2018-2019 Model Arab League
BACKGROUND GUIDE
JOINT DEFENSE COUNCIL
ncusar.org/modelarableague

Original draft by Sawsan Selim, Chair of the Joint Defense Council at the 2018-2019 National University Model Arab League, with contributions from the dedicated staff and volunteers at the National Council on U.S. – Arab Relations.
Honorable Delegates,

Welcome to the 2018-2019 Model Arab League. My name is Sawsan Selim and I am honored to serve as the chair for the Joint Defense Council. I am currently double majoring in Political Science and Journalism at Georgia State University. Coming from an Arab background myself, MAL has been an excellent opportunity to project my passions, hone my skillset to utilize in my professional future, confidently participate in difficult conversations (especially about the Middle East), and overall, become a well-rounded person.

This will be my third year engaging with the MAL program and the six MAL conferences that I participated in are where I am drawing the following expectations from:

1. **Be prepared and knowledgeable in your topics/ the country you are representing.** The months preceding your conference should incorporate rigorous research and practice. Lack of information and last-minute research shows up in your performance. My suggestions are to reach out to professionals well-versed in the topics, write a position paper, and hold regular mock conferences with your fellow teammates.

2. **Stay in character and on position.** Please be reminded that you are representing the ambassador for your assigned country – you are not representing yourself nor a Eurocentric perspective on the Middle East. Minimize the interactions that your personal biases and opinions have with your performance. Put yourself in the shoes of a Middle Eastern ambassador and get to running.

3. **When debate gets heated, maintain a professional demeanor.** Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority in the JDC are binding to all; thus, heated debate is inevitable. Successful diplomats navigate debate and/or conflict in a respectful, calm demeanor without losing sight of their position and interests. I will hold you all to this standard and I expect that you hold yourselves to this standard.

4. **If you need help, reach out.** Use every resource available to you. Please do not hesitate to email me with subject heading “JDC MAL” at sselim1@student.gsu.edu with any questions.

5. **Understand that MAL is an opportunity that only some get to experience.** Above all else, this is an opportunity for you to hone your skills and engage in personal development – take advantage of this opportunity.

I am looking forward to chairing the intelligent, well-prepared, and passionate delegates that you are and witnessing the ideas and resolutions that come about during our time together.

Best wishes,
Sawsan Selim
Topic I: Analyzing previous attempts to establish a joint Arab military force to identify reasons for failure and create a framework for its establishment.

I. Introduction to the Topic

A. General Background

A comprehensive understanding of the need for and history of attempts to establish the joint Arab military force is solidified by the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation (JDEC), which, in parallel with the name of the treaty, established both the Joint Defense Council and the Economic Council. This document, drafted and originally signed by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen, laid down the framework for regional cooperation to ensure the political stability, security, and strength of each contracting member on its individual capabilities as well as the League in a united capacity. Within this framework, Article II, Article IV, and the military annex elucidate the need and intent for a joint Arab military force.

Article II establishes a collective security agreement among the contracting members in which each member is to “consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all”.1 Furthermore, Article IV of the treaty establishes and makes clear one of the key means by which the collective security agreement is to be upheld. Accordingly, “the Contracting States…shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the said armed aggression.”2 The military annex further operationalizes such an endeavor through the Permanent Military Commission which is charged with tasks that include organizing the forces of the Contracting States as well as exchanging training missions in order ensure the efficacy and mobility of the joint forces.3

Alas, a joint Arab military force that could have a military manpower availability of 129,183,640, has yet to come to fruition. The absence of the joint forces comes almost 70 years since the need for and establishment of it was called for by the Arab member states. It becomes clear that the failure surrounding the attempts at a joint Arab military force does not amount to a lack of feeling of necessity for this endeavor within member states, but rather, it is the “how” of implementation of these plans that has historically been the issue.

