectarian or religious or tribal basis.

Having long been the losers in the imperialist power games, the Kurds benefited from the Gulf wars, three Gulf wars, but particularly from the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse of the institutions of the Iraqi state. It's difficult to underestimate the effect that this has had on the Kurds not only in Iraq, but in neighboring countries, who feel inspired, encouraged, empowered by the success of their brothers in Iraq. The Kurds in Iraq did not gain their independent state that many of the Kurds dream of, but they were able to basically achieve important gains from the new Iraqi Constitution, such as wide legislative powers, control of their own military forces, and authority over new discoveries of oil, although this is – this remains a controversial issue. It remains – it's contested by the central government and others. These gains basically consecrate the quasi-independence that the Kurds enjoyed since 1990-'91.

[EDITOR: The “quasi-independence” the Kurds to which Dr. Ghareeb refers began in 1991 following the Second Gulf War to liberate Kuwait. When President George H.W. Bush made the decision not to “go to Baghdad” and not to forcibly oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power, the expressed hope of U.S. policy was that the Iraqi people – notably the Kurds in the north of Iraq and the Shi'i population of the south - would rise up against Saddam Hussein, and he would be toppled from power by his own people. Saddam Hussein, however, was quick to move to crush such resistance to his regime, leading to United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 creating of “no-fly zones” in Iraq designed to prevent Saddam from bringing airpower to bear against these rebellious regions of the country. “Operation Provide Comfort” was a joint operation of the U.S. military to defend and protect Kurds fleeing their homes in Northern Iraq and to shelter them in their resistance to Saddam Hussein's forces. In late 1991 a ceasefire agreement was reached which led to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the creation of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government. In essence, the measure of freedom and self-rule gained by Iraqi Kurdistan between 1992 and 2003 under what amounted to an American protectorate, has made the Kurds extremely reluctant to give up any amount of political independence and control over territory and resources to any newly created Iraqi central government, even one based on a loose confederal model. Turkey remains deeply concern that the relative independence of Iraqi Kurds will fuel ambitions for a greater Kurdistan that would include Kurds now living inside Turkish borders. The Turkish government accuses the PKK of mounting raids across the Turkish border from inside the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan and has in some circumstances authorized the Turkish military to cross into Iraqi Kurdish territory in “hot pursuit” of these raiders. Thus, the United States increasingly finds itself caught between its promises to its Kurdish allies, its desire to build a stable central government in Iraq, and its long-term commitments to its NATO partner – Turkey.]

The Iraqi state today is, as Judith mentioned, is a federal state. It's a single independent, federal state. For many Kurds, this situation is a way station along the way toward the goal that many Kurds are dreaming of, and that is independence. Some Kurdish leaders are aware of the difficulties and they know that their leaders – some of

their leaders that you talk to, they say that the right to self determination is that – is a right and that it must be struggled for and – it must be achieved, but at the right time because they are very much aware of the sensitivity of this issue and its complexity, and particularly they are very much concerned about the stands of some of the neighboring states. And Turkey is at the top of the list.

However, the measures of autonomy for the Kurds and the constitution and its effects on the Kurdish population elsewhere are viewed with apprehension by the neighboring states in the region, particularly Iran, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Syria, which are struggling to accommodate the Kurdish aspirations of their own populations.

One of the things that I think we have to remember about this is that – and especially if we pay attention to the debate that's going on now – is that the great deal of – much of what – where we are today goes back actually also to the First World War and the rise of the new nation-states, the increased concentration of state power and the rise in Kurdish nationalism. The new nation-states were determined to centralize, to create new identities based on majority nationalist identity, not on the identities that existed under the Ottoman Empire of religion and of – or of tribe and sects. This occurred at a time when Kurdish nationalism was actually on the rise. It became much more important to larger numbers of Kurds, and this came about the more the Kurds asserted their rights, the more they demanded them, the more they revolted to achieve those rights, the more repressive the states were; and the more repressive the states were, the more resistant the Kurds became. And in fact, we went into this cycle that we are still in the midst of and what basically – I want to mention a few points basically on what is it that brings the Kurds together.