---


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.
B. History of the Topic

While the most important document to describe the plans for the joint Arab military is the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation (JDEC), attempts of this nature predated this document. In fact, the early manifestations of joint military plans in the Arab world that preempted the very establishment of the Joint Defense Council, was the catastrophic 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Combined forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine failed to defeat the outnumbered Israeli army, due to poor coordination and lack of a solid joint military plan. 4 Specific analysis must be placed on the Arab Liberation Army, an entity that was created by the League to counter the Holy War Army which was established by the Arab High Committee. However, when it came down to it, Arab governments took steps to prevent their own soldiers (thousands) from volunteering for either force. Out of the target of 10,000 volunteers, only 6,000 volunteered, and 3,500 were actually deployed.5

Subsequently, in 1964, during the first Arab summit, it was established that a joint Arab military command was of priority to the League. It was important enough to warrant a unanimous passing of the resolution that created what is known as the United Arab Command (UAC). Headed by Egyptian lieutenant general, Ali Amer, the command cost $15 million to create.6 The Samu Incident (Operation Shredder) of 1966 tested the UAC’s efficacy and yielded the result of inaction from the joint force.7 The world did not see anything of this nature come to fruition again until 1967, but even this was still disastrous. Essentially, following the Samu Incident, Jordan and Egypt signed a mutual defense pact to revitalize the UAC for use during the Six-Day War. Egyptian commander General Abdul Munim Riad was permitted command over the Jordanian army and Air Force and, in 72 hours, managed to lose East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 8 Similar cases can be seen in the Peninsula Shield Force, a joint force established by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in regards to the early stages of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and failure to coordinate during the 2003 Iraq war (in terms of fighting against Iraq).9

---

In March 2015, during the 32nd Arab Summit, Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi stated that “assuming the great responsibility imposed by the great challenges facing our Arab nation and threatening its capabilities, the Arab leaders had decided to agree on the principle of a joint Arab military force”. According to the projection of Egyptian officials, this force would consist of 40,000 elite troops and would be backed by jets, warships, and light armor. This was mainly stated to support the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen that includes Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, and Somalia. While this is one of the strongest joint force endeavors in the history of the League, it has severely exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and produced a strong international outcry.  

A good juxtaposition to the aforementioned joint force endeavors are the small victories of the Peninsula Field Force. This entity did engage in the liberation of Kuwait in March 1991 through a force of 3,000. It also intervened in the Arab Spring (2011) protests in Bahrain to protect its borders while it dealt with the internal crisis at hand. With the help of this coalition, the monarchy re-established its stability.

C. Finding a Solution to the Problem: Past, Present, and Future

Taking into account the goals of a NATO-like joint force and integrated Arab command structure, it is evident that substantial steps towards something of this absolute caliber has not happened yet. What the world has seen are episodic attempts at a joint military force that only includes a handful of countries. It is no surprise, then, that these attempts have failed – there is no solidified framework or unified militaristic methodology for even the episodic joint military forces to follow, let alone a joint Arab military force that incorporates all 22 member states in its language, contribution, and training.

In the history of attempts for a joint Arab force, a pattern is distinguished. A joint Arab force only works in situations in which ideologies, political positions and situations, interests, and/or geographical situations are aligned. Moving forward, please be reminded that not only are you tasked with analyzing previous attempts to establish a joint Arab military force to identify reasons for failure, but also create a framework for its establishment. Both of these objectives must be addressed in your talking points during conference as well as your resolutions.

---

II. Questions to Consider in your Research

- What are the implications, positive or negative, of a joint Arab force on my country?

- What are the implications, positive or negative, of a joint Arab force on the League as a whole? Given the current circumstances of the region, is a joint Arab force even possible?

- Has my country ever engaged in a joint force endeavor with other member states? With other states besides those in the League? What made those endeavors successful or problematic?

- What makes the joint forces of similar international organizations successful?

- What remedies can be applied to the previous failed attempts at a joint Arab force?

III. Questions a Resolution Might Answer

- Will the League carry out preliminary, extensive research on the previous attempts at a joint Arab force and other joint force endeavors? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

- Will all states be required to be members of the joint Arab force?

- How will contributions be determined?

- How will ideological/interest divides be addressed in the force? How will the League ensure that smaller states who have less influence and less to contribute are not treated unfairly in regards to the force?

- Will member states exchange information regarding military training? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

- Will the League conduct joint training exercises? How else will training be conducted?

- How will the League ensure that there is seamless fusion and unity between soldiers and military personnel in light of cultural differences, different societal norms, and/or different backgrounds?
IV. Additional Resources

- Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950
- NATO Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, Netherlands
- Gulf Cooperation Council Establishes Unprecedented Joint Military Command
- Aljazeera Middle East News
Topic II: Proposing methods of best practice for military response in dealing with civil unrest and protests.