I think that one of the main things about this is that while the Kurds – part of the reason why the Kurds did not achieve their objective, is that there was not – they did not have a unified Kurdish national movement. Also at the time that the other people of the Middle East, Arabs, Persians, Turks became very nationalistic, the Kurds were still tied to ideas of tribe, clan, and to a certain extent sect as well or family. And one of the other things that we saw as a result of this is that the Kurds have suffered actually from a number of points. One of them is that there were tribal differences, personality differences, and they were not really aware of the outside world, but things have begun to change. Kurds overlap state borders, and this is something that has security and political implications for all the parties. The Kurds are also – usually live in some of the poorest areas in their states, and also is that there are tensions within the Kurdish community.

I know I have two minutes left, but I'll briefly want to talk a little bit about the debate – the fierce debate that's taking place among the Kurds in Iraq. Part of the reason for this is that the Kurds often basically have found themselves in a very difficult situation in the area and that's partly because what we ended up seeing up is that the Kurds of Iraq have sought – have debated whether – what is it that they want to demand. Is it that they want independence or are they willing to accept the idea of federation within the Iraqi – a loosely federated Iraqi state?

The Kurdish issue has in fact become a very important one for the majority of the Kurds. The referendums that took place showed that most Kurds, probably the overwhelming majority would like to have an independent state in Iraq, but – and many of the Kurds believe that the reason why this is the case is that the time – the Kurds now are much stronger. They have a great deal of international sympathy in the United States and abroad. There are important economic issues that serve to strengthen their position and that any kind – if they don't do that at this time, this is going to be a betrayal of Kurdish rights and Kurdish interests.

Those, however, within the Kurdish community who want to stay within Iraq argue that basically that Iraq is a rich country and it would be in their interest to remain in a rich and stable Iraq, in a federal government that recognizes their rights and allows them to play an important role. In fact, what they believe is that they could benefit a great deal from this and ultimately a successful experiment like this is going to put pressure on the neighbors to provide the Kurds in other countries with their rights.

Basically, I think ultimately unless there is a solution to this issue and this solution cannot be an imposed solution. It has to be a solution that's going to be reached between the Kurds and the governments and the people with whom they are living. Unless that's done, I think the region is doomed to further violence and bloodshed over this issue in all of the countries where the Kurds live.

Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. NEUMANN: Thank you very much for reminding us that for all the difficult subjects we're talking about in the press daily, we have some others equally difficult, bloody, and potentially violent, and for reminding us of the connections of history to new issues. I was fascinated by the fact that as you characterized the debate, it is about interest and desire and not nearly so much about what is practical, which is I think also an interesting – I know I cut you short, so you might have said more about that, but I think it is also an interesting commentary on the nature of the debate itself and why there is an old pattern of overextension in moments of power suffered by bitter change later for the Kurds. So we'll see whether this is a new pattern or an old one.

And with that, Dr. Katzman – I go back and forth with old friends between Doctor and Ken, anyway you're on.

KENNETH KATZMAN: Thank you very much. I'm going to make some brief remarks about Iraq and then get right to Iran.

On federalism, which Judith and Edmund Ghareeb stressed, from my standpoint as an analyst with the U.S. Congress, I do see momentum and increasing support for the idea of a federal Iraq, what I call a decentralized Iraq. I do not use the word partition or even soft partition. I use decentralization. I do believe that on the ground the U.S., even though this is not declared U.S. policy, there is in what we're doing, particularly in Anbar and other places I do see U.S. policy sliding into the decentralization plan de facto. And I

do – and many of you know I've been very pessimistic on Iraq since day one, but I do see the potential for an emerging stability from this possible plan.

Some sort of a plan under which, for example, no Iraqi government forces that are mostly Shiite would be deployed in the Sunni areas, no Sunni police or army in the Shi'a areas, each community running its own affairs, very small central government limited basically to printing postage stamps and giving out the oil revenue under an agreed formula. Many of the areas of Iraq because of the battlefield situation we've had for five years are already homogenous, so I do see growing support for this idea and I do think U.S. policy is going toward this de facto, even though as I said, it is not declared U.S. policy at this point.

Now, to the subject I really want to talk about, which is Iran. The media and other analysts are rife with assessments that Iran is somehow ascendant. The U.S. is greatly weakened because of the Iraq difficulties, the summer fighting in Lebanon, other fronts in Afghanistan. Some analysts and press reports even go so far as to say there is a new cold war between the United States and Iran. Some of this analysis is the product of Iran's successful efforts to portray itself as a great nation and the major power in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians have successfully convinced many experts that Iran in fact verges on superpower status, that the future belongs to Iran and that the international community is a group of supplicants that need to prostrate itself before Iran's greatness. If we step back, however, and look at the facts, I believe there is no cold war between the United States and Iran because the United States and Iran should not even be talked about in the same sentence. Iran meets almost no criteria to be considered a great nation in any sense, nor is it ever likely to. Iran's economy is in fact not only mismanaged, but it is quite primitive. It exports almost nothing but oil. It does produce some automobiles under license from Peugeot, Renault, Mercedes, and others. It produces some light aircraft. But all of these were designed by others. Iran merely runs the production lines. It does not design these things.

Iran exports about 2.6 million barrels of oil a day and earns at current prices, let's say, \$50 billion a year. However, it gives at least \$5 billion of that back in the form of imported gasoline because it does not have enough refining capacity. Some studies say Iran may even be a net importer of oil by 2015 or at least not an exporter anymore.

Iranian leaders might not want to hear this, but in terms of conventional military power, Iran is a virtual nonentity. One week of U.S. air power would leave Iran militarily naked and defenseless. Their entire naval capability would lie at the bottom of the Persian Gulf. Its entire air force would lie in bits and pieces and its tanks and armor forces would be completely wiped out. This is not the makings of a great nation in my view.

It is no wonder that Iran has always backed off the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Iran's nuclear facilities are struck. This is because Iran knows that not only

would its own oil dependent economy be shut down, but that the U.S. Navy would be able to reopen the Strait within hours, rendering Iran's actions almost embarrassing. Iran's own military analysts say that at best Iran could close the Strait for about one day.

What are the implications of this analysis? Well, the U.S. – the administration view, and I think this is where I am, too, is that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable and must be prevented. This is a widely held view in the administration, the Congress, and among many experts. No one I've talked to, among the circles I've talked to, wants to wake up tomorrow to have an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. It is my view that the administration needs to refute Iran's assertions that it is some great nation deserving of lots of concessions. Sanctions are not to be feared if they can be made effective and the U.S. is working to make them effective. And I believe they are starting to cause dissension within the Iranian regime among those Iranian leaders that do not want to be isolated from the international community for economic and other reasons.

Military action against Iran's nuclear program is not to be feared. It is not to necessarily be a first resort, but it is not to be feared necessarily and it would likely be effective because U.S. forces in the Gulf would be quickly able to demonstrate that Iran is not the power that it advertises itself as.

Sure, Iran has options to activate Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, other movements. There's a clear harassment capability, but these do not fundamentally pose an existential threat to the U.S. or any of its allies. U.S. forces are more than capable, should it be decided to do so, of squeezing the Iraqi Shiite militias to the point where they are no longer politically capable of propping up the dominant factions in Iraq.

The conclusion is that the U.S. has far from exhausted all options in stopping Iran's nuclear program and need not acquiesce to the inevitability that Iran will be a nuclear state. This is not to argue that the United States should seek some early confrontation with Iran. If sanctions could be made effective, all to the good. If a grand bargain can be found that suits the interest of both, that should be pursued. This analysis is for the purpose of refuting those, however, who believe that the U.S. needs to go out of its way to accommodate Iran rather than risk dire consequences. Iran is in no position to impose any dire consequences on the United States unless the United States were to make the horrendous mistake of conducting some sort of ground invasion of Iran, which no one I've talked to believes is under consideration.

Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. NEUMANN: You, obviously, are entitled to extra time in the speaker's question session because you actually finished early, which is almost unknown and I'm stunned. (Laughter.) I thank you.

I think you opened up a subject that we probably will not get adequately into here, but that is certainly worth pursuing, which is the threat of Iran in asymmetric warfare as opposed to conventional. Certainly, looking at it from the perspective I just left in

Afghanistan, I felt that there was a considerable untapped potential for trouble, which I was happy we didn't have to engage in while I was there.

We are now moving to Dr. Parsi, who has also looked at Iran, who has come to somewhat different conclusions in his book, at least at the end of it about the utility of including Iran as a great power in the Gulf. I don't know if he was planning to talk about that, but I hope that you will touch at least on that, and I will ask, if you can, to keep to about 12 minutes or so. We'll have time for a few questions. I know Dr. Anthony has noble aspirations for the schedule: they end on time, they start on time, and they have all the credibility of the five-minute break.

Dr. Parsi, please?

TRITA PARSI: Thank you so much. Great being here today. Just a couple of hours ago, Secretary Rice announced that new stringent sanctions had been imposed on Iran, sanctions that would be targeting Iranian banks, as well as the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps]. The sanctions were presented as a measure to force Iranians to back down on the nuclear program while at the same time giving diplomacy a boost. It is good to know that in spite of all the difficulties and failures the Bush administration has suffered in the Middle East, its sense of optimism has not yet suffered a bit. (Laughter.)

I would say that this is a policy option that basically would be the continuation of a policy that already has proven to be unsuccessful. Whether Iran is a great nation or whether it's a smaller nation, the justification for these sanctions that were first imposed – comprehensive sanctions – in 1995 are pretty much the same today as they were then. And about 12 years later, Iran certainly is more powerful than it was in 1995, and the United States is finding itself in a somewhat more difficult position than the diplomatic apex that it was finding itself in in that year.

So if the sanctions had been effective so far, if this is a policy that's going to be able to be successful in turning Iran's foreign policy around, then so far we have hardly seen any signs of that success. Clearly, the sanctions have imposed a major cost on the Iranian economy. And I do believe that the new sanctions, certainly also will have a cost for the Iranians. But so far, none of the sanctions that have been imposed and none of the sanctions that are likely to be imposed have been able to translate that pain that the Iran economy is sensing into a change of policy in Tehran. And it's very difficult to see why the new sanctions will do so. In fact, I would argue that this new policy or this continuation of this failed policy carries two great dangers.

The real question is not whether these sanctions can hurt Iran; they can. The question is: Can the economic sanctions cripple Iran's economy faster than the United States itself is getting crippled in Iraq? If not, then as time passes, the Iranians may very well end up in a situation in which they are stronger in relation to the United States than they currently are, because the pain the United States is feeling out of the failure in Iraq is

greater than the pain of the sanctions on the Iranians, and that would certainly make it much more difficult for the United States to be able to achieve its objectives with Iran.

Secondly, I believe that this type of measures is just a continuation of pushing the United States and Iran into a paradigm of enmity. A paradigm that is very strongly held here in Washington as it is in Tehran, a paradigm that in and of itself is making diplomacy between the two countries all the more difficult as time passes and as more of these types of measures are being taken. The Iranians have already preemptively retaliated against the new sanctions by putting CIA on their own terrorist list. It's hard to see how this type of mud-slinging is going to have any positive effect for the region in the long run.

And whereas we can have a debate on the consequences of war with Iran, whether the Iranians would be able to prove themselves to be a worthy military opponent, or whether, as Ken pointed out, that their military is probably not as strong as they want it to appear, but also not as strong as many of the warmongers in Washington have tried to make it look in order to be able to justify the idea that Iran is an imminent threat.