I. Introduction to the Topic

A. General Background

The concept of “civil-military relations” (CMR) engages the scope of interaction between the armed forces of a state and the other factions of society in which the military carries out its activities. More specifically, this term explores the relationship between the civilian population, the military as an institution, and the government. There is a fundamental inherent tension that takes place in this relationship; formally, the civilians are supposed to control the military. The military has to accept that civilian authorities have the “right to be wrong”. At the end of the day, it must be understood that civilians are the ones who created and maintain the military; they decided there was a need for it, so they supply the funds, staff, and strategic direction needed for its establishment and upkeeping. However, informally, at any given point in time, the military has the capability of overpowering civilians. Because of this tension and the asymmetric relationship between civilians and the military, the two sectors choose to maintain distance from each other and take measures to prohibit encroaching of civilians in military affairs, and of the military in political affairs.

This distance becomes problematic when there is too much distance. Severe distance disallows defense of the country. After all, national security is a shared responsibility between the various societal domains, including both the civilian population and the military. Cooperation, to an extent, is absolutely vital in the interest of internal and external stability and security. In particular to the conditions of CMR in the Middle East and North Africa is that “civil-military relations have been largely reduced to a power struggle between civilian leaders and the armed forces”.

It is understandable that military crackdowns on civil unrest and demonstrations derive from the desire to maintain state legitimacy and internal security, but research has shown that in most cases, violent crackdowns or excessive uses of force are actually counter-intuitive. This kind of activity only further divides the civilian population, the military, and in some cases, the government, effectively disabling the solidification of security and stability. One may even take it a step further and say that it adds more fuel to the fire, securing a cycle of revolution, and making civil unrest inevitable.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
B. History of the Topic

It is no secret that military crackdowns on civil unrest and protest is a common phenomenon in the histories of member states of the League. However, there is an absence of analyses regarding civil-military relations theories during the 1950s to the 1990s that discussed violent military responses on protesting populations. This is because the paradigm prior to the early 2000s was dictated by military coups and the unrest surrounding those power struggles.

It is certainly worthwhile to research the civil-military relations in your country prior to the 2000s, but for the purposes of this topic, the historical analysis will concentrate on the phenomenon commonly known as the Arab Spring of 2011, in which violent and brutal crackdowns by the military on peaceful protesters was the subject of international outcry during that period. In accordance to civil-military relations theory, the Middle East during the Arab Spring was deemed as what political scientist Amos Perlmutter called the “Praetorian State” in which one notices “the rootedness of the military in the administrative structure as well as the oppressive powers of the state… like an octopus that has its tentacles in various aspects”.15

This explains the behavior of the militaries of Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, for example. In Egypt, one of the main images that circulated in 2011 was that showcasing the Egyptian military spraying (with a high-pressure hose), attacking, and/or running over (with vehicles), hundreds of peaceful protesters in prayer. In Libya and Yemen, the militaries were responsible for several bombings of mosques as well as firing assault rifles, machine guns, and heavy weaponry on peaceful protestors. In the tragic case of Syria, the military has gone to the extent of utilizing chemical warfare on its people.16

C. Finding a Solution to the Problem: Past, Present, and Future

The result of these violent crackdowns has largely been negative. The masses became united by a common dislike towards, and necessity to depose the ruler in power. Some were successful, some are still in an all-out civil war to this day and some live in failed states entirely. Nonetheless, the violent military crackdowns on peaceful protestors has only exacerbated the instability in an already insecure region. Thus, it is imperative that the League, in the interest of individual and collective security, build a method of best practices to deal with protests so as to not yield the same negative results as those in 2011.

A good place to look for strategies to implement is the history of dealing with uprisings in Oman under Sultan Qaboos. Not only was Oman one of the only states to quickly resolve civilian

16 Ibid
uprising in 2011 through peaceful measures that further secured confidence within the state, but it also demonstrated a great example of proper response in the 1970 Dhofar Rebellion. As a response to the rebellion, Sultan Qaboos instigated major reformation within the educational, social, and military sectors, coinciding these reforms with his “five-point plan” that ultimately led to the eradication of the rebellion. This “five-point plan” included the following: general amnesty to those who opposed the previous Sultan, officially incorporating Dhofar into Oman as its “southern province”, effectively utilizing military force to defeat the remaining rebels who did not accept amnesty, vigorous development across the nation, and the use of diplomacy to prevent the insurgency from receiving external aid as well as to establish the external legitimacy of Oman as a state with a new government.\(^{17}\) This counterinsurgency campaign was aided by the British Special Air Service (SAS) with the implementation of the “hearts and minds” campaign, diligent intelligence gathering, and medical assistance.\(^{18}\)

II. Questions to Consider in Your Research

- Have there been civilian uprisings in my country? How did the state and/or military deal with it?

- What do civil-military relations look like in my country?

- How closely does the military, civilian population, and the government work in cooperation with each other to maintain state security? If cooperation is minimal, what are the reasons for the distance between these sectors?

- What military protocols can be used to ensure the safety of civilians, military personnel, and state officials?

III. Questions A Resolution Might Answer

- Will there be facilitated dialogue between civilians, military personnel, and government officials to determine a method of best practices?

- In the interest of regional stability and security, will all members be required to follow the determined methods of best practice?

- Will the implementation of military protocols require an oversight committee?


IV. Additional Resources

- Civil-Military Relations in the MENA: Between Fragility and Resilience
- The Praetorian State in the Arab Spring
- Arbiters of Social Unrest: Military Responses to The Arab Spring
- Arab Charter on Human Rights
Topic III: Developing League-wide frameworks to prevent unauthorized involvement within the internal conflicts of other member states.

I. Introduction to the Topic

A. General Background

The basis of this topic originates from the League’s founding documents, including the Alexandria Protocol, the Charter of the Arab League, and the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation. In amalgamation, the language of these documents elucidates a severe respect for state sovereignty along with the strictly peaceful means through which any conflict or dissonance is to be primarily handled, even if the conflict primarily resides within the territory of a member state.

Specifically, the Alexandria Protocol, originally signed in 1944 by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to solidify intentions to create a joint Arab organization, states “in no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed” and “in no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed”. The five states during that time understood the necessity of such a provision as well as the underlying tone and method of operations that would dictate the joint Arab organization to come, while also keeping in mind that interstate conflict and unauthorized meddling with one another’s affairs only destabilizes, polarizes, and fragments the region further.\(^\text{19}\) This is reflected in the 1945 Charter of the Arab League, originally signed by Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen via Article V, which states “the recourse to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed.” This Article goes even further to delegate the responsibility for mediation and arbitration of disputes between member states to the Council, a strategy that has proved to be rather ineffective.\(^\text{20}\) Lastly, in the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, the founding document of this very Joint Defense Council, states in the first Article that “the Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, \textit{whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers}.\(^\text{21}\)


\(^{20}\) The League of Arab States. “Pact of the League of Arab States” \textit{Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy}, March 1945, 22, \url{http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp}

\(^{21}\) The League of Arab States. “Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League” \textit{Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy}, June 1950, 17, \url{http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp}
B. History of the Topic

In essence, the founding documents disallow member states to entertain a foreign policy that colludes to change the outcome of an internal conflict within a member state so as to align with the acting state’s own interests or coerce another state to act in a specific way. They also prioritize peaceful interactions with one another. Has that been the case? Overwhelmingly, the answer is no, both historically and in modern times. Most, if not all, member states are responsible for unauthorized involvement or meddling in the internal affairs of other member states so as to yield results more suitable to their interests at one time or another in their histories. This phenomenon has not escaped the modern discourse as evidenced by these few examples:

- The United Arab Emirates-led activities aimed at weakening the Farmajo administration in Somalia.\(^{22}\) This situation began when DP World, which is based in the UAE, gave a 19% stake in the Berbera port located in Somaliland to Ethiopia. Somaliland is a separatist movement that Mogadishu does not recognize the legitimacy of. Furthermore, Somalia has a history of animosity towards Ethiopia;

- The Saudi Arabia-led intervention (that also includes the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, and Sudan) in the Yemeni Civil War.\(^{23}\) Code named Operation Decisive Storm, Saudi Arabia led a military intervention in Yemen that was first a naval blockade of Houthi Rebels. The intervention now consists of ground forces in Yemen. Nonetheless, the intervention received international dissonance as it severely exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, pushing it towards being a failed state. The August 2018 airstrike hit a school bus and killed 40 children, drawing a large international outcry;

- Involvement by Iraq\(^{24}\), Egypt\(^{25}\), Saudi Arabia\(^{26}\), Qatar\(^{27}\), and other Gulf states in the Syrian Civil War. From 2011, Iraq has provided financial and material support (including airspace


use, supply trucks, and diesel fuel). Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has in recent years announced support for the Assad regime. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplied weapons and ammunition on a large scale to Syrian rebel groups;