But one consequence that I think we can be quite certain about is that Iran right now is a country that has a population that is somewhat unique from the populations of the other states in the region. In Iran right now, pro-American sentiments or the sense that there is a very great affection for American values, for American culture, for American people is very strongly held amongst ordinary Iranians. It is, unfortunately, not the case in many of the other countries in the region. In the other countries of the region, America's popularity stands somewhere between 1-15 percent in some of the recent polls. And in those countries, we're working very, very hard to be able to win the hearts and minds of their people.

In Iran, all we need to do is to make sure that we don't lose them. But by the first bullet, by the first missile, or if it goes into the first boot on the ground, we will lose the hearts and minds of the people of Iran. And the hearts and minds of the people of Iran is a strategic asset that the United States should much more wisely use in its favor to be able to pursue a more successful policy with Iran that could make Iran once again a friend of the United States.

Now, let me switch gears a little bit and talk about what has been mentioned here earlier on, both by Senator Hagel and by the Ambassador. Senator Hagel said that he could not imagine peace in the Middle East without Iran being included, and the Ambassador mentioned earlier on in his introduction that Iran has many times in the past shown imperialistic tendencies in its foreign policy. Iran certainly has been tremendously inept in explaining to the region what its inclusion in regional security architecture, political architecture would actually mean. What they have done is to argue for their inclusion by playing on the anti-Israeli card and playing on the anti-American card, arguing that the region needs to rid itself of the domination of external powers, without necessarily being able to explain that without external powers would some internal power like Iran be tempted to play that dominating role.

And Iran clearly needs to be able to do this in order to convince its Arab neighbors and its other neighbors that it is a status quo state, that it is state that needs to be included and be part of the piece of the Middle East. But I do believe also that the neighbors need to recognize that, at the end of the day, regardless of how incompetent the current economic policies of Iran area, Iran is a regional giant, and any government in Iran, regardless of its nature, whether it's an theocracy or a monarchy or perhaps hopefully in the future a democracy will be seeking a role in the region that is commensurate with its geopolitical weight.

Clearly, everyone should be concerned to make sure that Iran does not pursue a policy in which it is seeking a role that goes beyond that, that is, illegitimate in that sense. But I don't know if that's the current situation. The situation, to me, looks more like Iran is playing a far lesser role than its geopolitical weight would be able to justify it. And much of Iran's problematic behavior in the region in relation to the United States, in relation to the Arab countries, in relations to Israel is oftentimes directly related to Iran's exclusion.

Imagine if the idea of creating peace in Europe had been based on the idea of continuing to exclude Germany, I don't think that would have been successful. I think that would have been miserably a failure, and whereas Iran certainly is not the Germany of the Middle East right now, it is difficult to be able to say that one would be able to have a geopolitical solution in the region based on the exclusion of some of the larger states of that region, because that gives these countries the incentive to undermine all those efforts until they are included. And the geopolitical imbalance that currently is existing because of Iran's exclusion, I think, is fueling all of the other conflicts in the region.

If you take a look what's happening in Lebanon. If you take a look at what's happening in Gaza, in the Palestinian territories, or in Iraq, you see that the United States and Iran are often, if not, always on opposite sides even though when they sometimes actually are in support of the same powers as they are in Iraq. And this is creating an additional level of tension in the region that can only be resolved if you have an effort to be able to create an all-inclusive regional security arrangement. That is clearly much easier said than done, but taking further steps by imposing new ineffective sanctions is certainly not the way to go.

Thank you so much. (Applause.)

MR. NEUMANN: Dr. Parsi, thank you very much for a very cogent, coherent and disciplined statement. I was so struck when you made the comment about the reservoir of good feeling for America that in the – or Americans that in the 30 years since I left Iran, that has been an almost consistent theme of travelers from America going and coming from Iran, whether it was taxi drivers or porters or academics or people in the bazaar, that as individuals they felt welcomed and they felt that America was still liked.