- **The Iran-Saudi Arabia Proxy Conflict**. Iran and Saudi Arabia, in attempts to reach regional hegemony, involve themselves within the nearby conflicts, giving support to the groups that best meet their goals and interests. Some of these conflicts are the 2011-2014 Bahraini Uprising, the Syrian Civil War, the Yemeni Civil War, and the Lebanon-Saudi Arabia dispute;

- **The Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip in Palestine**. Since 2007, Israel and Egypt imposed a land, air, and sea blockade. After Hamas and Fatah formed a unified government in 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in the Battle of Gaza. Shortly afterward, the unified government dissolved as Hamas put more of its own members in the place of seats held by Fatah officials. As a result, Israel and Egypt imposed the blockade; and

- **Saudi Arabia-led blockade of Qatar**. Qatar was accused of supporting terroristic activity, violating a 2014 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Agreement, and having close diplomatic ties with Iran. As a response, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a land, sea, and air blockade on Qatar and severed diplomatic relations.

### C. Finding a Solution to the Problem: Past, Present, and Future

The League of Arab States is in need of two provisions. First, the League requires a proper and specific mediation and arbitration mechanism to solve the current conflicts that maintain the unauthorized involvement of other members states within them. It is important to note that Article 5 of the Charter limits dispute settlement by the Council to cases which do “not concern a state’s independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity” and only where “the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference”. It also focuses on “differences which threaten to lead to war between two member-states, or a member-state and a third state”.

The second provision involves punitive measures taken against member states who disrespect the sovereignty of other member states and unlawfully involve themselves within the conflicts that

---

27 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding Smith. "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms". *Financial Times*. 16 May, 2013, [http://ig-legacy.ft.com/content/86e3f28c-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de](http://ig-legacy.ft.com/content/86e3f28c-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de)


do not directly involve them. This provision is essential to regional and individual security. Otherwise, the blind eye and complacency that the League gives to this behavior will further corrupt any efforts to maintain unity, foster growth, and establish economic, political, and social stability throughout the region.

II. Questions to Consider in Your Research

- Have there been instances in which other member states involved themselves in the internal conflicts in my country? What were the impacts of this?

- What are ways that my country has handled internal disputes that involved various groups of people that can be copied and expanded at the League level?

- Are there other international organizations that have a successful mediation/arbitration mechanism to handle the current conflicts that have various state actors involved?

- How can the JDC discuss this heavy topic without deviating from diplomatic, respectful behavior while still ensuring we break ground on it?

III. Questions A Resolution Might Answer

- Does the Charter need to be amended to include Council mediation of these types of conflicts?

- Where will the mediation/arbitration take place? Who will be the mediator/arbitrator?

- What are the punitive measures that will be put in place for future unauthorized involvement of member states’ internal conflicts?

- Will a body be required to process complaints made by states who believe there is unauthorized meddling within their internal conflicts?

IV. Additional Resources

- Oman Positions on the Regional Crises

- Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: The Role of the Arab League

- Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945
• The Alexandria Protocol; October 7, 1944

• Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950

• Internal Dispute Resolution at International Organizations
Topic IV: Evaluating external threats to cyber security including but not limited to digital espionage, malware threats, and computer safety within the League.

I. Introduction to the Topic

A. General Background

Political scientists argue that war is seeing a decline in utility in the modern world.30 Within the modern technological world and the ever-expanding global market, the ill intentions of war and conflict, such as to destabilize an enemy, gain resources or confidential information, etc., can be accomplished using less costly and more available tools. This is especially the case through cyber means which include digital espionage, malware threats, and computer attacks. In the modern day, cybersecurity has become a severe concern to the international community as analysts have determined that disruptive cyber-actions have goals that surpass simple monetary motives – in fact, the goals are more aligned with disrupting normal systems, signaling the capability of the perpetrator, and demonstrating the instability of the targeted state or non-state entity. In other words, “The strategic logic of cyber has now shifted from restraint to one of disruption and constant harassment designed to signal capability and the threat of escalation.”31