But it is also true that in that large part of that 30 years, we have gotten into a situation where for politicians on both sides, criticism of the other is at least free of political pain, if not a positive benefit, and concessions are dangerous, and that the ability to find both the wisdom and the courage to make concessions on each side at the same time to sustain to each other is extraordinarily difficult, difficult obviously doesn't mean it isn't something we shouldn't do.

We actually, through the discipline of the panelists, have a few moments for questions. Let me start with one that has an Iraqi dimension, and the question is that in the "New York Times" yesterday, Tom Friedman argued that Iraq has no incentive for national reconciliation unless Iraqis know the U.S. intends to leave by a specific date. Do you agree that the political surge is only possible when U.S. leaves or vows to leave?

The focus question, I'm going to let Judy start with, but then anybody else who wants to jump in – I'll restrain myself because I'm the moderator – is basically whether a date certain or a withdrawal is something which can trigger a positive political process, or the contrary, is it one which simply puts everything into suspended animation and everybody prepares for the next war?

DR. YAPHE: I can give you a really short answer and keep us within the timeframe. I stopped reading Tom Friedman because I don't consider him an expert on Middle East policy. I love his book "From Beirut to Jerusalem" – (applause). He should have stopped.

They have incentives, but they have to decide they're ready, and I don't think that the Iraqis now see or have a concept of what national reconciliation needs. They know the certain steps they should make. I mean, they know what it means in that sense, but they're not ready to take them yet, and I think for some, there isn't a sense of why do we need to do that. So that would be my short answer.

It's similar with the people who say if – in this country – who say if we set a date, that will tell them we'll get out, everything will be fine. That is also, I think, naïve. Thank you.

MR. NEUMANN: Yeah.

DR. YAPHE: Yeah.

MR. NEUMANN: I was very struck by one colleague in Iraq who said to me that we really overused this word "reconciliation" in a society where nobody has been reconciled to anybody for a very long time, that at least we ought to be talking about political accommodation, which is a concept that at least people understand. A reconciliation is one that is coming out of a very different context.

Let me go ahead with a question – by the way, on any of these – I mean, you know – just jump up and down, throw your water glass or something if you feel moved to

add to something of the other speakers. This one is particularly for Dr. Parsi. It says many, if not all, of those worried about Iran's growing power in the Middle East focus upon the words and actions of Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Could you please explain the role the president generally plays in the Iranian government scheme, particularly the power he has in military decision-making?

DR. PARSI: Thank you. This is a recurring question. It's always the same whoever is in power in Iran: what is actually the power structure over there? It seems to always be confusing in Washington, and it's actually deliberate. Iranians have a policy that they call "simulated irrationality." They want to make sure that the outside world doesn't fully understand how decisions are made inside of Iran because they believe that this will buy them security, but it also is a reaction towards past European, colonial interference in Iran in which the Iranians have concluded that because of the openness of their system, foreign powers could manipulate the political to their favor, and as a result they deliberately try to make sure that right now the outside world doesn't fully understand it, which is reflective of a very, very deep sense of mistrust that the Iranians have of the outside world in general.

I would say, though, that I think that Ahmadinejad has been made much more powerful through the media attention that he's been given, particularly in the United States, which is understandable, mindful of the comments that he is making . . . that he actually has made. Now, there's been some interesting things happening in the last couple of days with the resignation of Larijani, the national security adviser, and a calculation or speculation that this would mean that Ahmadinejad is taking greater control over the foreign policy apparatus in Iran. That may certainly be the case. It's certainly part of his agenda to be able to do so.

But there may also be other interpretations, one being that the Iranians want to send a clear signal to the Europeans, in particular, that Larijani too was seen as a hardliner when he first replaced Hassan Rohani. And no one was praising Rohani as a moderate until he was out. (Laughter.) And no one was praising Larijani as a moderate until he resigned. And by sending in a person that is accompanying Larijani to the negotiations, the Iranians may be trying to send a signal to the Europeans: choose which one you want to negotiate with, but if you don't meet Larijani halfway, Jalali will take over. [EDITOR: Dr. Ali Larijani was named as Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council by President Ahmadinejad in 2005 as one of two representatives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. In that role he served as Iran's main negotiator on foreign policy issues, including negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the status of Iran's nuclear development program. After apparent controversy over how far to go in negotiations with the IAEA, Ahmadinejad accepted Larijani's resignation in October 2007 and replaced him with Saeed Jalili, previously Deputy Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs and seen as more of an Ahmadinejad loyalist. Ironically, Larijani was seen as more of a moderate among hardliners, and his resignation – not discouraged, if not forced by Ahmadinejad – met with protests of disapproval from many members of the Iranian parliament.]

MR. NEUMANN: We –

DR. YAPHE: Could I just ask?

MR. NEUMANN: Yeah, please.

DR. YAPHE: There is a question: What is the role of the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] in policy and decision-making, in your view?

DR. PARSI: My answer to that will be that clearly they are quite, quite influential, and we see how in the negotiations that took place in Baghdad between the United States and Iran and also at the meeting in Cairo how the IRGC elements are accompanying the negotiators and sometimes the negotiators themselves either have a past or a present in the IRGC. So it's clearly a very powerful force.

However, it is not a monolithic force, and one interesting example is that the proposal that was presented by the former head of the IRGC, who's still a very powerful figure in Iran, Mohsen Rezaei, which he made in the spring of 2003, and only a couple of months or weeks later you had the 2003 May proposal that the Iranians sent over to the U.S. He was echoing that same proposal, and this is a person that has still a very, very strong role in the IRGC. So seeing them as a monolith, I think, could be somewhat dangerous.

MR. NEUMANN: We have another one here which touches on Iran, but I'm going to ask all four panelists to respond briefly – I really like you guys, this is a lot – to this question. The question itself says, what would Iran do with nuclear weapons? But I would like you to, without going into great analysis because the time does not permit, simply to give your best guess answer to three subordinate parts of that question: one is would Iran, if it had a nuclear weapon, give it to any non-Iranian power, non-governmental power; secondly, in your view, would Iran use a nuclear weapon to initiate a strike on Israel; and third, would you expect a significantly altered Iranian regional policy, if it had a nuclear weapon, as a kind of shelter or shield? I would ask on the third that you do not try to delineate in great detail what that altered regional policy might be in mercy to your colleagues.

Thank you. So who's listening? Ken, you're at the far end, you will start. Ed, you just – we'll just roll down from there.

DR. KATZMAN: I think some of the think-tanks around town have discussion groups where a lot of this has come up. The consensus seems to be that, no, it would not actually use a nuclear weapon, meaning detonate it. The consensus seems to be, no, it would not transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a protégé party, such as Hezbollah. But the clear consensus among a lot of these discussion groups is that it would indeed – the key threat is that it would alter Iran's regional policy. All the aspects that actually Trita talked about where Iran is, in my view, trying to undermine what the U.S. is trying to do in the Middle East would be enhanced because Iran would feel

protected under a shield that would prevent U.S. retaliation and therefore, Iran would be more aggressive in supporting these protégé parties against U.S. policy in the region.

DR. GHAREEB: My answer is no and no to the first and second question. Basically, I think Iran is trying to acquire nuclear capability, although they say and emphasize it's for peaceful purposes, but primarily whatever the purpose, the real purpose is, I think, deterrence down the road is real answer to this. But for the third question, I think the acquisition by Iran of nuclear ability is going to try and swarm [enlarge] Iran's regional role. It's going to make Iran the only, perhaps the major region of superpower and that is going to affect its relations with its neighbors.

DR. PARSI: I would say no and no to one and two as well. I've written about number two, Israel, quite extensively in the book *The Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.*, and I do believe that the Israelis themselves are quite aware that they do have the deterrence capability to deter any nuclear attack by Iran, particularly through their second-strike capability with the Dolphin submarines. Whatever Iran does, Iran cannot destroy Israel's capability to strike Iran back in return.