The threat of cyberattacks does not exclude the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region – quite the contrary, in fact. Before delving into a discussion regarding the history of cyberattacks and cyber issues in the MENA region, it is imperative to understand the basic definition and general background of implications of cyber security, digital espionage, malware threats, and computer attacks.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, cybersecurity “is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user's assets. The general security objectives comprise availability, integrity, which may include authenticity and non-repudiation, and confidentiality.”32 The Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) defines digital or cyber espionage as “any act undertaken clandestinely or under false pretenses that uses cyber capabilities to gather (or attempt to gather) information with the intention of communicating it to the opposing party. The act must occur in territory controlled by a party to

the conflict.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines computer attacks as “action taken to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in a computer and/or computer network, or the computer and/or computer network itself.” And lastly, malware, also called malicious software, “is any software that brings harm to a computer system. Malware can be in the form of worms, viruses, trojans, spyware, adware and rootkits, etc., which steal protected data, delete documents or add software not approved by a user.”

Notice how these definitions came from various international organizations, independent organizations, and websites. The Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) brings attention to the fact that there is a lack of common definitions for cyber terms – each term means something different to each state, international organization, or other non-state entity. This will be further discussed in the Finding a Solution to the Problem section.

B. History of the Topic

The Ponemon Institute conducted a study that yielded the fact that cyber attacks and breaches are both widespread and frequently undetected in the Middle East. It also yielded results that point to problematic figures: “30% of cyberattacks in that region target operations technology, OT networks, and half of all cyberattacks there are against oil & gas networks”. This study was conducted very recently, which is a testament to the severity of cyberattacks in the history of the MENA region. This high prevalence of cyber security issues in modern times comes despite the availability of new technologies and systems to set-up proper cyber safety protocols.

In 2012, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt were attacked by the “Flame” virus, which maintained severe espionage capabilities, like recording conversations, gathering data files, remotely changing settings on computers, taking screen shots and copying instant messaging chats. Moreover, one of the most destructive private business cyberattacks was the 2012 Shamoon attack, which was a computer virus that shut down and impacted entities for 48 hours. Additionally, in November 2017, the Saudi Arabian government was hit with the Powershell malware in an attempt to destruct government computers through email phishing

---

34 abid
techniques. In the United Arab Emirates during March of 2017, hackers installed skimmers into ATMs throughout the UAE and managed to steal one million in AED.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{C. Finding a Solution to the Problem: Past, Present, and Future}

At the very minimum, there are three needed aspects to the solution that must come about. Firstly, as aforementioned, various states and non-state entities lack concrete, universal definitions of key cyber issues such as digital espionage, malware threats, and computer attacks. The League is no exception to this. This council must define what is considered to be/what elements go into digital espionage, malware threats, computer attacks, and other cybersecurity issues this council deems important to address.

The second aspect of the solution involves \textit{preventative} measures and security protocols to address cyber issues. This will most likely require extensive research and information gathering regarding the cyber capabilities of potential perpetrators. The third aspect of the solution involves \textit{proactive} measures and security protocols to address cyber issues. This aspect involves handling any ongoing cybersecurity issues.

\textbf{II. Questions to Consider in Your Research}

- Does my country have any cyber terms defined in their own documents and/or legislation? Can these definitions be applied to all members of the League?

- Has my country taken steps to address cybersecurity issues, both in terms of preventative and proactive measures?

- Has my country ever experienced a cyberattack of some sort, whether it be within the private, public, or governmental domain?

- Are there any other international organizations that have successful cybersecurity protocols/programs that the League can tweak according to Arab needs?

\textbf{III. Questions A Resolution Might Answer}

- What are the established definitions of the important cyber terms associated with this topic that will be universal throughout the League?

- What measures can be put in place to prevent and combat cybersecurity breaches?

• Will the measures decided upon be implemented throughout the League or will it be implemented on a case-by-case/as needed basis?

• Should participating and implementing cybersecurity protocol be obligatory?

• How will these endeavors be funded? Where will the sensitive information regarding these protocols be housed? What kind of security will be set up to ensure that sensitive information does not get into the wrong hands?

IV. Additional Resources

• Cyber Definitions
  This is a great resource that has a collection of the definitions of cyber terms to various state and non-state entities.

• Arab Information and Communication Technologies Organization

• The Prevention of Information Technology Crimes, Federal Law 2006, UAE

• Best Cybersecurity Conferences in the Middle East 2018-2019

• ITU National Cybersecurity/CIIP Self-Assessment Tool