On number three, I would slightly disagree with Ken in the sense that it depends on how we understand the root of Iranian behavior right now. Is Iran inherently going to try to undermine U.S. policies under all circumstances, or is that a policy that they're using because of an absence of an agreement between the United States and Iran on a better relationship? I believe that a more powerful Iran that does have a more – a better, improved relationship with the United States would not be pursuing the same policies that it is today, and I don't think that it is so that the Iranians inherently always under all circumstances going to undermine the U.S.

DR. YAPHE: And the answer is no, no and yes. No to other – they have promised to share their nuclear knowledge, their technology with other governments in the Arab and Muslim world. For example, the offer made to Sudan and to the president of Yemen a while back was: we will share this. Now, can you imagine Sudan or Yemen – nothing personal against Yemen – but it's hard to imagine this kind of proliferation.

But let me ask this – a change – turn it around – because much of what you'll hear of here depends on the answers to these questions. Do you think the Iranians understand what deterrence means? We knew the Soviet Union understood deterrence in the same terms we did because we talked to them all the time, but not talking to Iran, in my mind, means they don't understand what we mean by deterrence and red lines and objectionable behavior and we don't understand what they need.

Second question: Is Iran a rational actor? Everyone talks about how crazy Ahmadinejad is, but this – Iran's quest for nuclear capability goes back to the mid-1980s Rafsanjani, the so-called moderate, is responsible as well. So rational actor? I'm not sure I know what that means. I do think in the third question, altered regional policy, of course. That's probably a lot that's behind it. It's important for prestige, all kinds of values, but what will be the result? I think it will trigger a new form of the – of an arms

race. We'll have more proliferators. Picture this: what Saudi Arabia, UAE, countries that have lots of money can afford to buy a whole – whole – what's the word I want? I'm sorry?

MR. NEUMANN: Technologies?

MR. : Programs?

DR. YAPHE: Programs – they could buy the whole plant, construct a whole plant here, a turnkey project. You could run it for us. We'll tell you when to use anything, but they don't have to have the technical capabilities to build, supply or maintain it. That is a very frightening thought.

MR. NEUMANN: Judy, thank you.

DR. YAPHE: Oh, I have one more point.

MR. NEUMANN: Go for it.

DR. YAPHE: That the Iranians have achieved already one of their goals in this whole nuclear debate, which is to get a lot of attention and a lot of sympathy and to really keep things boiling.

MR. NEUMANN: Thank you. I think we have really run out of our time. We certainly didn't answer all the questions. I have a stack of cards here that we were, unfortunately, unable to get to; some of them were very good questions. Even in that last discussion, certainly for every question we answer, we open new ones. Would Iran find – if it had a nuclear weapon, did it – was as little able to use it beneficially, politically as we have often that ours – I mean, we managed to have the Korean War when we were nuclear – sole, almost sole nuclear-power in deployment terms, Vietnam and a host of small wars. So there's a real question about whether they will find it as liberating as some strategists think, assuming they want it and they get it.

Certainly huge questions of whether Iranian – to what extent Iranian policy is one of theological expansion, or whether it is far more predominantly one of influence and dominance in a status sense, which give you very different outcomes in a changed policy even if it changes. And also take you back to some of the questions of what – even if you want to be more reckless, what do you have to be reckless with and who do you have to play with?

So we've certainly not exhausted the questions, but we have hopefully stirred – put in a few answers, stirred some other questions and helped a little with definition. My thanks to all the panelists, and for both your erudition and your discipline, and John, back to you.

DR. ANTHONY: Some of those questions may be revisited tomorrow under the defense cooperation focus, and possibly even in the developmental dynamics of the Iranians and the uses to which nuclear research could be put to non-lethal or non-military purposes.

We'll end this session, and switch right now to segue to the energy panel. And we're lucky to have an august group of presenters. Last year, they had a nice sense of humor. They hadn't practiced, but they say this is the first time all of us have been together since a year ago when we were all subpoenaed by the Congress. (Laughter, applause.)

DR. YAPHE: My apologies, John. (Off mike.)

(End of session.)